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1General introduction
"Human beings are not only weird animals who construct systems of 
representation, but also still weirder ones who have emotions about 
what they have constructed."
(Stenning 2002, 260)
What do emotions tell us? How can they give us any kind of 
information? Is there any way emotions can help us make sense of 
things? All these questions concern the epistemic roles of emotions, 
and have recently become the subject of a disciplinary broad wave of 
research interest. The growing interest in the topic is not surprising, 
given the increased awareness of the interrelation between cognition 
and emotion in the human mind. In the past, higher level cognitive 
processes were largely studied as separate from affective processes, as 
if they were immune from their influence, or as if affective 
components were just a source of noise to be controlled. This division 
may have come from the traditional conceptual differentiation 
between reason and passion, with its implicit hierarchical distinction. 
More recent approaches, however, revealed a dynamic interaction 
between cognitive and affective variables, between reasoning and 
feeling, and between subcortical and cortical regions of the brain. In 
light of this, it appears evident that an appropriate study of cognitive 
activities cannot avoid examining their emotional components. By the 
same measures, epistemic processes, such as acquiring knowledge, 
understanding and reasoning, traditionally labeled as cognitive, 
cannot be adequately considered in isolation from emotional 
elements. On the contrary, given the pervasiveness of emotions, 
2failing to factor them in leaves important aspects of these processes 
unattended. The work of this thesis is motivated exactly by this 
perspective. Specifically, in this thesis, I examine from a 
philosophical viewpoint, how emotions intervene in a few epistemic 
activities, what are their epistemic roles, and how they perform them. 
My objective is to show that emotions have an epistemic "value", that 
is, they can give a positive, distinctive, and even essential contribution 
to certain epistemic processes within particular contexts. 
Since emotions can serve a great variety of epistemic roles and 
across multiple domains, addressing the epistemic value of emotions 
within a doctoral dissertation necessarily requires adopting a definite 
perspective and making a conscious selection.  Thus, this thesis 
focuses on a few of the ways in which emotions can be epistemically 
valuable, specifically, on their contribution to the acquisition of 
knowledge, and to the processes of understanding, argumentation 
and reasoning. Moreover, this contribution is not considered in 
general terms, but in reference to particular domains, such as the 
political context, the narrative setting, and specific ethical issues. In 
the four papers that make up this dissertation, four particular 
questions about the epistemic value of emotions will be addressed, 
respectively:
1) What kind of knowledge can emotions provide to make citizens 
more politically sophisticated? 
2) What part do "feeling" and "inferring" emotions play in the 
readers' understanding of literary narratives?
3) Are the arguments presenting emotional appeals necessarily 
manipulative, or can they be epistemically beneficial?
4) How can the feeling of belonging ground the value of national 
identity, and how can it affect reasoning about immigration 
policies?
It should be noted that the four papers, each forming one 
chapter of this thesis, include introductions of their own. Therefore, 
this general introduction will be limited to material that is not 
covered in the individual papers, but that is nevertheless relevant to 
appreciate the connection between them, and the thesis as a whole. 
First, the theoretical landscape of the relation between 
emotions and epistemology will be introduced (Section 1). Second, it 
will be explained how this relation can be fruitfully unfolded by 
examining one feature of emotions, namely their evaluative character 
3(Section 2), and by showing how this feature grounds the epistemic 
relevance of emotions (Section 3). Specifically, it will be examined 
how emotions, in virtue of their evaluative character, can offer an 
epistemic contribution to the processes of knowledge (Section 3.1), 
understanding (Section 3.2), argumentation (Section 3.3), and 
reasoning (Section 3.4). In this connection, the key themes around 
which the thesis is organized will be presented. Moreover, it will be 
shown how referring to particular domains, such as the political 
context, the narrative setting, and specific ethical issues, is 
instrumental to articulate what the epistemic value of emotions 
consists in. Finally, a central aspect of this thesis will be highlighted, 
namely the importance of empirical findings for the formulation of 
sensible hypotheses about the epistemic value of emotions (Section 
4).
1.  Emotions and epistemology
The relationship between emotions and epistemology is a key element 
in the study of the epistemic value of emotions, but it is not directly 
addressed in this thesis, as it is rather taken for granted. In this 
section, I will briefly outline the terms of this relationship, to 
contextualize the work of this thesis in respect to the research that 
has been previously conducted, and to highlight the research 
achievements that have made this work possible.
Discussing the relation between emotions and epistemology 
requires to consider two different perspectives, namely, the place of 
emotions in epistemology on one side, and the place of epistemology 
in the philosophy of emotions on the other. I identify the rediscovery 
of emotions in the fields of neuroscience and cognitive sciences as a 
decisive factor both for including emotions in epistemology 
discussions, and for including epistemic considerations in the 
philosophy of emotions. Studies in these fields have shown that 
emotions are crucially involved in processes commonly regarded as 
alien to them, such as reasoning and decision making.1 Moreover, the 
results of experiments where participants were presented with 
deductive reasoning exercises, revealed that emotions do not 
1 Pivotal, in this respect, is the research conducted by Damasio, the most overly 
cited author in the philosophical (and probably non-philosophical as well) academic 
literature on emotions.
4necessarily impair cognitive performances, but rather, they improve 
their outcomes under certain conditions.2 What epistemology and the 
philosophy of emotions retained from these studies does not concern 
directly the specific function of emotions for undertaking certain 
tasks, but rather their relation to, and interaction with, the cognitive 
domain. In this connection, the word "cognitive" is not supposed to 
recall to the so-called "cognitive theories" of emotions, as opposed to 
non-cognitive theories. Rather, following Debes (2009), emotions can 
be said to be cognitive  in a wide sense because, besides any further 
characterization, they involve cortical brain states or processes, and 
therefore they are part of our mental life. The recognition of emotions 
as part of our mental life, and as interacting with our mental states, is 
what, I believe, paved the way to the inclusion of emotions in 
epistemology, and, vice versa, to the inclusion of epistemological 
considerations in the philosophy of emotions.
As for epistemology, it was traditionally conceived as a 
normative discipline, exploring the grounds and the validity of 
knowledge in propositional terms: in this context, since emotions 
were judged to be particularly fallible, they were not taken into any 
regard within its realm, except than as deceivers of cognitive 
functions (Brun and Kuenzle 2008). An important development in 
epistemology, that opened the way to emotions, is the shift of the 
central epistemic goal from the static ideal of knowledge to 
understanding as an activity. Without delving into details beyond the 
scope of this introduction, what was suggested by a few scholars, is 
that analyzing the concept of knowledge in itself is idle, and imposes 
inapplicable standards to people's inquiry; rather, what seem most 
relevant are the processes through which people strive to understand, 
and these do not include only propositional components, such as 
judgments and assertions, but also values, rules, categories and 
methods (Hookway 1990, Goodman and Elgin 1988, Elgin 1996). This 
move towards epistemic processes and activities lead to a broader 
understanding of the area of competence of epistemology, including 
2 See Blanchette and Richards (2004) for a comprehensive review.
5mental states of epistemic agents that were previously disregarded: 
among them, emotions were included as well.3 
As for the philosophy of emotions, cognitive theories and 
perceptual theories are the ones keener to account for emotions' 
epistemic characteristics. Both these families of theories conceive of 
emotions as mental states, but they conceptualize their epistemic 
features in different terms. Cognitive theories, on one hand, claim 
that emotions are reducible to, or have constitutive components in 
propositional attitudes, such as judgments and beliefs. These 
attitudes are described as evaluative, in the sense that they concern 
evaluative properties; for example, to feel fear is to judge that 
something is dangerous (e.g. Solomon 1988, Nussbaum 2004). 
Similarly, in psychology, beliefs have been claimed to be part of 
emotions as cognitive kinds of appraisals: according to this view, 
emotional responses start with the cognitive processing of an event or 
a situation as relevant to an individual's concerns (e.g. Frijda et al 
2000, Clore & Gasper 2000). It is easy to see how, in the cognitive 
framework, emotions have an inherent epistemic character, as they 
can give rise to new beliefs and prompt the change of existing ones, 
by modifying their strength or revising them completely.
Whereas for the cognitive theories, the close relation between 
emotions and beliefs is what grounds emotions' epistemic properties, 
perceptual theories ground these properties in the assimilation of 
emotional responses to perceptual states. Given the central 
importance of sense perception as a paradigmatic source of belief and 
contributor to justification, knowledge, and understanding in 
epistemology, conceiving  of emotions as perceptual states has 
obvious and important implications for the epistemology of emotions 
(Pelser 2014). Indeed, according to the perceptual theories, just as 
having a visual experience of a red apple is a defeasible reason to 
judge that there is a red apple on my desk, in the same way, my 
experience of guilt is a defeasible reason to judge that I did something 
wrong (e.g. Tappolet 2016, Döring 2003). The popularity of perceptual 
theories of emotions has attracted criticism (Salmela 2011, Brady 2013, 
Deonna and Teroni 2015), but has also prompted further interest in 
3 I do not include here examples of the first studies about emotions in 
epistemology, because it is beyond the scope of the present introduction. An 
overview can be found in Brun and Kuenzle (2008).
6emotions' epistemology. Questions have been raised on the reliability 
of emotions as a source of justification, and how this reliability 
depends on the appropriateness of emotions themselves (e.g. Deonna 
and Teroni 2012). Here, I will not tackle these questions in detail, but 
I will address two points in relation to them, as they are relevant to 
frame the work in this thesis. The first point concerns the evaluative 
dimension of emotions, whereas the second one concerns their 
epistemic relevance.
2.  The evaluative character of emotions
Although different theoretical descriptions of emotions entail 
different claims about their specific epistemic functions, there is one 
feature of emotions, namely their evaluative character, that I consider 
as the most fundamental for characterizing the epistemic relevance of 
emotions in general. All the major theoretical accounts of emotions 
acknowledge emotions' evaluative nature. As was previously 
mentioned, cognitive theories define emotions as judgments with 
propositional content about their evaluative properties (e.g. to fear 
something is to judge that something is dangerous), whereas 
perceptual theories describe emotions as perceptions of evaluative 
properties (e.g. to fear something is to perceive the dangerousness of 
something). Moreover, feeling theories (e.g. James 1884; Kriegel 2014) 
identify emotions with bodily changes as automatic responses to 
evaluative properties (e.g. to fear something is to undergo the 
physiological changes associated with fear in response to the 
dangerousness of something). The evaluative character of emotions is 
highlighted also by the attitudinal theory (Deonna and Teroni 2015), 
and by enactivist theories as well (e.g. Ellis 2005, Thompson & 
Colombetti 2012).
I will not report additional theories here, nor will I go into 
details about any of these theoretical characterizations of emotion. My 
simplistic illustration of a few of them is intended only to show how, 
despite the different theoretical accounts, emotions are generally 
regarded as signaling some evaluative properties of their objects, i.e. 
properties that represent the value that some features of those objects 
have for the agent. Psychological theories of emotions, and, in 
particular, the so-called "appraisal" theories are based on a similar 
idea. According to these theories, "emotions are adaptive responses, 
7which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that are 
significant for the organism's well-being" (Moors et al. 2013, 119). 
Leaving aside whether these appraisals have a cognitive nature or not, 
as different theories propose different solutions, the fundamental 
claim of these types of theories is that emotions signal what it is in the 
environment that may affect the agents' concerns, including needs, 
attachments, values, goals, and in general "anything that an individual 
cares about" (Moors et al. 2013, 120). In order to explain how the 
evaluative character of emotions can ground their epistemic 
relevance, it is essential to clarify how epistemic relevance is defined.
3.  What is epistemic relevance?
As mentioned above, developments in epistemology have extended 
the area of competence of this discipline from the static concept of 
knowledge to the activity of understanding. The present thesis 
embraces an even broader conception, including among what counts 
as epistemically relevant, not only what contributes to knowledge and 
understanding, but also to reasoning and argumentation. In the 
following, I will illustrate how the evaluative character of emotions is 
crucial for their epistemic contribution to these processes.4
4 The ways in which emotions can be epistemically relevant are not exhausted by 
my list. There are indeed other important epistemic features of emotions that I do 
not tackle in this thesis. One of them is for instance, the motivational force of 
emotions: emotions such as curiosity, interest, surprise can motivate people to 
learn, but also disappointment or doubt can prompt critical evaluation and further 
research (e.g. Hookway 2000, Dohrn 2008). Moreover, a growing body of literature 
has examined the so-called "epistemic emotions", that is, emotions about the 
subject's own mental capacities and processes (de Sousa 2008, Michaelian and 
Arango-Muñoz 2014). Among them, there is, for instance, the "feeling of knowing", 
namely the intellectual satisfaction that motivates the endorsement of an 
explanation (Gopnik 2000). Along the same lines, psychological studies have 
detected a "feeling of logicality", by showing a correlation between increased 
autonomic arousal (measured through skin conductance) and syllogisms in which 
believability and logical validity conflicted (De Neys, Moyens and Vansteenwegen 
2010). These studies, and more generally the studies on the motivational force of 
emotions and on epistemic emotions, are certainly important, especially for 
showing the deep intertwining between emotional and cognitive processes. In this 
thesis, however, I do not tackle them, as I focus on the epistemic contribution of 
emotions in other terms, namely knowledge, understanding, reasoning and 
argumentation.
83.1 Knowledge
I intend the epistemic contribution of emotions to knowledge, as 
their capacity to provide access to beliefs that would be inaccessible 
otherwise. This topic is addressed in the first chapter of the thesis. In 
this paper, I argue that emotions are the source of a distinct kind of 
knowledge, which I call "evaluative knowledge". I define "evaluative 
knowledge" as the knowledge about evaluative properties of objects, 
and I argue that, since emotions are evaluative in character, they can 
offer this kind of knowledge, by disclosing these properties. 
Discussing the epistemic relevance of emotions as a source of 
knowledge raises two main issues: first, whether or not the kind of 
knowledge that emotions provide is reliable, and second, whether it is 
only accessible through emotions.  Since I address both issues in the 
paper more specifically, here I will only frame the discussion in more 
general terms.
As for the first issue, the reliability of emotions as a source of 
knowledge has been doubted, on the ground that emotions easily lead 
to wishful thinking and self-deception (Frijda and Mesquita 2000 p 
55). As noted by Brady (2013), emotions are not sufficient for justifying 
evaluative beliefs, as they need further reasons or evidence. For 
instance, if a noise downstairs, in the night scares me, fear alone 
cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence to believe that I am in 
danger; rather, further evidence is needed, in order to confirm or 
deny the accuracy of my initial emotional appraisal. This criticism 
points out that emotions, by themselves, may lead to distorted and 
unwarranted beliefs and, therefore, the evaluative knowledge, which 
they provide, may not be epistemically reliable. I argue that this 
conclusion can be challenged, by adopting a coherentist account of 
epistemic justification. 
Specifically, drawing from Elgin (2008) and de Sousa (2008), I 
argue that, although emotions in themselves are not sufficient to 
ground evaluative knowledge about their objects, emotions can do so 
together with other coherent epistemic attitudes about those objects. 
For example, a feeling of repulsion alone is not enough to ground the 
evaluative judgment that D. J. Trump is dishonest. However, this 
judgment can be grounded in the feeling together with the beliefs 
based on further information about his conduct and his felonies. 
9Under a coherentist theory of justification, the fact that emotions may 
bring about biased beliefs does not necessarily undermine the role of 
emotions as conveyers of knowledge, because this content should not 
merely be accepted on its own, but rather, should be considered in 
conjunction with non-emotional attitudes (i.e. other beliefs and 
values). The idea, simply put, is that, the evaluative content suggested 
by an emotion should be assessed in respect to the agent's values and 
beliefs, and should be accepted only if it results to be coherent with 
them. I will talk more extensively about the relationship between 
emotions and values, as well about its connection to the coherentist 
account of epistemic justification, in section 3.3.
Having assumed a coherentist account of epistemic 
justification to ground the reliability of emotions as a source of 
evaluative knowledge, the second question, as mentioned above, is 
whether emotions are the only way to access this knowledge. For 
instance, even if my feeling of repulsion towards D. J. Trump is 
included among the epistemic attitudes grounding my evaluative 
judgment of him as dishonest, wouldn't this judgment be the same 
without it? Drawing from Goldie (2002), I argue that there is a 
qualitative difference between the evaluative knowledge achieved 
with and without the contribution of emotions. In the first chapter of 
the dissertation, I focus in particular on evaluative knowledge in 
politics. I will briefly summarize my argument in the following.
I argue that an emotional reaction towards a political object not 
only signals certain evaluative properties of the object, as they could 
be attributed to it without any emotional involvement, but it signals 
that the agent personally, with her values and beliefs, is sensitive to 
these properties. I argue that this distinctive contribution is relevant, 
not merely in virtue of its content, but because of its inclusion in the 
integrative process, aimed at assessing coherence, through which the 
agent's evaluative knowledge is formed. Indeed, by including the 
emotional component, the values and beliefs that the agent holds in 
relation to a certain political object, are confronted with their actual 
import for the agent with respect to the object. As a result, the 
opinion that the agent forms, is characterized as really invoking, and 
not just ideologically or superficially reflecting, her values and beliefs. 
This makes the agent's evaluative knowledge more sophisticated, and 
it grounds, I claim, the epistemic relevance of emotions as a source of 
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knowledge in the political context. I will say more about the concept 
of political sophistication is section 3.4.
3.2 Understanding
In order to discuss the contribution of emotions to understanding, a 
clarification on the definition of understanding is necessary. 
Although there is much debate over the nature of understanding in 
current epistemology, most scholars agree that understanding is 
basically appreciating connections. Knanvig, for instance, defines 
understanding as "an internal grasping or appreciation of how the 
various elements in a body of information are related to each other in 
terms of explanatory, logical, probabilistic, and other kinds of 
relations" (Kanvig 2003, 192-193). Likewise, Roberts and Wood (2007, 
45) argue that understanding essentially involves "grasping 
connections" and "fitting things together". 
The contribution of emotions to understanding is addressed in 
the second chapter of the thesis. In this paper, I examine a specific 
type of understanding, namely the understanding of literary 
narratives. The narrative mode of understanding has been 
highlighted as a particularly relevant one, for the human tendency to 
explain everyday phenomena and other's people actions in a narrative 
form (Goldie 2004). Following Carroll (2001) and Velleman (2003), I 
maintain that understanding a narrative consists in grasping a 
"narrative connection" between the narrated events, that is, to see 
that these events are meaningfully related to each other, in such a way 
that they form a narrative. In the paper, I commit to the enactivist 
theory of emotions proposed by Ralph Ellis (2005), as I argue that this 
account is the one that can best explain the epistemic contribution of 
emotions to narrative understanding. However, in order to 
comprehend the epistemic contribution of emotions to understanding 
in general, it is not necessary to presuppose an enactivist theory, but 
only to consider one feature of emotions, that is endorsed by other 
theories as well, namely, their evaluative character. I will summarize 
my proposal in the following.
Since understanding consists in grasping connections, I argue 
that emotions contribute to understanding by contributing to the 
grasping of connections, and that they can do so in virtue of their 
evaluative character. Specifically, since emotions are evaluative in 
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nature, they make salient certain goals or values, and by doing so, 
they acquire an anticipatory character, because they set a goal/value 
to be reached, and thus they trace a certain direction. For instance, if 
an agent feels fear, the direction set by this emotion is (presumably) 
towards soothing this state: by feeling fear, the goal/value of safety is 
made salient, and the agent anticipates being safe as the goal or value 
to be reached. My claim is that the emotional response to a certain 
event makes the agent process subsequent events in light of the goal 
that that the emotional response highlights. In the case of fear, the 
agent processes subsequent events in light of the goal of safety, thus 
connecting them to the previous event. Since understanding consists 
in grasping connections, the emotion contributes to the agent's 
understanding of certain events, by making the agent process them as 
connected to each other.
3.3 Argumentation 
I identify two further ways in which emotions are epistemically 
relevant, that is, by contributing to the processes of argumentation 
and reasoning. These processes have been the object of extensive 
research, and in this thesis, I examine only a few aspects of them. 
Specifically, I focus on how emotions intervene in evaluative 
arguments, how they ground the values at the core of these 
arguments, and on the role that emotions play in reasoning about 
issues involving this kind of arguments. As will appear, elements that 
are related to the evaluative character of emotions, and that are key 
for explaining the contribution of emotions to knowledge and 
understanding, also explain the contribution of emotions to 
argumentation and reasoning.
In the third chapter, I analyze the role of emotions in 
evaluative arguments, and I focus specifically on the evaluative 
arguments used in politics. As I will refer more extensively to the 
political domain in the paper, here I will just introduce my view on 
evaluative arguments in general. I define evaluative arguments as 
arguments supporting an evaluative conclusion (i.e. a normative 
statement) by presenting some factual evidence coupled with a 
goal/value. For instance, given the factual evidence that smoking 
damages health, if my goal/value is being healthy, then the evaluative 
conclusion that I shouldn't smoke is supported. Clearly, keeping 
12
stable the factual evidence, the supported conclusion changes, 
depending on the relevant goal/value. For instance, if my goal is 
getting sick, then, the evidence that smoking damages health, 
becomes a reason to smoke. 
My claim is that emotional reactions influence evaluative 
arguments, by making salient certain goals or values over others. I 
illustrate this by referring to the responses of fear and compassion 
elicited by certain emotional appeals. For instance, depicting refugees 
as potential terrorists is an emotional appeal aimed to elicit fear. Fear, 
as mentioned before in illustrating the evaluative character of 
emotions, makes one specific goal/value more salient than others, 
namely, safety: by eliciting fear in relation to immigrants, people are 
led to worry about their safety. Let's suppose that this salient 
goal/value is coupled with a certain factual evidence, for instance, 
about the high number of refugees asking for asylum. Then, the 
supported evaluative conclusion will be in favor of restrictive 
immigration policies. Clearly, changing the emotion, will change the 
salient goal/value, and thus the conclusion. For instance, by depicting 
refugees as innocent victims, compassion is evoked, which makes 
salient the goal of solidarity with them. In this way, an appeal to 
compassion is used to support open border policies. 
Although the evaluative character of emotions in general, 
explains how emotions work within evaluative arguments, I identify a 
difference in the use of emotions within such arguments. As was 
pointed out before, the evaluative content suggested by the emotion 
can be epistemically justified only if it is assessed in respect to the 
agent's other attitudes, and it results to be coherent with them. When 
an emotional appeal aims to evoke a certain emotion, it may either 
promote the assessment and coherent integration of the goal made 
salient by the emotion or it may not. Such assessment, for instance, is 
promoted when the emotion evoked is itself "grounded", that is, 
when reasons for the appropriateness of the emotion to the situation 
are presented. For instance, the fear in relation to migrants in the 
appeal mentioned above, might be grounded in actual or in biased 
and fabricated evidence. Moreover, the value that it makes salient (i.e. 
safety), might either be assessed with respect to the agent's other 
values, or not. Further and more detailed examples illustrating this 
difference between emotional appeals are presented in the paper.
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Whereas the argument presented in the third chapter rests on 
the capacity of emotions to make salient certain goals/values, the 
argument presented in the fourth chapter rests on their capacity to 
ground goals/values. "Making salient" is not the same as "grounding". 
On the one hand, saying that emotions make salient a value means 
that they make more apparent the importance of something that is 
important already. On the other hand, saying that emotions ground a 
value indicates that the emotion is what makes something important, 
that is, what makes something a value. Whether or not emotions can 
ground values is a topic of great interest in the philosophy of 
emotions and in moral philosophy as well. In this thesis, I do not 
enter this debate. However, in the fourth chapter I examine one 
specific value, namely the value of national identity, and I argue that 
it is grounded on a specific emotion, namely the feeling of belonging. 
My claim is that the valuable character of national identity is due 
specifically to its capacity of providing people with a feeling of 
belonging to their national community. In the paper, I examine how 
the value of national identity is appealed to in arguments favoring 
restrictive immigration policies. I will say more about this in the next 
section.
3.4 Reasoning
Given the place of emotions in evaluative arguments, emotions result 
to be involved in reasoning about issues that involve this kind of 
arguments. As was illustrated above, evaluative arguments are 
arguments that support normative conclusions, that is, they are about 
what should and should not be done, what is and is not preferable. 
As such, evaluative arguments are typical of discussions about issues 
with ethical and political relevance. Although emotions inevitably 
intervene in these discussions, there is a certain resistance to 
acknowledging their presence as legitimate. This is likely due to the 
traditional depiction of emotions as partial and irrational, which 
would make them epistemically unsuitable and even detrimental in 
discussions about normative questions. Leaving aside the debate on 
the place of emotions and their epistemic features in ethics in 
general, as this is not tackled in the thesis, I will discuss their place in 
politics, as this is relevant to three out of the four dissertation 
chapters.
14
Modern liberal theory has promoted a rationalist conception of 
politics, where normative ideals such as "public reason" (Rawls 1993) 
and "communicative rationality" (Habermas 1984) regulate the public 
debate in terms of exchanges based solely on logical principles and 
rules of evidence. The political theorists following this tradition have 
been mainly concerned with the improvement of adequate reasoning 
skills in order to achieve an ideal form of deliberation, disregarding 
any emotional contribution to it; they considered emotions as 
irrational and thus as either epistemically irrelevant, or even 
damaging for the political discourse (Nie, Junn & Stehlik-Barry 1996, 
Callan 1997). The plausibility of the rationalist position, which 
maintains the exclusion of emotions from the political domain, has 
been challenged by the studies showing that emotions are part and 
parcel of human reasoning, and they are engaged in our deliberative 
assessments in the political context (Marcus 2010, Redlawsk 2006). In 
philosophy, liberal rationalism has been dismissed not only as a 
highly idealistic notion, but also because it disregards the role of 
emotion in argumentation and public discourse (Benhabib 1992, 
Young 1996, Hall 2005, Kingston & Ferry 2009, Dowding 2016). 
Along the same lines, in this thesis, and specifically in the first 
and third chapter, I argue for the epistemic relevance of emotions in 
politics, by appealing to the notion of political sophistication. Political 
sophistication has been defined in political theory as comprising not 
only the knowledge about political facts, but also the capacity to link 
one's political preferences to one's values (Luskin 2002, Schreiber 
2007). I call the latter "evaluative knowledge" and, as illustrated 
above, I argue that emotions can provide a relevant and distinctive 
contribution to it, thus serving a positive function for the citizen's 
political sophistication. What my discussion of political sophistication 
shows is that emotions cannot and should not be excluded from 
political reasoning; rather, instead of dismissing them as intrinsically 
interfering with reasoning and knowledge acquisition, the conditions 
under which emotions offer a valid epistemic contribution should be 
specified. As illustrated above, I propose to determine these 
conditions within a coherentist framework of epistemic justification. 
In the next section, I will explain what I find particularly appealing 
about this framework.
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The fourth chapter of this thesis, as mentioned, is concerned 
with one peculiar issue, that has both political and ethical relevance, 
namely immigration. As with other political and ethical issues, 
concerns about the inclusion of emotions in the public debate on 
immigration have been expressed, especially because of the dangers 
of emotional rhetoric. Such rhetoric is believed to distort and 
trivialize the reality and the complexity of the issue at stake, as well as 
to obstruct the public's sound judgment. Indeed, research on the 
persuasive power of emotional messages has shown that they can 
modify people's attitudes independently of one's rational interests 
and deliberations (Cassino & Lodge 2007, Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir 
2000). In this respect, studies on anti-immigrant propaganda have 
shown its effectiveness in promoting anti-immigrant attitudes, by 
mobilizing emotions such as anger and fear towards migrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees (Brader et al 2008; Hodge 2015; Tazreiter 
2015, Lecheler et al 2015). 
This thesis puts forward two claims relevant to the role of 
emotions in reasoning about immigration. The first one, covered in 
chapter 3, is that the rhetorical use of emotional appeals is not 
necessarily negative: rather, as illustrated in section 3.3, the epistemic 
contribution of these appeals depends on whether their integration 
with further mental attitudes is promoted or not. The second point, 
addressed in chapter 4 and presented in section 3.3, is that one of the 
values mostly appealed to in the immigration debate (i.e. national 
identity) is fundamentally constituted by an emotional component 
(i.e. the feeling of belonging).
4.  Accounting for empirical data
One crucial aspect of this thesis is its attention to empirical data. The 
philosophical relevance of empirical findings is the object of heated 
debate in philosophy: here, I will not introduce the debate, but I will 
outline my position, as this will help to make sense of the approach 
that characterizes this thesis. I maintain that considering empirical 
data is not only desirable, but even necessary in order to formulate 
and test sensible philosophical hypotheses, especially if these 
hypotheses concern the epistemic relevance of emotions. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, the very possibility of an epistemology of emotions 
has been promoted by the scientific studies suggesting a conception 
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of emotions as mental states. The reason why I find the coherentist 
model of epistemic justification particularly appealing is specifically 
its conformity to this conception: since emotions are mental states 
interacting with other mental states, it seems only reasonable for the 
content they convey to not be considered in isolation, but rather in 
connection with that brought about by other mental states as well. 
The adoption of a coherentist model of epistemic justification is not 
the only element that takes empirical findings into account within the 
present thesis. 
Considering empirical data, I maintain, is essential for 
conducting philosophy about phenomena, such as emotions and 
epistemic processes, that have psychological and behavioral 
implications, and that, as such, are object of experimental inquiry. 
Historically, philosophers who studied phenomena of this kind, did 
not close their eyes to their observable effects. The body of empirical 
data that is now available constitutes just further evidence, besides 
what can be ordinarily observed. This is why ignoring these data 
would be equivalent, for any philosopher, to just close their eyes. In 
this respect, considering the epistemic value of emotions in relation 
to specific domains, is what has allowed me to avail this thesis with 
the consideration of empirical data. 
Indeed, scientific studies that investigate the role of emotions 
in processes such as the acquisition of knowledge, understanding, 
argumentation and reasoning, are not about the abstract and ideal 
performance of these processes, but about how these processes are 
carried out in specific situations. This is why, in the first and in the 
third chapter, I consider how emotions contribute to the acquisition 
of knowledge and to argumentation in the political context 
specifically. This allows me to inform my philosophical hypotheses 
with empirical studies about, for instance, the contribution of 
emotions to political sophistication, and with empirical models about 
the function of emotional appeals. Likewise, in the second chapter, I 
do not address how emotions affect understanding in general, but 
rather in relation to literary narrative: this is an area where emotional 
states are highly involved, and where those states are empirically 
tested relatively to their effects on text comprehension. Even in the 
last chapter, empirical findings are reckoned, concerning the 
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influence of national feelings for the formation of attitudes about 
immigration. 
It is still quite common for philosophers who aim to make their 
theories about emotions widely applicable, to make only a few 
purportedly uncontentious assumptions about human emotional 
dispositions, deliberately avoiding to confront more specific empirical 
considerations. Furthermore, they tend to devolve the task of 
worrying about the realizability of their theories on to psychologists 
and political scientists, and to draw a sharp line between 
philosophical and empirical issues. In this thesis, I tried to move away 
from this approach, emphasizing instead the importance of an 
empirically informed analysis, in order to provide an adequate 
philosophical examination of the emotions and their epistemic roles.
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Chapter 1
The Epistemic Value of Emotions in Politics
(Published in Philosophia 2017)
Abstract 
In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political 
facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about 
those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic 
and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, 
although emotions in themselves are not sufficient to ground evaluative 
knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of 
further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to 
the political part, I argue that the contribution of emotions to evaluative 
knowledge about political facts, is indeed politically valuable. To develop 
my argument, I first show that an evaluative kind of knowledge is 
relevant for reaching a sophisticated level of political cognition. Second, 
I show that emotions contribute distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I 
conclude that, when emotional experiences towards political events are 
coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can 
ground a distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such 
knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political perspective.
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Introduction
History is studded with political events that have prompted pervasive 
emotional reactions. The election of D. J. Trump, Brexit, and the 
Syrian refugee crisis are just a few contemporary examples. With 
respect to these sorts of event, studies on the role of emotions in 
politics have shown interesting results. For example, Marcus and 
colleagues (2007) found that distinct emotions activate different 
patterns of information processing and decision making, resulting in 
major effects on political behaviors and attitudes, such as, to name 
just a few, voting, candidate evaluation, opinion formation, and 
political participation. In this paper I will not delve into any of these 
phenomena in particular, but rather I will examine one epistemic 
aspect that characterizes the involvement of emotions in the political 
context. Specifically, I will focus on the kind of knowledge, if any, 
emotions may provide about the political events evoking them. I will 
attempt to answer the following question: can emotions towards 
political events, be the source of any valuable knowledge about those 
events? I will then attempt to give a positive answer to this question 
and will structure my answer, as follows. 
In the first four sections of this paper, I will discuss some 
epistemic characteristics of emotions, including emotions towards 
political events. In Section 1, I attempt to show how emotions may 
provide knowledge, and I argue that they can do so by generating and 
modifying beliefs. In section 2, I try to determine what kind of 
knowledge emotions may provide, and I argue that such knowledge 
has an evaluative character. In Section 3, I give some examples of 
criticism concerning the value of emotion as a reliable source of 
evaluative knowledge. In section 4, I respond to that criticism, by 
arguing that although emotions in themselves are not sufficient to 
ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so 
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when taken together with other coherent epistemic attitudes about 
those facts.
In the five sections that follow, I assess the value of the 
contribution that emotions may provide to evaluative knowledge 
about political facts. In section 5 I show that evaluative knowledge is 
relevant in the political context, and I do so by introducing the notion 
of political sophistication. In section 6, I show that emotions may 
contribute to the evaluative knowledge about political facts, only if 
they are coupled with adequate factual knowledge about those facts. 
In section 7 I present the following problem: what is distinctive about 
emotion's contribution to evaluative knowledge about political facts? 
In section 8, I argue that emotions provide a distinctive contribution 
to evaluative knowledge in general and in section 9 I illustrate how 
they may contribute distinctively to evaluative knowledge, about 
political facts specifically. 
Before I begin, two premises are in order. First, in this paper I 
use the expression "political objects" to refer to events, issues, facts, 
individuals, groups, and entities, in general, which have political 
relevance. Second, the scope of my discussion is limited to emotions 
that are integral, and not incidental, to the political context. 
I define "incidental", as the emotional reactions that are not 
related to political objects, but rather which play a role in the political 
context. A study conducted by Small and Lerner (2008), offers an 
example of this kind of emotion, revealing that feelings of sadness 
and anger, arising from events in one's personal life, influence one's 
preferences concerning public policies on welfare. The effects of 
emotional appeals in campaign advertisements and political 
propaganda are further examples of incidental emotion. These kinds 
of emotional occurrences, triggered either by events unrelated to 
politics or by rhetorical devices, influence people's attitudes towards 
political objects, because of the psychological effects that emotions 
operate on their mental processes. However, since they are not 
triggered by the political objects themselves, I do not take incidental 
emotions as pertaining strictly to political objects; I consider them 
more likely to provide information about their actual source rather 
than about the political objects at issue.
 Therefore, I will not examine incidental emotions in my 
discussion. Rather, I will focus on the emotions that are "integral" to 
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political events; that is, on the emotional responses that are genuinely 
triggered by politically significant matters. Examples of these kinds of 
emotion are the anger towards the Muslim ban, the fear that Marine 
Le Pen might win the elections in France, or the joy felt at the 
recognition of same-sex unions in Italy. Since these emotions are 
prompted by the political objects directly, they are better suited to 
providing information about them. But, how can these emotions 
provide any information about political objects? What kind of 
knowledge, does this information give rise to? Having clarified my 
premises, I will now go on to answer these questions in sections 1 and 
2, respectively.
1.  How can emotions provide any knowledge about political 
objects?
In order to explain how emotions towards political objects may 
provide knowledge about them, I will now call on some psychological 
theories about the interaction between emotions and beliefs. In 
particular, I will ground the idea that emotions may be a source of 
knowledge, in the theories claiming that emotions exert an influence 
on beliefs. 
It is a common experience that emotions can give rise to 
beliefs. For example, if I hear footsteps on the roof at night and they 
scare me, then I may form the belief that I am in danger; if my 
girlfriend tells me that she is having dinner with one of her colleagues 
and I feel jealous, then I may come to believe that she is cheating on 
me; if I feel overwhelmed by a certain situation, I may believe that 
such a situation is unsolvable. The fact that an emotional experience 
often insinuates or results in a belief, reveals the human tendency to 
take emotions, at least implicitly, as conveyers of information about 
the world. I argue that emotions towards political objects may 
function in an analogous way. For instance, disappointment in the 
election of D. J. Trump, as president of the United States, prompted 
the belief, in many, that the American voting system is unfair; 
indignation at the high rates of unemployment in Italy led many to 
believe that the government is inadequate. 
The psychologist, Nico Frijda, has conducted extensive 
research on the effect of emotions on beliefs. He has claimed that not 
only can emotions generate new beliefs but they can also change 
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existing ones, by modifying their strength, or revising them 
completely (Frijda & Mesquita 2000). Many of the examples that he 
cites are taken from the political world. For example, he reports that 
"prior to the NATO bombing of Serbia in the Kosovo war, many 
Serbians were critical of Milosevich. After its onset, they gave him 
their enthusiastic support (or so at least it seems), and, foreseeably, 
became ready for unflinching and long-lasting resistance fed by the 
conviction of their cause being just" (Frijda & Mesquita 2000, p 49). 
Frijda highlights that the emotional influences on beliefs about 
political issues, have crucial consequences for political behavior: for 
instance, "participation in political violence or, at least, support for 
violent movements by one's votes, one's budget allocations, or one's 
emotional support, is facilitated by the firmness of one's beliefs 
regarding the states of the world motivating those actions, and (...) 
such firmness of beliefs is fed by the emotions connected to those 
states of the world" (Frijda, Manstead & Bem 2000 p 4).
Following Frijda, a number of scholars have highlighted the 
pervasive effects of emotions on beliefs. For example, the so-called 
"feelings-as-information" theory maintains that people listen to their 
emotional reactions as a source of information, and this in turn 
affects their judgments and beliefs (Schwarz 2011). Similarly, Clore 
and Gasper (2000), showed that beliefs are modified not only to be 
compatible with external evidence from perceptual experiences but 
also according to internal evidence, in the form of emotions. 
Here, I will not delve in these psychological theories further, 
but rather I will use them as the basis of the idea that emotions may 
provide some knowledge about their objects, including the political 
ones, by generating new beliefs and modifying existing ones, about 
those objects. I will now turn to a characterization of the knowledge 
that emotions may provide.
2.  What kind of knowledge may emotions provide about political 
objects?
In the previous section, I showed that emotions may provide some 
knowledge of their objects, through their effect on the beliefs about 
those objects. In light of this, and in order to characterize the type of 
knowledge that these emotions may provide, I will now look into the 
character of the beliefs that they may generate and influence. In the 
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following, I will explain why I define such beliefs as evaluative, and 
why emotions may consequently provide an evaluative kind of 
knowledge.
All the major theories of emotions in philosophy, attribute 
some evaluative character to emotions, despite the differences in how 
they characterize the nature of emotional phenomena and their mode 
of operation. For example, cognitive theories (e.g. Nussbaum 2004; 
Solomon 1988), define emotions as judgments with propositional 
content about their evaluative properties (e.g. to fear something is to 
judge that something is dangerous); feeling theories (e.g. James 1884; 
Kriegel 2014) identify emotions with bodily changes as automatic 
responses to evaluative properties (e.g. to fear something is to 
undergo the physiological changes associated with fear in response to 
the dangerousness of something); perceptual theories (e.g. Döring 
2003; Prinz 2004) describe emotions as perceptions of evaluative 
properties (e.g. to fear something is to perceive the dangerousness of 
something). I will not report additional theories here, nor will I go 
into details about any of these theoretical characterizations of 
emotion. My simplistic illustration of a few of them is intended only 
to show how, despite the different theoretical accounts, emotions are 
generally regarded as signaling some evaluative properties of their 
objects, i.e. properties that represent the value that some features of 
those objects have for the agent. Psychological theories of emotions, 
and, in particular, the so-called "appraisal" theories are grounded in a 
similar idea. According to these theories, "emotions are adaptive 
responses, which reflect appraisals of features of the environment 
that are significant for the organism's well-being" (Moors et al. 2013 p 
119). Leaving aside whether these appraisals have a cognitive nature or 
not, as different theories propose different solutions, the basic claim 
of these types of theory is that emotions signal what it is in the 
environment that may affect the agents' concerns, including needs, 
attachments, values, goals, and in general "anything that an individual 
cares about" (Moors et al. 2013 p 120).
What I would like to point out, through my brief sketch of 
philosophical and psychological accounts of emotion, is the central 
attribution to emotions of an evaluative aspect; whatever they are and 
however they work, emotions have some evaluative content, because 
they make a type of evaluation of their object, by catching what is 
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valuable about it for the agent. The information that emotions may 
carry, as I illustrated in the previous section, may contribute to 
knowledge about a certain object, by giving rise to, or by influencing 
beliefs about, that object. Given the evaluative content of emotions, I 
conclude that the beliefs they may affect are evaluative in character; 
that is, they are beliefs about the value of their objects for the subject. 
Consequently, emotions may provide evaluative knowledge about 
their objects. 
If the object of an emotion is a political one, then the emotion 
may contribute to knowledge of such an object, by affecting the 
evaluative beliefs that we hold about it, and thus may provide 
evaluative knowledge about that political object. Fear of North 
Korea's nuclear ambitions may lead to judging the country as 
dangerous, admiring Justin Trudeau may lead to judging his 
administration as honest and fair. Both judgments constitute an 
evaluative form of knowledge, as they both express the value of their 
object for the subject. In the following section I will consider some of 
the problems concerning the idea that emotions may provide 
evaluative knowledge.
3.  Criticism of emotion as a reliable source of evaluative knowledge
Although emotions may indeed provide evaluative knowledge about 
their objects, some criticism has been raised about the epistemic 
reliability of this type of knowledge. This criticism become even more 
problematic, when we consider emotions towards political objects. As 
I illustrated earlier, Frijda highlighted how the influence of emotions 
on beliefs about political issues may have dramatic effects on political 
behavior. It follows that if one's knowledge about political objects, 
which is provided by the effect of emotions on beliefs, is unreliable, 
this could have serious repercussions within the political context. In 
the following, I will describe two epistemic difficulties that have been 
identified, concerning emotions as reliable sources of evaluative 
knowledge about their objects, and will elucidate how each of these 
epistemic difficulties applies to evaluative knowledge in the political 
context. 
The first problem is raised by Frijda. Specifically, he identifies 
two problematic features in the characterization of beliefs affected by 
emotions. The first is the tendency towards generalization: for 
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example, a man who was abandoned by a woman may easily take his 
resentment as evidence of women's dishonesty in general (Frijda & 
Mesquita 2000 p 55). On the political scene, rage against the Muslims 
who harassed several women in Köln, on New Year's Eve in 2015, 
sustained the racist idea in many European citizens', that Muslims are 
bad and dangerous people in general. The second problematic 
feature of beliefs affected by emotions is, according to Frijda, their 
tendency to be felt as true: in the grip of jealousy, one is certain that 
one's suspicion is justified and that a given sign clearly indicates 
unfaithfulness (Frijda & Mesquita 2000 p 55). Following the fear 
engendered by the terroristic attacks in Paris, on the 13th of 
November 2015, many people in France were convinced that the only 
viable solution to keep their country safe was to close its borders. In 
sum, the problem raised by the features that Frijda identified, is that 
evaluative knowledge, which is gained through the emotions' effects 
on beliefs, may be distorted and, therefore, not reliable. 
The second critique of emotions as reliable sources of 
evaluative knowledge about their objects is raised by Michael Brady. 
He argues that emotions are not sufficient for justifying evaluative 
beliefs, as they need further reasons or evidence to justify the 
evaluative content they suggest. For instance, if a noise downstairs, in 
the night scares me, I do not accept my fear alone as sufficient 
evidence to believe that I am in danger. Rather, I tend to look for 
further evidence, in order to confirm or deny the accuracy of my 
initial, emotional appraisal: "[w]e strain our ears to hear other 
anomalous noises, rack our brains trying to think of possible non-
threatening causes for the noise, and so forth. It is unlikely that, in 
these circumstances, we would regard our feeling of fear as a 
conclusive reason to judge that we are in danger" (Brady 2011 p 139). 
Within the political context, I cannot take my antipathy towards a 
certain candidate as evidence that they are dishonest. Although my 
feeling of antipathy may push me in that direction, it would be 
inappropriate to base my belief on that alone; I need more 
information about their conduct, to reliably ground my judgment. In 
sum, Brady raises the criticism that emotions are not enough to justify 
evaluative beliefs, because more evidence is needed from other non-
emotional reasons and, thus, emotions alone cannot provide any 
26
reliable evaluative knowledge. In the next section, I will describe a 
solution to the problems, raised by Frijda and Brady's observations.
4.  How emotions can be a reliable source of evaluative knowledge: a 
coherentist solution
The concerns, put forward by Frijda and Brady, threaten the 
reliability of evaluative knowledge's being reached through emotional 
experiences. They show that emotions, by themselves, may lead to 
distorted and unwarranted beliefs and, therefore, any evaluative 
knowledge, which they provide, may not be epistemically reliable. I 
argue that this conclusion can be challenged, by considering a 
coherentist account of epistemic justification.
According to the coherentist theory of justification, no source 
of belief is capable of conferring the degree of justification necessary 
to render a belief justified or rational, apart from coherence with 
other beliefs and mental states. Some philosophers have used this 
type of theory as a basis for the justificatory power of emotions. For 
example, Elgin argues that emotional deliverances (i.e. what 
emotional experiences may indicate), are initially tenable (i.e. 
justifiable), because "an agent, in the grip of an emotion, has a 
tendency to credit its deliverances" (Elgin 1996 p 4). Furthermore, 
Elgin claims that if emotions only had this initial tenability (i.e. 
justificatory power), they would have only "a weak and precarious 
epistemological status" (Elgin 2008 p 34). However, Elgin continues, 
when emotional deliverances cohere with the content of other beliefs 
and epistemic commitments, "they integrate into a tenable system of 
thought" (Elgin 2008 p 34), and they acquire the same degree of 
tenability as the other beliefs with which they are incorporated. In 
Elgin's proposed coherentist solution, emotions are not fully reliable 
by themselves, no matter how compelling an emotional response may 
seem, ; rather they need collateral supports, and with them all our 
further epistemic commitments (although to different extents): "no 
commitment, however firmly held, is fully warranted in isolation" 
(Elgin 2008 p 34), but "is tenable only if it is integrable into a system 
of cognitive commitments in reflective equilibrium" (Elgin 2008 p 48). 
De Sousa embraced a similar position: "Despite the treachery 
of our emotional dispositions, emotions in general constitute 
apprehensions of axiological reality. We tell which is right and which 
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is wrong much as we test the veracity of perceptual information: by 
appealing to corroborating evidence" (de Sousa 2004 p 75)
I argue that a coherentist view of justification, as concerns 
emotional evaluations, seems to be perfectly reasonable, if not the 
most suitable view, particularly when we consider existing research 
into the interaction between emotions and beliefs. In the first section 
of this paper, I outlined how emotions affect beliefs. Studies have 
also investigated the reverse relationship,  revealing that beliefs can 
affect emotions by modulating their intensity and by changing them 
completely, through a reinterpretation of the meaning of the stimulus 
that triggered the emotional response (Ochsner 2005). Generally, the 
results of studies into the interaction between emotions and beliefs, 
show that they the two are closely interwoven. The evaluative beliefs, 
which are suggested by our emotional reactions, are intertwined with 
our ensuing beliefs and mental states, and because of this, they are 
necessarily subjected to their contradiction or their support. 
Consequently, such evaluative beliefs should not be considered in 
isolation, but rather their reliability should be accounted for in a 
coherentist way – by assessing how the content of such evaluative 
beliefs is integrated into the network of our further epistemic 
commitments. 
The coherentist explanation of evaluative beliefs also holds for 
evaluative beliefs about political objects. For example, if D.J. Trump 
inspires a sense of repulsion in a citizen, this may lead that citizen to 
endorse the belief, initially, that D.J. Trump is not trustworthy. 
However, they do not ground their evaluative knowledge about D.J. 
Trump on the basis of this feeling alone. After reading the news 
about his felonies and reflecting on D.J. Trump's conduct, they form 
further beliefs. Since the content of the citizen's emotional appraisal 
is coherent with those further beliefs, they the use them as the basis 
of their evaluative knowledge of D.J. Trump as not trustworthy. The 
content of their initial emotional appraisal alone cannot justify the 
citizen's evaluative knowledge, but it can do that, when combined 
with other coherent beliefs on the subject. 
A coherentist solution, about the justificatory power of 
emotional experiences, seems to resolve the problems related to 
Frijda and Brady's earlier observations: evaluative beliefs, brought 
about by emotions, may be biased and not fully justifiable solely using 
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emotional experience. However, when those evaluative beliefs are 
inserted into a net of further beliefs and mental states, their biased 
character may be mitigated by interaction with these beliefs and 
mental states for reaching internal coherence. It is the coherence, and 
not the emotional occurrence alone, that grounds evaluative 
knowledge. Under a coherentist theory of justification, the fact that 
emotions may bring about biased beliefs does not necessarily 
undermine the role of emotions as conveyers of knowledge, because 
what they reveal should not merely be accepted on its own, but rather 
should be considered in conjunction with further non-emotional 
attitudes.
In conclusion, emotions are not sufficient for justifying 
evaluative beliefs, but this is understandable given the fact that they 
are inherently connected with other beliefs and mental states. 
However, although emotions are not sufficient by themselves, they 
still play a role in the justification of evaluative knowledge. The 
question remains: how important is the role of emotions in grounding 
evaluative knowledge, and specifically, evaluative knowledge about 
political objects? I will try to answer this question in the next five 
sections. First, I will introduce the concept of political sophistication, 
in order to show that evaluative knowledge is relevant in the political 
context.
5.  Political sophistication and the relevance of evaluative 
knowledge in politics
By now, I have argued that, should emotions be able to provide any 
kind of knowledge, that knowledge is likely to be evaluative in 
character, that is; knowledge about the value of the object evokes 
emotion for the agent experiencing the emotion. Although my goal is 
to assess whether emotions make a relevant contribution to evaluative 
knowledge about political objects, my discussion would be pointless 
without showing that evaluative knowledge is relevant from a political 
point of view in first place, independent of whether emotions 
contribute to it. I will now introduce the notion of political 
sophistication, in order to demonstrate that evaluative knowledge is 
indeed politically relevant. 
Political scientists have offered different concepts of political 
sophistication, and have used various expressions to describe it, such 
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as "political expertise", "political cognition", "political awareness", 
"political competence", and "political literacy". In my discussion, I 
will use these meanings interchangeably, referring to them all as 
political sophistication. What seems to be the common idea, behind 
the diverse explanations of this concept, is that political 
sophistication indexes not only the amount of knowledge held about 
political facts but also the way in which that knowledge is organized. 
In this respect, attention to and interest in political issues are 
considered important traits for political sophistication, as they foster 
information exposure and consumption, making sophisticates not 
only more knowledgeable but also more capable of forming 
connections among political concepts and information (Krosnick 1990 
p 4). Political scientists argue that this capacity, in turn, provides 
sophisticates with a better understanding of political issues and a 
greater ability to connect their interests and values with concrete 
matters in politics. This last point, in particular, seems crucial for 
political sophistication: "[t]here are many reasons to think 
sophistication important, but perhaps its greatest importance lies in 
its conditioning of the relationship between values and policy and 
candidate preferences, which can be expected to be tighter among the 
more sophisticated" (Luskin 2002 p 220). Schreiber (2007) highlights 
the same point. Political cognition, he argues, cannot be explained 
only in terms of the facts that one is able to recall but also concerns a 
more meaningful knowledge, consisting of the ability to map one's 
own values onto one's own political opinions and choices: "If you 
know the name of the Indonesian president, whether he has the 
power to veto legislation, and whether his party controls the 
legislature, you do not have sufficient knowledge to assess whether he 
and his policies will conform to your values" (Schreiber 2007 p 65). 
Further studies (Alvarez & Brehm 2002) have shown that one 
fundamental difference between political novices and political experts 
is that, although both may be sure of what they value, the first are 
unsure of how to use those values in political choices. Schreiber 
explains this discrepancy by adapting Searle's famous Chinese Room 
Argument: "For a political novice, who has little or no knowledge of 
national politics, responding to the questions in a political survey 
might be like being the English speaker in the Chinese room during 
the first day on the job. Survey respondents, who cannot identify 
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leading political figures, the policy position of the major parties, or 
use ideology as a framework for their political thinking, might well be 
processing meaningless symbols and merely answering questions, 
rather than revealing preferences (...).  However, I contend that, for 
some people [i.e. political experts], the symbols of politics have 
meaning and are connected to deeply held values; these people are in 
the Chinese room and they speak Chinese" (Schreiber 2007 p 64). In 
his analogy, Schreiber proposes political attitudes as the output of an 
information processing system such as the Chinese Room. The 
analogy with Searle's argument is that political novices process 
political information, in the same way as the English speaker 
processes Chinese symbols; that is, without proper understanding. 
Conversely, political experts process political information by 
attaching a meaning to it, as does the Chinese speaker with Chinese 
symbols. 
Based on the characterization of political sophistication that I 
have just outlined, I conclude that political sophistication includes 
not only factual knowledge about political issues but also evaluative 
knowledge about them; that is, knowledge of how such political 
issues invoke our values. Having clarified that evaluative knowledge is 
relevant in the political context, I will now discuss the conditions, 
under which emotions towards political objects, may contribute to 
such knowledge.
6.  Conditions for the contribution of emotions to the evaluative 
knowledge about political objects
In the previous section I presented the notion of political 
sophistication, and I showed that the evaluative type of knowledge is 
relevant in the political domain. In this section, I will show that 
emotions' contribution to such knowledge is subject to certain 
conditions. To do this, I will review some of the research in political 
psychology, revealing an effect of emotions on the formation of 
political opinions. In my discussion, I regard political opinions as an 
expression of evaluative political beliefs and, therefore, I consider the 
results of these studies to be relevant to my discussion on the role of 
emotions in evaluative knowledge in politics. In line with the 
premises I outlined, at the beginning of my discussion, my analysis 
will be limited to studies that examined emotions that were integral to 
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political events; that is, emotions generated by those events. 
Therefore, I will leave aside the studies that investigated the influence 
of incidental emotions; that is, emotions elicited by stimuli unrelated 
to politics. 
Much research in political psychology has shown that 
individuals' emotions are an indicator of their political opinions. The 
types of political opinions investigated varied from candidate 
evaluation to the evaluation of countries in general, and of specific 
policies. For example, Marcus (1988), showed that voters' feelings 
towards candidates mattered significantly for their voting choices; in 
particular, positive feelings towards a certain candidate, such as 
feelings of hope, pride, and sympathy, were found to be correlated 
with a disposition to vote for that candidate. Another study, 
concerning the effect of integral emotions on political opinions, was 
conducted by Huddy, Feldmand, and Cassese (2007). They examined 
the effects of angry and fearful attitudes, connected to the 9/11 attacks, 
on citizens' opinions about support for the Iraq war. Anxiety was 
found to increase the perceived risk of the war, and to promote an 
opposition to it; whereas anger was found to minimize perceived risk, 
and to promote support for the war. 
Other research considered the role that information about 
political issues plays as a variable in mediating the influence of 
emotions on political opinions about those issues. The 
aforementioned study by Huddy, Feldmand, and Cassese (2007), for 
example, found that fearful individuals, who had a higher level of 
political information, were even less likely to support the Iraq war, 
compared to individuals with a similar attitude, but who had a lower 
level of information. Among the studies, investigating how non-
emotional information conditions the effect of emotion on political 
opinions, the most relevant to my discussion, are those that consider 
the role of political sophistication.
 As I showed in the previous section, political sophistication 
comprises both factual knowledge and evaluative knowledge; that is, 
knowledge about political facts, and knowledge about how those 
political facts are related to an individual's interests and values, 
respectively. Some scholars believe that political sophistication 
conditions the effect of emotion on political opinion. However those 
same scholars hold different views on how emotions influence the 
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opinions of more and less sophisticated individuals. For example, 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), argued that on one hand more 
sophisticated individuals were less likely to rely on emotions to form 
their political opinions, whereas less sophisticated individuals were 
more likely to do so. The results of their study seemed to support 
their thesis: specifically, less educated people were more likely to rely 
on their feelings about African Americans in expressing their opinion 
on racial equality policies, than more educated people were. 
Conversely, a study conducted by Miller (2011) led him to draw quite 
different conclusions. He explored the effects of discreet emotions, 
such as anger, fear, hope, and pride, in forming opinions about 
presidential voting and Iraq war policy. The results of his study 
revealed that citizens who were more politically sophisticated were 
also more emotionally engaged with politics, in such a way that they 
were more likely to experience emotions towards political objects, 
and to consider those emotions when forming their political opinions. 
Similarly, Schreiber has argued that more sophisticated, in 
comparison to less sophisticated, individuals rely on their affective 
associations more, in forming their opinions about political figures 
(Schreiber 2007 pp 56-58).
 Although further and more thorough research is clearly 
needed to explore political sophistication's role in mediating the 
effect of emotion on political opinion, I believe that one important 
consideration is called for, as concerns the results of the studies I 
have already outlined. There is a common belief, and Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock (1991) seem to confirm it, that less sophisticated 
individuals may use their emotional attitudes as low information 
heuristics for forming political opinions about issues about which 
they lack expertise and knowledge. In contrast, more sophisticated 
individuals rely less on their emotional attitudes, preferring to use 
their knowledge and expertise to ground their opinions. 
However, if less sophisticated individuals lack contextual 
information and general knowledge about political issues, I wonder 
whether they can actually engage in any meaningful emotional 
experiences towards such issues. Specifically, I doubt that the 
emotional attitudes of less sophisticated individuals are actually 
integral to those political issues, and I suspect them to be more 
incidental (e.g. grounded in some general preconceptions or on some 
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features that are not related to the political characteristics of the 
issues in question). 
In contrast, I believe that the emotions, experienced by 
individuals who are more knowledgeable about certain political 
issues, may be more likely to be triggered by the actual political 
implications of those issues. I believe that this could be a potential 
explanation for the discrepancies between the findings obtained by 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) and those obtained by Miller 
(2011): whereas less sophisticated individuals may rely more on 
emotions that are unrelated to political issues to form their opinions, 
more sophisticated individuals may rely more on emotions that are 
actually related to political issues. 
Mine is obviously a speculative claim, requiring further 
empirical evidence to substantiate it, however, Miller's interpretation 
of his own findings seems to give it some plausibility. Specifically, 
Miller argues that the emotions experienced by more sophisticated 
individuals are determined by their political sophistication itself. He 
claims that, since sophisticated individuals are more knowledgeable 
and more interested in politics, they create connections among 
political data more effectively. This in turn makes them better at 
relating political data to their own goals, values and concerns. 
Consequently, and in conformity with the appraisal theory of 
emotions, they are more likely to experience emotions in relation to 
political objects: "Being sophisticated about politics implies that one 
has a greater understanding of political objects and how they connect 
to each other. If emotion requires the ability to link political objects 
to individual and group goals, then high sophisticates appear better 
able to make those linkages" (Miller 2011 p 593). Miller goes on to 
argue that, in contrast, low sophisticates may not have sufficient 
understanding of politics to see how political facts connect to their 
interests, leaving them less capable of making the appraisals that elicit 
emotion in the political context. This is consistent with my 
suggestion, as less sophisticated individuals may still experience 
emotions towards political objects, but their emotions may not be 
actually related to political objects as such. 
My discussion of the studies, which investigated how political 
sophistication may mediate the influence of emotions on political 
opinions, seems to shed some light on my original discussion about 
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the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge of political 
objects. Specifically, I argued that although both more and less 
sophisticated individuals may experience emotions towards political 
objects and may use those emotions in their evaluative judgments 
about political objects, the emotions of less sophisticated individuals 
are less likely to be informative about the political issues they are 
directed towards, because of the scarce factual knowledge that less 
sophisticated individuals hold about those political issues. From this, 
I conclude that the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge 
about political objects is conditional on the presence of appropriate 
factual knowledge about those objects. In the rest of this paper, I will 
define more exactly, what the contribution of emotions consists of 
and why it is politically relevant.
7.  Are emotions truly relevant to the evaluative knowledge about 
political objects?
In the previous section, I argued that emotions may indeed contribute 
to evaluative knowledge about political objects, but only if they are 
coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those objects. 
Such a claim seems to be in line with the coherentist account of the 
justificatory power of emotion, which I illustrated before: emotions 
may contribute to evaluative knowledge about political objects, but 
only if they are coherent with an adequate system of non-emotional 
(i.e. factual) epistemic commitments about those objects. 
Clarifying the conditions of emotion's contribution to 
evaluative knowledge about political objects still does not clarify what 
this contribution actually consists of. If we suppose that more 
sophisticated individuals actually use their emotions, towards political 
objects, to form their evaluative judgments of those objects, then how 
relevant is the presence of an emotional component to their 
evaluative judgment? Would their evaluative knowledge about the 
political object be the same without any emotional contribution? 
For example, suppose that I am a fairly politically sophisticated 
individual; even if I admit that my emotional attitude towards D. J. 
Trump figures among the mental states that ground my opinion of 
him as being untrustworthy, is my emotional attitude really relevant 
to my arriving at such an opinion? 
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It could be argued that the beliefs that I formed through non-
emotional means, by for instance, apprehending and judging facts 
about his conduct without any emotional reaction to them, could 
suffice to ground my evaluative knowledge of him as being 
untrustworthy. Another example might be the case of a middle-class 
Italian citizen, who is politically sophisticated and, simultaneously, 
angry at the government, because yet another tax increase was 
approved for small commercial activities, as part of the government's 
plan for containing the national budget, leaving the stellar wages of 
the political class untouched. His anger may be part of his grounds 
for judging this measure to be unfair, but it is possible that he might 
have reached the same conclusion, without experiencing any anger, 
by simply assessing the facts and leaving out all emotional 
involvement. 
This criticism threatens the epistemic role of emotions in 
providing evaluative knowledge: although emotions may be part of 
the reasons, justifying such knowledge, their role may not be relevant, 
as the same evaluative knowledge might be reached without 
emotions. In order to overcome this criticism, it should be 
demonstrated that emotions make a distinctive contribution to certain 
evaluative knowledge and, therefore, without them a relevant aspect 
of this evaluative knowledge could not be accessed. I will undertake 
this task in the following two sections. In section 8, I will consider the 
general evaluative knowledge provided by emotions; in section 9, I 
will specifically consider the evaluative knowledge that emotions 
provide about political objects.
8.  How emotions are relevant to evaluative knowledge: a solution 
from Goldie
In order to demonstrate that emotions are relevant to providing a 
certain evaluative knowledge, including about political objects, I will 
try to show that there is a qualitative difference between the 
knowledge achieved with the contribution of emotions and the one 
achieved without such a contribution, and that the knowledge 
achieved with emotions is richer than the one without. I will support 
my claim, by appealing to Peter Goldie's distinction between the 
emotional and non-emotional apprehension of evaluative content. 
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Goldie uses the expression "feeling towards" to define a 
particular way of thinking that is "thinking with feeling" (Goldie 2002 
p 19). In "feeling towards", the feeling part (i.e. the emotion) is not 
merely added to the thought but is an integral part of the content of 
the thought, because it is what allows us to grasp certain particular 
properties (i.e. evaluative properties) of the object towards which the 
thought is directed: "content properly captured, from the personal 
point of view, is essentially emotion-involving, so that there could not 
be content captured in that way without the person experiencing the 
emotion as he does" (Goldie 2002 p 51). Goldie assimilates "feeling 
towards" with vision: in the same way as colors can only be presented 
in visual experiences, certain evaluative content can only be 
presented through an emotional experience (Goldie 2002 p 29).
To clarify this point, Goldie takes the example of a person who 
believes that ice is dangerous and then, after slipping, comes to fear 
ice, and to think about the fact that the ice is dangerous with fear. 
The change, Goldie argues, is not simply the addition of a feeling of 
fear, but it is also a change in the content of thought: "Coming to 
think of it [i.e. the danger of ice] in this new way is not to be 
understood as consisting of thinking of it in the old way, plus some 
added-on phenomenal ingredient – feeling perhaps; rather, the whole 
way of experiencing, or being conscious of, the world is new... The 
difference between thinking of X as Y without feeling and thinking of 
X as Y with feeling will not just comprise a different attitude towards 
the same content - a thinking which earlier was without feeling and 
now is with feeling. The difference also lies in the content, although 
it might be that this difference cannot be captured in words" (Goldie 
2002 p 60). For Goldie, although the emotional and the non-
emotional apprehension of the danger of ice both allow the concept 
of the danger of ice to be understood, only the emotional 
apprehension allows a complete grasp of the concept, because only an 
emotional response can adequately catch an evaluative concept such 
as dangerousness. 
To clarify this further, Goldie draws a comparison with color 
concepts; for example, the concept of the color red: a color-blind 
person may recognize red things in the world, possibly thanks to a 
constant companion who points out red things to them. By virtue of 
this, the color-blind person may have some concept of the color red, 
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but since they lack the appropriate visual experience, they cannot 
completely grasp the concept: "This person can have the 
demonstrative thought 'That ball is red', but that thought will differ 
in respect of its content from that of a thought also expressed as 'That 
ball is red' had by a person who is using his normal ability to see 
colours. So it does not follow from the fact that both thoughts are 
naturally expressed in the same words that they have the same 
content; the words used are inadequate to express the difference" 
(Goldie 2002 p 60).
In the same way as vision is necessary for fully grasping the 
concept of a color, emotion is necessary for fully grasping an 
evaluative property: grasping the concept of a color, without seeing it, 
and grasping an evaluative property, without feeling an emotion, only 
allows an incomplete grasp of their concepts. Since the concept that 
is grasped in "thinking with feeling" and in "thinking without feeling" 
is different, as in one case it is complete and in the other incomplete, 
then emotional and non-emotional apprehension do not have the 
same content, despite having the same referent. To employ the 
concept of the danger of ice, after apprehending it emotionally, in a 
belief about some state of the world (e.g. that ice is dangerous) gives 
the belief a different content compared to a belief wherein the mere 
theoretical concept is employed. Goldie's fundamental claim is that 
the content of the emotional and of the non-emotional apprehension 
of the same evaluative property is different, because the concepts 
employed to think about the evaluative property are different in the 
two kinds of apprehension.
It is relevant to my discussion, to highlight that the difference 
in content, advocated by Goldie, should not be understood as a 
distinction between different objects or events. The same event can 
be apprehended either emotionally or non-emotionally. Emotional 
apprehension does not give information about a different object; 
rather, it provides a different kind of information about it. I suggest 
illustrating this point, by thinking about the duck-rabbit optical 
illusion: this figure incorporates both the image of a duck and of a 
rabbit, but we cannot see them at the same time; we have to look at it 
in a certain way to see the duck, and in another way to see the rabbit. 
These two distinct ways of looking at the figure play the same role as 
emotional and non-emotional apprehension of a certain event: 
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although the figure is the same one, the way we look at it reveals just 
one of two distinct images. By analogy, although there is just one 
event at issue, the emotional and the non-emotional apprehension of 
it reveal only one aspect of that event respectively, which cannot be 
revealed through the other aspect of apprehension. Grasping an 
evaluative property by means of emotion reveals a different content in 
the sense that it reveals an aspect of it that cannot be disclosed by 
apprehending that same property in a non-emotional way.
Following Goldie, I claim that the evaluative knowledge 
achieved with the contribution of an emotional experience and the 
evaluative knowledge achieved without such a contribution, have 
different contents, as they allow different grasps of certain evaluative 
properties. Therefore, the emotional component is relevant to the 
achievement of a different kind of evaluative knowledge. How does 
this translate into the political context? What is distinctive about the 
evaluative information disclosed by emotions towards political 
objects? How is the contribution of emotions relevant to a certain 
evaluative knowledge about political objects? In light of the elements 
that I have discussed up until this point, I will finally provide an 
answer to these questions.
9.  How emotions are relevant to the evaluative knowledge about 
political objects
Since my discussion is not concerned with evaluative knowledge in 
general, but rather with evaluative knowledge about political objects, 
my current objective is to show how the argument I drew from Goldie 
applies to the political context; that is, to explain how emotions may 
make a distinctive and relevant contribution to evaluative knowledge 
about political objects. My claim is, by "feeling towards" political 
objects, i.e. by "thinking-with-feeling" about the evaluative features of 
those objects, a different understanding of those features is brought 
about, and a more sophisticated evaluative knowledge about those 
objects results from this. Specifically, I argue that by experiencing an 
emotion towards a political object, its evaluative properties are 
apprehended in a distinctive way; namely, as directly concerning the 
subject as an individual and as a political agent. I argue that the 
personal salience, of the evaluative character of the object, which is 
disclosed by the emotional component, within the apprehension of 
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the object, is relevant to the evaluative knowledge of the object, 
because of the coherent integration of the evaluative information it 
discloses, within a subject's further (political) attitudes, such as their 
values and beliefs. I will now elucidate my claim, about the 
distinctiveness and relevance of the contribution of emotions to 
evaluative knowledge about political objects, by referring to two 
different examples. 
If I consider the Syrian refugee crisis; I may form an opinion 
about it based on my (political) values; such as, the value of solidarity 
among human beings, the value of defending human dignity, and on 
the basis of facts I have learned, such as the extremely difficult living 
conditions for the refugees in their home country and the 
circumstances that gave rise to the Syrian conflict. Given my values 
and beliefs, which do not depend on my emotional reaction to the 
Syrian refugee crisis, I may form the evaluative judgment that 
European countries should adopt reception and integration policies 
for the refugees. If, in addition to taking into account my non-
emotional values and beliefs, I also feel compassion towards the 
refugees, my evaluative judgment about the policy towards them may 
be the same, but I argue that my evaluative knowledge will be 
different. How does the emotional component, which is provided by 
my feeling of compassion, make my evaluative knowledge different? 
In "thinking-without-feeling" about the Syrian refugee crisis, I 
may make certain evaluative considerations about it, in the same way 
as, following another example by Goldie, I judge a gorilla that is 
behind bars at the zoo and without fear, as dangerous. In contrast, 
"thinking-with-feeling" about the refugees, that is, thinking about 
their situation with a certain emotional involvement (e.g. with 
compassion) is like, in Goldie's example, judging the gorilla as 
dangerous when the cage suddenly opens, that is, with fear. The 
judgment, "The gorilla is dangerous", and the judgment, "A policy of 
reception and integration towards refugees is appropriate" are 
expressed in the same way, both in the emotional and in the non-
emotional apprehension of their objects. However, I argue that the 
evaluative knowledge they reflect is different, because the internal 
meaning of these evaluative judgments is different in the emotional, 
and in the non-emotional apprehension of their objects. Specifically, 
in the first case the gorilla is judged as dangerous in general, while in 
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the second one it is judged as dangerous for you: "now your way of 
thinking of the gorilla as dangerous is new; now it is dangerous in an 
emotionally relevant way for you" (Goldie 2000 p 61). Analogously, 
feeling compassion indicates that the refugee crisis is an event that 
matters to you as a person and as a political agent. An emotional 
reaction towards a political object not only signals certain evaluative 
properties of the object, as they could be attributed to it without any 
emotional involvement, but it signals that the agent, specifically, is 
sensitive to these properties with their feelings, values and beliefs. In 
sum, I argue that the distinctive contribution of emotions, to the 
evaluative knowledge about a political object, consists of its disclosing 
of the personal import of the object for the subject. I will now clarify 
the relevance of this distinctive contribution. 
As I illustrated in sections 4 and 6, the contribution of 
emotions to evaluative knowledge about a political object is 
epistemically and politically significant, if it is coherent with an 
adequate system of non-emotional attitudes towards the object; that 
is, with the set of values and factual beliefs held by the subject 
independently from their emotional responses. Given that an 
adequate set of values and beliefs is present, and that the emotion 
towards the object is coherent with them, how is the emotional 
contribution relevant for the evaluative knowledge about the object? 
In order to answer this, it is important to recall that, as the 
considerations in sections 4 and 6 suggested, the formation of a 
certain evaluative knowledge about a political object is grounded in a 
process of coherent integration of information. 
As I highlighted above, using Goldie's example, whereas 
evaluative information that is based on an agent's non-emotional 
attitudes, such as values and beliefs, has a general relevance, 
evaluative information based on an agent's emotions is relevant to the 
agent, personally. 
In integrating emotional and non-emotional information about 
a political object, in order to reach internal coherence, not only are 
the evaluative considerations, which are disclosed by the emotions, 
assessed in respect to the agent's non-emotional attitudes, but also 
the latter are in turn confronted with the personal evaluative import 
of the object as disclosed by the emotion. In other words, by 
including the emotional component in the integrative process of 
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information, the evaluative information that is based on values and 
beliefs is connected with the dimension of personal significance, 
brought up by the emotions. I argue that, by virtue of this connection, 
evaluative knowledge that integrates the emotional component ends 
up being more sophisticated than evaluative knowledge that does not 
integrate it. This is because in the former, as distinct from the latter, 
the values and beliefs that an agent holds, and may employ in their 
evaluative judgment, are assessed in respect to their actual import for 
the agent in relation to the political object. 
Recalling Schreiber's formulation, the individuals who are 
more politically sophisticated are those who process political 
information by attaching a meaning to it, and by grounding their 
political opinions in their deeply-held values. In contrast, the less 
politically sophisticated individuals are those who process political 
information in a superficial and ideological way, without attaching a 
meaning to it. Despite holding certain values, they are unable to apply 
these values to their political opinions; that is, to ground their 
political opinions properly in their values. I argue that, by integrating 
the emotional component, in evaluative knowledge about a political 
object, the agent develops a more sophisticated knowledge, because 
the latter comes to reflect not only their values and beliefs in general, 
but the import that they actually hold for them, as a person and as a 
political agent, in respect to their evaluative judgment of the object. 
Recalling my previous example of the Italian citizen, why 
would the inclusion of his anger, within the processing of evaluative 
information about government measures, make his evaluative 
knowledge more sophisticated? Given the coherentist framework for 
the justificatory power of emotions that I have endorsed, I describe 
the integration of the anger component, within the processing of 
information about the government measures, as articulating such 
processing in the following terms. On one hand, it is assessed on 
whether the personal significance of the evaluative considerations, 
which stemmed from the citizen's anger, are coherent with their 
beliefs and values: "Given what I know (e.g. that the measures damage 
the middle class proportion of the population, but does not even 
slightly affect the political class), and given what I value (e.g. social 
justice), is my anger at the governmental measures justified?". On the 
other hand, it is assessed on whether the beliefs and the values that 
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the citizen endorses are really those that matter for them, in their 
evaluative judgment of the object. "Is my judgment of the government 
measures, as being unfair, really grounded in what I, as a person and 
as a political agent, value and believe?" This last passage within the 
integrative process makes the resulting evaluative knowledge more 
sophisticated, because it characterizes the citizen's judgment about 
the measures as truly invoking and not just ideologically or 
superficially reflecting, their beliefs, as well as their political and 
personal values. 
In sum, I argue that in "feeling towards" a political object, an 
emotional component introduces distinctive evaluative information, 
amounting to the personal evaluative import of the political object for 
the agent. The inclusion of this distinctive emotional element in the 
process of the coherent integration of evaluative information about 
the object, makes the resulting evaluative knowledge more politically 
sophisticated, and herein, I believe, lies the relevance of the epistemic 
contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political 
objects.
10.  Final remarks
A number of objections may be raised to the claims I have proposed 
in this paper. For example, I have argued that the evaluative beliefs 
brought about by emotions may reliably ground some evaluative 
knowledge, through their integration within a coherent network of 
further non-emotional beliefs. However, according to a number of 
psychological studies, such an integration might be problematic. For 
example, Cassino and Lodge (2007), found that immediate affective 
reactions drive candidate evaluations, even after individuals are 
presented with subsequent information. Moreover, Redlawsk (2006) 
found that when people encounter information that is incongruent 
with their initial affective apprehensions, they actually recall 
congruent memories that help to bolster their existing attitudes.
Another objection may concern my claim that the emotions 
that contribute to an individual's evaluative knowledge about a 
political object, are those triggered by that object. It could be argued 
that it is difficult to differentiate those emotions. Specifically, it may 
be difficult to isolate our apprehension of political objects and the 
emotions that they elicit, from external emotional influences, such as 
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those more or less subtly conveyed by the media, and which in turn 
affect our apprehension of those objects. Moreover, we may be easily 
mistaken in attributing the cause of an emotion that we experience, to 
a political event, rather than to a personal one. 
Despite recognizing these difficulties, I argue that they may not 
be as problematic, if we take the role of factual knowledge into 
account; a point which I emphasized earlier. Specifically, I contest 
that politically sophisticated individuals, who possess more consistent 
factual knowledge, may be better at integrating their emotional 
appraisals into their additional epistemic attitudes, and that they may 
be better at recognizing which environmental features trigger their 
emotions. Factual knowledge is crucial to emotions' contribution to 
evaluative knowledge; however, provided an adequate set of 
additional non-emotional attitudes is in place, such a contribution 
may still play the relevant role that I have described. 
One further point that I would like to consider briefly, 
concerns the work of Martha Nussbaum, especially in relation to her 
recent book "Political Emotions", with the rather suggestive 
subheading: "Why Love Matters for Justice". Nussbaum's core 
premise is that the goal of constructing a better society, by relieving 
poverty, fostering racial justice, and advancing democracy, can only 
be reached with the contribution of the vast majority of citizens. She 
argues that, in order to persuade citizens to dedicate their time, 
resources, and passions towards reaching this goal, it is vital to 
activate their most powerful positive emotions, especially compassion 
and love. According to Nussbaum, love, in particular, can motivate 
and sustain people's cooperation, altruism, and caring within a larger 
society. In the book, Nussbaum explores the role of public rituals and 
speeches extensively, as well as the role of the narratives and systems 
of education that should be constructed, in order to stir people's 
positive emotions. 
Although the scope of this paper prevents me from engaging in 
a thorough discussion of Nussbaum's ideas; even more so given that it 
is not my primary interest here to advance any normative proposal, I 
would like to point out one evident difference between Nussbaum's 
account of political emotions and the account that I have developed 
in this paper. I do not dismiss Nussbaum's claim that "All political 
principles, the good as well as the bad, need emotional support to 
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ensure their stability over time, and all decent societies need to guard 
against division and hierarchy by cultivating appropriate sentiments 
of sympathy and love" (Nussbaum 2013 p 2-3). However, I believe that 
the latter are not the only emotional instances that may serve a 
positive function within the political context, and therefore I do not 
believe that they are the only ones that should be promoted. 
Emotions with a negative valence, such as anger and fear, may also 
provide a valuable contribution, when their epistemic dimension is 
considered. As I have illustrated in the last section of this paper, 
emotions may contribute to making evaluative knowledge about 
political objects more sophisticated, and their contribution does not 
depend on their valence, but rather on their capacity to make the 
certain evaluative features, of the political objects that trigger them, 
personally salient. Thus, not only positive emotions but also general 
emotional engagement with political objects, including negative 
emotions, may serve a positive function within the political context, 
and should therefore be promoted. Clearly, as I have repeatedly 
emphasized throughout my argument, it is fundamental for the 
epistemic and the political value of such emotional engagement, that 
the latter is supported by, and integrated within, an adequate set of 
non-emotional attitudes towards the political objects in question.
Conclusion
The purpose of my paper was to argue in favor of a relevant, 
epistemic role for emotions within the political context. In order to 
achieve this, I first showed that emotions can provide an evaluative 
type of knowledge about political objects, and that such knowledge is 
epistemically valuable when it is coherent with a set of non-emotional 
attitudes towards those objects. By introducing the concept of 
political sophistication, I showed that an evaluative type of knowledge 
is relevant within the political domain. Following that, I argued that 
the emotions' contribution to evaluative knowledge about political 
objects is politically valuable when it is integrated within an adequate 
set of non-emotional attitudes towards those objects. By referencing 
Goldie's distinction between the emotional and non-emotional 
apprehension of evaluative content, I claimed the existence of a 
qualitative difference between the evaluative knowledge achieved 
with the contribution of emotions, and the one achieved without such 
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a contribution. In transposing this difference to the political context, 
I identified the distinctive character of the evaluative information that 
is provided by emotions, in the personal import that the evaluative 
features of such objects bear for the agent. 
Finally, I argued that this distinctive contribution is relevant, 
not merely by virtue of its content, but also because of its inclusion in 
the integrative process, is aimed at reaching coherence, through 
which the agent's evaluative knowledge is formed. Specifically, the 
evaluative knowledge that results from an integrative process, which 
includes emotions, presents a more politically sophisticated character 
and herein, I believe, lies the relevance of the epistemic contribution 
of emotions to the evaluative knowledge about political objects.
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Chapter 2
The Epistemic Value of Emotions 
in Literary Narrative
Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to determine how emotions contribute to the 
understanding of literary narratives. Narrative understanding depends on 
the connection between the elements within a narrative, but previous 
philosophical solutions that explain the contribution of emotions to this 
connection seem to be inadequate. I develop a more plausible account, 
by drawing insights from empirical literature, and by applying an 
enactivist account of emotions. I argue that the reader responds to 
emotional affordances in the text, and that by feeling or inferring 
emotions, she processes subsequent elements in the narrative in respect 
to the anticipation afforded by previous elements. I conclude that this is 
the way in which emotions intervene to connect the elements within a 
narrative, thus contributing to narrative understanding.
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Introduction
When judging the quality of a novel or a short story, people 
commonly resort to terms with emotional connotations, such as 
"engaging," "moving," "funny," "disturbing," etc. Emotional elements 
are conventionally assumed to be part of the appreciation and the 
aesthetic character of a narrative. What is more controversial is 
whether emotions have any epistemic function in respect to 
narratives, that is, whether they play any role in their understanding. 
Studies conducted in philosophy, literary studies, and, more recently, 
in psychology and cognitive sciences, have maintained that 
understanding a narrative is something different than understanding 
other kinds of texts, such as essays or poems. What is peculiar about 
narrative understanding, and how it is brought about, are long 
debated questions. In this paper, I do not intend to provide an 
exhaustive answer to these questions, but to offer a contribution to 
the ongoing discussion. Specifically, I will determine what kind of 
understanding the emotions involved in reading a narrative may 
provide, and I will explain how they may be able to do so. Before 
introducing the central concepts of my analysis, a few preliminary 
notes are in order.
First, I will not try to establish which criteria are sufficient for 
a text to be a narrative, or how different degrees of "narrativity" may 
be attributed to a text. My focus will be epistemological rather than 
metaphysical: instead of inquiring into what a narrative is, I will focus 
on how the reader understands it. Moreover, by taking into account 
the results of empirical studies on narrative processing and 
comprehension, I will consider the experience of the actual reader, 
rather than considering the reader merely as a hypothetical construct. 
My second remark concerns the use of the expression "narrative 
explanation." In this paper, I take the term "narrative explanation" to 
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refer to the way a narrative presents its elements as connected, and 
thereby conveys a certain understanding of those elements. However, 
I do not enter the debate on whether the form of narrative 
explanation is more or less explanatory than others, as I am not 
interested in assessing the value of narratives based on their 
explanatory powers. Finally, I specifically consider the literary kind of 
narrative typical of novels and short stories. As Lamarque (2004) 
rightly points out, this is only one particular instance of the more 
neutral concept of narrative, which also includes, for instance, 
biographical and historical kinds. I focus on literary narrative, 
because it is the object of most of the relevant literature on the topic. 
In addition to this, it is the kind of narrative that involves the most 
emotional states. Establishing whether or not any of the claims in this 
paper may be generalized to other types of narrative falls beyond my 
scope here.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 1, I clarify the 
notion of narrative understanding, as depending on the connection 
between the elements within a narrative. In section 2, I examine how 
Velleman and other scholars propose to account for the contribution 
of emotions to this connection, and I explain why I consider each of 
their solutions inadequate. In order to construct a more suitable 
account, I look for insights in the empirical literature. In section 3, I 
identify the on-line emotional states relevant for narrative 
understanding, and I include among them not only felt emotions, but 
also inferred ones. In section 4, I consider the role that such states 
play in understanding a narrative, according to the cognitive model 
and to Miall's model. By comparing them, I show that both models 
consider emotions as contributing to narrative understanding in 
virtue of their capacity to connect previous with subsequent narrative 
elements. In order to explain how this feature can comprehensively 
account for the role of both felt and inferred emotions in narrative 
understanding, I illustrate Ellis' enactivist account of emotions in 
section 5. In section 6, I apply this account to the case of literary 
narrative: I argue that literary narratives offer emotional affordances 
to the reader, making her feel emotions towards the narrative. 
Moreover, I argue that both felt and inferred emotions are 
characterized by an implicit intentionality, and because of it, the 
reader processes upcoming narrative elements in respect to the 
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anticipation afforded by previous elements. I conclude that this is the 
way in which emotions intervene to connect the elements within a 
narrative, therefore contributing to narrative understanding.
1.  What is narrative understanding? The initial debate
The terms of the debate over narrative understanding were defined 
by the philosophers Noël Carroll and David Velleman. They both 
endorse the idea that understanding a narrative means to see the 
narrated events as related to each other in a meaningful way, and that 
the particular way in which they are related is what conveys the 
understanding of them as forming a narrative. Specifically, Carroll 
(2001) coined the expression "narrative connection," to indicate that 
the events presented in a narrative are connected in a distinct way, in 
comparison to events that are presented as connected in other kinds 
of texts. The particular connection between the events in a narrative 
is what conveys, in Velleman's words, a "narrative explanation" 
(Velleman 2003), that is, an understanding of the events presented as 
part of a narrative. In the following discussion, I illustrate how Carroll 
and Velleman hold different conceptions of the nature of the 
narrative connection, and consequently, of the kind of understanding 
that it brings about. 
According to Carroll (2001), the narrative connection is 
necessarily causal: narrative events are meaningfully connected to 
each other only if they are causally related. Carroll does not intend 
this causal connection in the sense that earlier events necessitate later 
events, but only in the sense that earlier events are causally relevant 
conditions for later events. For instance, "[w]e read that a thief enters 
a bank and robs it; in the next scene, as he exits the bank, he is 
apprehended by the police whom we subsequently learn have been 
watching him all along" (Carroll 2001, 122). In this narrative, robbing 
the bank is causally relevant for the police apprehension, but does 
not necessarily entail it; rather, robbing the bank is a necessary part 
of the sufficient cause for the police apprehension. For Carroll, what 
is distinctive of the narrative connection is a retrospective causal 
explanation: the events must be related in such a way, that the reader 
can infer causation, namely, the reader must recognize that earlier 
events were causally relevant conditions for the occurrence of later 
events in the story. 
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Velleman (2003) criticized Carroll's proposal on the ground 
that it fails to define what is explanatory about the causal connection 
specifically provided in a narrative form, in comparison to the causal 
connection provided in other forms, for instance in an argument. 
According to Velleman, although causality is necessary for a 
narrative, as a narrative would make no sense without it, it is not the 
distinctive feature of the narrative connection: understanding the 
events presented as meaningfully related to each other within a 
narrative text does not distinctively entail understanding them as 
causally connected, but as emotionally connected. More precisely, 
Velleman claims that the specificity of a narrative lies in the 
organization of the events narrated in such a way that the reader finds 
their sequence emotionally satisfying: what is distinctive about a 
narrative is not that it represents how events happen, but how they 
feel. Velleman presents an example from Aristotle's narration of the 
following events: Mitys was murdered, and then, the murderer of 
Mitys was killed by a falling statue of Mitys himself. These events, 
namely the murder and the death, are apprehended as meaningfully 
connected within a narrative, not because they are counterfactually 
dependent, but because the juxtaposition of these events completes 
what Velleman calls an "emotional cadence" (Velleman 2003, 6) in the 
audience: 
"When a murder is followed by a fitting comeuppance, we feel 
indignation gratified. Although these events follow no causal 
sequence, they provide an emotional resolution, and so they 
have a meaning for the audience, despite lacking any causal 
connection" (Velleman 2003, 6). 
The peculiarity of a narrative connection in comparison to a 
mere causal one has also been highlighted by authors other than 
Velleman. In this paper, I do not delve further into the importance of 
causality for constituting the narrative connection but, following 
Velleman's critique, I endorse the idea that grasping the causal 
relations between events does not exhaust the understanding of them 
as part of a narrative. Given that my objective is not to determine 
what is peculiar about narrative understanding, I do not try to assess 
whether emotions, as Velleman claims, are what distinctively and 
necessarily mark the process of narrative understanding. Instead, 
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what I do is to determine whether and how emotions can provide any 
understanding of the narrative that elicits them, and what kind of 
understanding that is. I will start by discussing the solutions 
proposed by Velleman and other scholars.
2.  Philosophical accounts of emotion and narrative understanding
In this section, I illustrate how Velleman and other scholars have 
conceived the contribution of emotion to narrative understanding. 
Specifically, I examine the notions of emotional closure and 
emotional resonance, as well as the idea that feeling emotions helps 
understanding by filling gaps in the text, and the idea that emotions 
foster understanding by forming evaluations. Then, I explain why 
each of these solutions is problematic, and ultimately unsatisfactory.
2.1 Emotional closure
According to Velleman, narrated events are meaningfully connected 
because their sequence is emotionally significant, and such 
significance crucially depends on the presence of a final resolution in 
the narrative: "the power to initiate and resolve [emphasis mine] an 
emotional cadence ought to endow narrative with its power to render 
events intelligible" (Velleman 2003, 18). For Velleman, the 
explanation of narrated events consists in an understanding of them 
as an "intelligible whole" (Velleman 2003, 1), and this can only be 
achieved by the presence of a conclusive event, whose emotional 
significance brings to an end the emotional sequence produced by 
the preceding events. A classic example of such "emotional closure" is 
the relief of a happy ending, after the fear occasioned by a cliff-
hanger.
Velleman's claim might be questioned. Although narrated 
events may be connected in an emotionally significant way, as 
highlighted by Velleman, it does not follow that the emotional 
sequence they form should be completed, in order for these events to 
be apprehended as part of a narrative. A typical example is the case of 
open-ended narratives: the emotions associated with the events in a 
narrative may convey a narrative connection, without necessarily 
resolving the climatic feeling that they instantiate. Therefore, 
regardless of whether or not closure is a necessary element for a 
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narrative to be such,5 reducing the role of emotions for narrative 
understanding to their capacity to provide closure does not seem 
appropriate.
2.2 Emotional resonance
As was previously mentioned, for Velleman, the reader understands 
narrated events as connected in a narrative form because they 
produce an emotional cadence. He argues that the reader catches 
such cadence, and consequently the narrative connection, because "it 
resonates with a familiar emotional pattern" (Velleman 2003, 21):
"Although the audience may have no discursive memory of events 
such as those of the story, it nevertheless has an experience of déja 
senti, because its emotional sensibility naturally follows the ups and 
downs of the story, just as a muscle naturally follows the cycle of 
tension and release" (Velleman 2003, 19). 
According to Velleman, the process of resonance between the 
emotional sequence of a narrative and our emotional sensibility is 
made possible because of the "diachronic nature" (Velleman 2003, 14) 
of emotions themselves, as they presuppose other emotions before 
and after. Relief and disappointment, for instance, presuppose fear 
and hope, respectively: relief comes from fear not confirmed by later 
events, disappointment comes from unfulfilled hope caused by 
certain events. According to Velleman, long sequences of emotions 
can be generated because of their presuppositions and consequences: 
"One emotion often gives way to another: puzzlement to curiosity, 
curiosity to foreboding, foreboding to horror, horror to grief-or 
perhaps instead to anger, which gives way to resentment, and so on" 
(Velleman 2003, 14). Under the assumption of the diachronic nature of 
emotions, narrated events can be connected to form an emotional 
sequence, specifically because they convey emotions that are 
themselves essentially part of a sequence.
Again, Velleman's claim does not seem to be warranted. 
Within narratives, indeed, a few emotions may appear in 
conventional sequences, such as those mentioned above. Many 
5 Carroll (2007), among others, has pointed out that "although closure is a recurring 
feature of some, even a great many, narratives, closure is not a feature of all 
narratives, let alone, as some have suggested, a distinctive or essential feature of 
narrative as such" (Carroll 2007, 2).
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others, however, appear within sequences that are only arbitrarily 
established, as their order, in relation to the events within a narrative, 
vary greatly. 
Moreover, from Velleman's description, it seems that 
emotional resonance is produced by somehow comparing a 
representation of the emotional structure of the story with the 
reader's natural emotional structure. However, Velleman does not 
clarify what the objects of this comparison actually are, and how the 
comparison occurs. Overall, it seems that the process of emotional 
resonance is not sufficiently specified and supported to properly 
characterize how the narrative connection, and the corresponding 
narrative understanding, are brought about.
2.3 Feeling emotions as filling gaps
Robinson (2010) noted that a literary narrative is a kind of text 
characterized by the presence of gaps, and understanding it 
necessarily entails filling those gaps: "an author relies upon our 
making inferences all the time as we read, in order to fill in what the 
text does not explicitly say" (Robinson 2010, 76). According to 
Robinson, in order to fill those gaps, the reader not only draws causal 
kinds of inferences, but also relies on her emotional responses. These 
responses, specifically, fill gaps in the text because they alert the 
reader to important information about character and plot that is not 
explicitly asserted in the text: "In The Ambassadors Henry James does 
not say 'Strether is a mildly comic character.' He induces us to laugh 
(rather quietly!) at Strether" (Robinson 2010, 77). A child, Robinson 
argues, who does not get the author's irony in "The Ambassadors," 
may understand the literal meanings of the words, but will not 
understand the characters and their motivations, and therefore he 
will not properly understand the narrative. Robinson claims, similar 
to Velleman, that 
"[O]ur emotional experience of a novel is itself a form of 
understanding, even if it is an inarticulate or relatively 
inarticulate understanding: if I laugh and cry, shiver, tense, 
and relax in all the 'right' places, then I have in some sense 
understood the story" (Robinson 2010, 77)
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The presence of gaps in literary narratives has also been 
highlighted by proponents of an enactivist approach to literature, 
such as Caracciolo (2012) and Popova (2014). In their accounts, they 
describe narrative understanding as a "participatory process of sense 
making," meaning that the reader makes sense of the narrated 
content, by engaging with it. They claim that the reader's 
understanding of the narrative emerges from the interaction between 
the text and the reader's world, that is, her experiences, values, 
beliefs, and emotions, as triggered by the text. Similarly to Robinson 
(2010), Popova notes, "[l]iterary texts have more gaps than other forms 
of communication, hence, require more active participation" (Popova 
2014, 10), and it is precisely through "the emotional reactions and the 
evaluations of the recipients of a story" (Caracciolo 2012, 381) that the 
understanding of a narrative can take place. 
What the accounts proposed by Velleman, Robinson, and the 
enactivists Caracciolo and Popova have in common is the idea that 
emotions contribute to the understanding of the narrative in virtue of 
their being felt by the reader. Whether it is the comeuppance or 
indignation in respect to the events narrated, the amusement at the 
irony of a situation, or any other emotion triggered by the text that 
helps the reader to make sense of it, the common assumption made 
by these authors is that the way in which these emotional states 
contribute to connecting the narrated events is through their being 
felt by the reader. 
Leaving aside whether or not feeling an emotion is necessary 
in order to experience a narrative connection,6 it seems that emotions 
might contribute to the understanding of the narrative, even if they 
are not properly felt. For instance, certain romantic stories or crime 
6 Carroll (2007) disputes the idea that understanding a narrative requires feeling 
emotions. He points out that narratives are not necessarily designed to trigger 
emotional reactions: "Surely, one may tell an affectless narrative – perhaps one 
about the collision of a comet with an asteroid in a galaxy far, far away. I see no 
reason to deny that such a story could be a narrative, even though it arouses no 
emotion . . . Perhaps, most aesthetic narratives engage the emotions. But there are 
also literary experiments that strive for a clinical, affectless presentation of events" 
(Carroll 2007, 14). Moreover, as noted by Henning (2009), even narratives that do 
have the goal of triggering emotional reactions may fail to do so, but they still retain 
the status of narratives; as Henning notes, Velleman fails to acknowledge this: in his 
account, boring narratives cannot even be narratives, because, by failing to elicit 
any emotions, they cannot establish any narrative cadence, and therefore they 
cannot form a narrative connection between the narrated events (Henning 2009, 
200).
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dramas are so predictable that the reader may be perfectly able to 
detect in which places the climactic tension is supposed to rise or 
dissolve, without actually feeling any tension or relief. Similarly, it 
seems plausible for a reader to understand that a certain situation is 
ironic without being amused by it, and to understand what kind of 
emotions certain narrative events are supposed to arouse, without 
being herself aroused by them. To conclude, emotions may intervene 
in the understanding of a narrative even if they are not felt.
2.4 Emotions as evaluations 
What emerges from Velleman's account is that the narrative 
connection arises from the link between making evaluative sense of 
the narrated events, and experiencing emotions about them: simply 
put, as the villain is punished and the hero wins, the reader feels 
good, and it is in virtue of this that she apprehends the events she is 
reading about as forming a narrative. Other scholars have followed up 
on this idea. Among the most prominent, Currie (2006) has argued 
that our sense of a narrative connection is given by some reason-
based dependencies that we attribute to the relation between events 
in a story. According to Currie, such reason-based dependencies may 
be grounded in our tendency to see that some events restore the 
moral balance compromised by previous events, as suggested by 
Velleman. However, Currie claims, they may also be grounded in 
other principles, such as, in the thought that the universe is 
fundamentally ironic, and that therefore it fosters injustice. 
According to Currie, we attribute to the events in the story a 
connection that suits the framework we adopt: 
"Our affective response to the narrative can influence the 
extent to which we interpret the events of the story as 
connected by reason-based relations; this perception, or 
misperception, of a connection then has further emotional 
effects on us, and may contribute to our sense that this 
discourse really is a narrative, rather than something else" 
(Currie 2006, 315).
 It seems that both Velleman and Currie recognize emotions as 
playing a role in forming a narrative connection, but only in respect 
to some other elements, such as evaluative judgments or, more 
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generally, reason-based dependences. In contrast to this position, I 
argue that such elements are not the vehicles through which 
emotions contribute to narrative understanding. 
Indeed, the emotions that the reader feels with respect to a 
narrative might influence the formation of evaluative judgments 
about the narrated events, and, more generally, might foster the 
instantiation of reason-based dependencies. For example, the novel 
The Betrothed by A. Manzoni (Manzoni 1898), presents "Divine 
Providence" as the main force governing the world: in light of this, 
the reader's pity towards the poor Lucia, kept captive by The 
Unnamed, might inform her evaluative judgment that she should be 
saved, and this is exactly what the reader expects to happen. A 
different example is provided by the short stories in Brief Interviews 
with Hideous Men by D. F. Wallace (Wallace 2012): given the author's 
pervasive irony, the pity that the reader might feel towards the 
unlucky characters is accompanied by amusement, and does not 
activate her expectation of a moral order to be reestablished, but 
rather of more adversities to occur, in line with the grotesque and 
comic tone of the book. 
Although emotions might contribute to the reader's 
construction of a framework, based on her evaluative/reason-based 
considerations, as shown by the examples above,7 I argue that these 
considerations do not concern the process of narrative 
understanding. Indeed, the reader might make use of a certain 
interpretative framework (e.g., by assuming a world ruled by "Divine 
Providence" or by Murphy's law), in order to make sense of the 
sequence of events she has read about. By doing so, she engages in 
the interpretation of the connection between the narrated events; that 
is, by framing them within a certain interpretative matrix, she sees 
why it makes sense that a certain event followed another within the 
narrative (e.g., assuming that the world is ruled by divine providence, 
7 Whether or not understanding a narrative necessarily involves the construction of 
an evaluative/reason-based framework is questionable. Many narratives may 
deliberately lack any elements for an evaluative assessment on the part of the 
reader, or they may present such elements as so conflicting that any assessment may 
be problematic. For instance, the author may induce the reader to experience 
contrasting attitudes towards certain characters, making her unsure whether they 
should be pitied or punished. An obvious example is given by the so-called 
"antiheros" in literature, such as Madame Bovary, in the eponymous novel by G. 
Flaubert (Flaubert 1981), or Meursault in The Stranger by A. Camus (Camus 1954)
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it makes sense that Lucia's kidnapping is followed by The Unnamed's 
repentance, and then by her liberation). 
This process of interpretation, however, is not equivalent to 
narrative understanding. Specifically, narrative understanding, as 
characterized in section 1, is a more basic process, consisting in the 
apprehension of the unfolding narrated events as connected in such a 
way that they form a narrative. Instead, as illustrated above, the 
interpretation of the connection between narrated events consists in 
the apprehension of such events as filling a certain interpretative 
matrix. Therefore, the contribution of emotions to the interpretation 
of narrated events, on the basis of evaluative/reason-based relations, 
as specified by Velleman and Currie, is not the epistemic contribution 
of emotion about which the present paper is concerned.
2.5 Final considerations
As I have illustrated in this section, emotions have been claimed to 
contribute to the narrative connection, and consequently to narrative 
understanding, in different ways. All of these interpretations, 
however, seem problematic. Specifically, the contribution of the 
reader's emotions to narrative understanding cannot be reduced to 
the presence of emotional closure; it is not explained by the notion of 
emotional resonance; it is not exhausted by the felt character of 
emotions; and finally, it does not seem to depend on the role of 
emotions in the formation of an evaluative framework. 
In light of these criticisms, it is likely that none of the 
proposed ways are suitable to account for the contribution of 
emotions to narrative understanding. This, however, does not entail 
that emotions do not offer such a contribution at all. Rather, I argue 
that they do, but that a more suitable account is needed to explain 
what this contribution consists in, and how it is achieved. A 
fundamental consideration for a proper account of the epistemic 
function of emotions within narratives is that it is grounded in, or at 
least, does not contradict, the available empirical data. Before 
discussing this data more specifically, it is important to clarify what 
kind of emotions we are talking about.
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3.  Which emotions are elicited during literary reading?
Given that, as illustrated in section 1, narrative understanding consists 
in the apprehension of the unfolding narrated events as forming a 
narrative, the emotional states that are relevant for narrative 
understanding are the on-line ones: that is, those occurring during 
comprehension, in the course of reading (Kneepkens and Zwaan 
1995). I include among on-line emotional states not only the emotions 
that the reader feels but also those that she infers, because, as I will 
show throughout the paper, both are relevant for narrative 
understanding, and in virtue of the same relevant feature.
Concerning felt emotions, different taxonomies of emotional 
responses elicited during literary reading have been proposed. One 
important distinction was pointed out by Miall and Kuiken (2002), 
who differentiate "narrative feelings," which are experienced by the 
reader towards specific aspects of the narrative itself, such as events 
and characters, from "aesthetic feelings," which occur in response to 
the formal and stylistic components of a text, such as figures of 
speech and other linguistic features. In the group of narrative 
feelings, I include the emotions of sympathy and empathy towards 
narrative characters. In the literature, sympathy is defined as feeling 
for another in a certain situation, while empathy involves taking the 
perspective of another, and feeling, as a result, an emotion similar to 
the one experienced by the other. For instance, when in the novel My 
Brilliant Friend by E. Ferrante (2012), Lila is mistreated by her father, 
the reader experiences sympathy and feels sorry for her if she 
considers Lila's situation, while she experiences empathy if she 
identifies with Lila, and, like her, feels angry towards the father.
One further category of emotional responses elicited during 
literary reading is given by the so called "remembered emotions" 
(Cupchik et al 1998): they occur when a situation described in the 
narrative reminds the reader about a personal situation, and evokes 
the emotion that the reader experienced in relation to that. For 
instance, reading about Al playing tennis in Infinite Jest by D. F. 
Wallace (2011) may remind the reader about her difficulties in learning 
that sport, and may evoke a feeling of unease; alternatively, it may 
remind the reader about the pleasant afternoons spent playing with 
her father, evoking a feeling of joy. The kinds of emotions evoked 
during literary reading cannot be sharply disentangled, as they may 
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occur simultaneously, and they may interact with each other. For 
instance, feelings of sympathy and empathy may be driven by 
personal recollections, and formal aspects of the text may remind the 
reader about familiar patterns, evoking emotions that are both 
"aesthetic" and "remembered" (Mar 2011, 826).
Concerning inferred emotions, characters' emotional states 
may be inferred by the reader if they are not mentioned in the text 
(i.e., "elaborative inferences", van den Broek 1990). For instance, by 
reading that the hero turned pale after hearing a voice from the grave, 
the reader may infer that he felt fear. If the emotional state is 
mentioned, its connection to the story events may be inferred (i.e., 
"backwards inferences", van den Broek 1990). For instance, by 
reading that the hero was ashamed of his actions, and then went to an 
isolated place, the reader may infer that he hid because he was 
ashamed. 
Besides inferring a character's emotional state, the reader may 
also infer the mood or tone of the story, which is conveyed by the 
description of situations, settings, and objects. The description of a 
dark stormy night, for example, may be detected by the reader as a 
schema for the attribution of fear; the reunion of two lovers after 
many vicissitudes may be associated with relief, and so on. As I will 
later explain more thoroughly, the same narrative event may be a 
source of both inferred and felt emotions. The expert reader, who is 
acquainted with certain schemas and topical narrative elements, may 
be able to detect their emotional significance without really feeling 
any emotion. In contrast, if the framing of narrative events induces 
the expert reader to infer suspense, those same events may induce the 
less expert reader who is not yet so familiar with these narrative 
schemas, to actually feel suspense. Even the same expert reader, if 
she was recently robbed, may be more engrossed than usual in the 
same murder mystery, that seemed to her trivial before. I will return 
to this issue in section 6. Now, I will proceed to illustrate the studies 
that analyze specifically how the variety of emotional states elicited, 
both felt and inferred, during reading are relevant for narrative 
understanding.
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4.  Empirical accounts of emotion and narrative understanding
In this section, I present and compare the two most prominent 
approaches in psychology to the processing and the comprehension 
of narratives, namely, the cognitive model, and the model proposed 
by David Miall. Then, I discuss how they may offer valuable insights 
for developing a comprehensive account of the contribution of 
emotions to narrative understanding.
4.1 Cognitive models 
Within the cognitive framework, understanding a narrative involves 
constructing not just a verbatim representation of the words, but 
rather a mental representation of the state of affairs denoted by the 
text, namely a "situation model" (Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). In order 
to convey understanding, the model should be coherent, that is it 
should present conceptual connections among text elements, 
explaining why actions, events and states are mentioned within the 
text (Graesser et al 1994). The construction of such a model requires 
the reader to integrate information from the text with relevant 
background knowledge, and to make inferences in order to include 
information that is not made explicit in the text. In terms of basic 
comprehension, the most significant narrative inferences are those 
that maintain the causal coherence of a story, but inferring 
information about space, time, goals, and motivation is also highly 
relevant (Graesser et al 1994). Difficulties in the generation of 
inferences have been found to implicate failures in comprehending 
narratives (Yuill and Oakhill 1996). The cognitive approach 
investigates the contribution of emotions to narrative understanding, 
in terms of how inferring and feeling certain emotional states during 
reading contributes to the construction of an accurate situation 
model.
Concerning the inference of emotions, proponents of cognitive 
models have argued that readers infer emotions from the 
juxtaposition of the character's actions, goals, and relationships 
(Gernsbacher et al 1992). In one of the first studies trying to 
demonstrate that characters' emotions are represented in readers' 
mental models (Gernsbacher et al 1992), readers were presented with 
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narratives that implied the emotional state of a character, without 
explicitly stating it. Each narrative ended with a sentence explicitly 
mentioning an emotion that either matched or mismatched the 
emotional state previously implied. For instance, the story about Tom 
who steals from a cashier and then finds out that his friend has been 
unjustly accused of the theft, was followed by either a matching final 
sentence ("It would be weeks before Tom's guilt would subside") or a 
mismatching final sentence ("It would be weeks before Tom's pride 
would subside"). The results showed that readers read the first 
sentence faster than the second. According to the authors, these 
results indicate that readers inferred the character's emotional state 
while reading, including this information in their mental model, as 
the matching sentence was incorporated in the model more readily 
than the mismatching one.8 Follow-up studies revealed that readers 
were able to update their representations of the characters' emotional 
states to fit contextual shifts, and that such representations were kept 
accessible beyond the local context in order to provide global 
coherence to the narratives (de Vega et al 1996). Further studies 
demonstrated that readers made emotional inferences about narrative 
characters, in a rather automatic way (Gernsbacher et al 1998).
4.2 Miall's model
In contrast to the cognitive approach, Miall did not conceive the 
contribution of emotions to narrative understanding as providing 
elements for the construction of an appropriate representation of the 
narrated content, but rather as the very principle guiding the process 
8 Another experiment in the same study (Gernsbacher et al 1992), contrasting 
different emotions with the same valence (e.g., anger and boredom), presented 
similar results, supporting the idea that the readers' representations of emotional 
states included more details than just valence. However, the specificity of the 
emotions inferred during reading was questioned by Gygax and colleagues (2003). 
They used a similar methodology to Gernsbacher and colleagues (1992): after 
presenting a narrative implying a target emotion (e.g., boredom), they contrasted 
the final sentence containing this emotion not only with a sentence containing a 
mismatching emotion (e.g., excitement), but also with sentences containing a 
synonymous emotion (e.g., unchallenged), and a similar emotion (e.g., loneliness). 
They found a significant difference in reading times between matching and 
mismatching emotions, but no difference between all matching emotions (target, 
synonym, and similar). From these results, the authors concluded that the readers' 
representations of characters' emotions were not as specific as previously claimed. 
Later studies (Gillioz & Gygax 2017) showed that the specificity of emotional 
inferences depended upon the contextual support from the text.
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of understanding. Specifically, Miall (1988a) identifies two levels of 
understanding of a literary text. The first level concerns those parts of 
the text providing information about a situation that is readily 
grasped by the reader. These parts allow the reader to instantiate a 
schema, based on her pre-existing knowledge of the world. The 
second level of understanding concerns those parts of the text called 
"foregrounded features," including, either phonetic (e.g., rhymes and 
alliterations), syntactic (e.g., the repetition of phrase structures), or 
semantic (e.g., irony and metaphors) stylistic effects. Foregrounded 
features disrupt habitual comprehension schemata, as their meaning 
is ambiguous. In order to resolve the indeterminacy of these parts of 
the text, Miall argues, the reader resorts to her affective responses, as 
a principle to guide comprehension (Miall 1989, Miall and Kuiken 
1994a, 1994b, 2001). 
In a range of experiments with short stories, Miall and Kuiken 
(1994b) have shown that the extent to which foregrounding is present 
in the segments of a narrative is a predictor of both reading times, 
and readers' reports of these segments as affectively more intense. 
They interpret these findings as indicating that more ambiguous parts 
of the text require a longer time to read because they require the 
mobilization of resources other than preexisting schemas, in order be 
understood, and that the aroused emotional responses direct the 
search for meaning. In another study, Miall (2004) focused on a 
structural unit called "episode"9 within literary texts. Readers were 
presented with a short story, divided into subsequent sections, and 
they reported greater shifts in feeling when comparing sections that 
marked divisions between episodes, rather than within an episode. 
Such feelings included empathy for characters, or feelings due to the 
plot, such as suspense, curiosity, or surprise. In interpreting this 
finding, Miall argued that feelings are used by the reader as markers 
for episodes, and therefore as a vehicle to structure the narrative: 
"[F]eeling is able to overcome the limitations of working 
memory, providing a platform for registering the implications 
of events as they unfold within an episode. In addition, feeling 
9 Miall defines an episode in the following terms: "In prose this is likely to consist 
of a number of sentences taking up half a page or a page, usually demarcated by a 
coherence in the temporal or spatial setting or both. The most signal feature of the 
episode, however, is that it offers a thematically distinctive topic requiring a shift in 
the reader's understanding" (Miall 2004, 112).
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registers shifts in significance as one episode takes up, and 
develops the issues laid out in a previous episode" (Miall 2015, 
130).
In the model elaborated by Miall, emotions guide the search 
for meaning in ambiguous parts of the text, in virtue of their self-
referential and anticipatory character. Specifically, according to Miall, 
emotional responses not only implicate the reader's reference to her 
own experiences when she relates to characters and situations in a 
narrative, but they also imply the significance of these experiences for 
the reader's concerns and goals. In other words, the reader has an 
emotional response to certain parts of the text, because these parts 
recall one of her current concerns: "the reader's response to literary 
narrative may rehearse on a symbolic stage the current concerns of 
the self" (Miall 1989, 63). Experimental results (e.g., Miall 1988b, 1990) 
seem to show that readers tend to agree on which parts of the text 
require a second level of understanding, but they differ in their 
affective response to these parts, and in their resulting understanding 
of them. This is due, Miall argues, to the fact that the text evokes 
different concerns in different readers. 
In Miall's model, the self-referential character of affective 
responses motivates the reader to seek a resolution to the critical 
implications of the narrative for her own concerns. This kind of 
motivation is what gives affective responses their second fundamental 
feature for guiding the understanding of the literary text, that is, their 
anticipatory character: "Given the indeterminacy of the reader's 
experience, the reader must develop some representation of the 
outcome of the narrative to keep the comprehension process on-line 
(...). In this sense, affect offers a pre-structuring of the meaning of the 
text as a whole" (Miall 1989, 61-62; emphasis added).
Miall (1988b) has shown that anticipation is common during 
the reading of narrative, while it is not during the reading of 
expository prose, and he claims that emotions are exactly the vehicle 
for the reader to make predictions while reading.
4.3 Insights from the empirical models
By comparing the cognitive model and Miall's model, it becomes 
possible to gain insight to develop a suitable philosophical account of 
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the role of emotions for narrative understanding. One of the 
assumptions that both models seem to share is that the narrative text, 
by itself, does not offer all the means to be comprehended. Instead, 
the reader's emotions, or those that the reader infers, intervene to 
function as a guiding principle, or to supply further information, in 
order to achieve understanding, and this is because of the text's 
structural incompleteness or indeterminacy. This assumption echoes 
the philosophical idea which was illustrated in section 2.3, that 
literary narratives have gaps, and can be understood by filling those 
gaps with the emotions felt by the reader. In this respect, the 
cognitive model seems to accommodate the objection that emotions 
can contribute to understanding, without being necessarily felt. 
Indeed, within the cognitive framework, it seems plausible for the 
reader to get the irony of a situation, or to detect climactic points in a 
narrative, by making the appropriate inferences from textual cues. 
What both models seem to consider important for 
understanding a narrative is the connection between elements within 
the text. This idea seems to be consistent with Carroll's and 
Velleman's conception of a "narrative connection" as conveying a 
"narrative explanation," which I discussed in section 1. The two 
models, however, emphasize a different kind of connection between 
text elements. On the one hand, for the cognitive paradigm, the 
reader's model of the narrative conveys an understanding of the text, 
by being coherent: that is, by explaining (inferentially) how the text 
elements fit within the model in relation to one another. On the other 
hand, Miall considers narrative understanding to be not just about 
the representation of the context denoted by the text, but rather 
about the reader's structuring of the narrated elements as they unfold 
during the reading process. Despite their differences, both 
conceptions seem to be based on the assumption that understanding 
a narrative depends on a certain connection between text elements, 
and both models consider emotions, either felt (in Miall's model) or 
inferred (in the cognitive paradigm), as contributing to such a 
connection. 
For the cognitive model, emotions contribute to narrative 
understanding by affecting the connection between the elements 
within the model instantiated by the reader: the inferences about 
emotions that the reader draws help her to gain the information 
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necessary to meaningfully relate subsequent events in the narrative to 
each other. For instance, by inferring that a character is ashamed, the 
reader can understand why he goes into hiding, therefore connecting 
in a meaningful way the event of hiding with the previous ones. For 
Miall, the relevant connection for narrative understanding eludes the 
model, and its instantiation by the reader crucially depends on her 
emotional responses while reading. For instance, by feeling fear in 
respect to a certain narrated event, the reader is led to anticipate 
potentially dangerous outcomes, therefore reading the following 
events in this light. 
 In both cases, emotions seem to contribute to narrative 
understanding by connecting what comes earlier with what comes 
later, either by coherently relating text elements within the reader's 
representation, or by connecting subsequent text elements as they 
unfold during reading. My claim is that the different contributions of 
emotions to narrative understanding that the two models emphasize, 
involve both felt and inferred emotions in virtue of the same feature. 
In order to explain what this feature is, and how it can account in a 
unitary way for the role of emotions in narrative understanding, I 
consider the enactivist account of emotions proposed by Ralph Ellis 
(2005).
5.  Ellis' enactivist account of emotions 
As is typical of enactivist views, Ellis conceives the agent not as 
passively hit by environmental stimuli to which it reacts, but as an 
active organism characterized by ongoing self-organizational activity. 
In its activity, the organism is geared up to selectively attend to those 
stimuli offering action affordances10 that are relevant for its self-
organizational purposes. In this framework, emotions are not just 
responses activated by a particular stimulus, but are part of the 
organism's self-organizational ongoing activity. Specifically, they are 
processes that monitor how well the organism is doing in maintaining 
10 Ellis employs the term "affordances" as indicating those elements in the 
environment to which the organism is geared up to act, that is, those features of the 
environment that matter for the agent, and that cannot be specified independently 
from the agent's disposition to act on them. For instance, heights are an affordance, 
because they afford the action of falling on the part of the agent: in this, they are an 
environmental feature that matters for the agent, and that the agent recognizes as 
such, specifically because falling is the action that they afford for her.
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its self-organizing balance, and that indicate what to do in order to 
achieve or maintain such balance. It follows that, according to Ellis, 
the intentional object of an emotion, that is: "what the emotion is 
really about, or what causes it, or what the emotion aims primarily to 
change" (Ellis 2005 p 32) is not a specific object, but the integrity of 
the organism: "[e]motions aim towards holistic self-organizational 
purposes, rather than towards specific environmental events" (Ellis 
2005 p 32). Although the specific object triggers the emotion, it is not 
what the emotion "is about." To better clarify this point, it may be 
useful to contrast Ellis' enactivist account of emotions to other 
theories of emotions in philosophy.
It is a common assumption across different theories that an 
emotion is an intentional state, as it is directed at something, and thus 
it has an intentional object (e.g., I am afraid of something, for instance, 
a dog); such an object is characterized by certain evaluative properties 
(e.g., dangerous), and experienced as what causes the emotion (e.g., I 
experience the dangerous dog as causing my fear). Given this 
common assumption, as illustrated in this simple sketch, differences 
arise in respect to the vehicle through which the intentional object of 
the emotion is apprehended. 
For instance, according to the version of cognitivism known as 
"judgmentalism" (e.g., Solomon 1988, Nussbaum 2004), an evaluative 
judgment (i.e., the thought that the motorist has wronged me) is 
necessary to determine the intentional referent of my anger. Indeed, 
in the cognitivist paradigm, the intentional object of my anger cannot 
be identified through my bodily feelings, as my pounding heartbeat, 
for instance, could be a sign of anger, as well as of surprise, or of 
something else. The role of bodily feelings has been reconsidered by 
other contemporary philosophers, who have defined emotions as 
"perceptions" (Prinz 2005, Tappolet 2016), and as "felt bodily 
attitudes" (Deonna & Teroni 2012). According to these theories, the 
intentional object of the emotion is given by a certain representation, 
whose content is non-propositional. For instance, for Prinz (2005), 
emotions are perceptions that represent matters of concern in the 
organism-environment relationship, and they do so by registering 
particular patterns of bodily change; for Tappolet (2016), emotions are 
analogous with sense-perceptual experiences, involving non-
conceptual representations of values; Deonna and Teroni (2012) 
67
conceive of emotions as felt bodily attitudes, in which one takes a 
(bodily) attitude toward a certain object.
The enactivist view proposed by Ellis11 has some similarities 
and fundamental differences with the accounts of emotions that I 
have briefly illustrated above. It shares with the cognitivist account 
the claim that the intentional object of an emotion cannot be 
identified through its feeling component. However, differently from 
the cognitivist account, this is not because a cognitive element (i.e., an 
evaluative judgment) is necessary to identify such an object; instead, 
in the enactivist view, it is because the real intentional object of an 
emotion is not something specific, but the complex of the organism's 
self-organizational purposes. According to the enactivist view, the 
emotion, as it is felt, only reveals that something is affecting the 
balance of the organism-environment relationship, and it discloses 
some general features of this disturbance in terms of action 
affordances, that is, by signaling that something is affecting the 
organism's self-organizational activities. In comparison with the 
perceptualist account, the enactivist view similarly acknowledges the 
role of the body in feeling an emotion as it reacts to the environment; 
however, in contrast with the perceptualist account, the enactivist 
view maintains that emotions are intentional (i.e., that they are about 
some situation to which they refer) without necessarily being 
accompanied by any perceptual or interoceptive representation. 
The fundamental difference in comparison with the 
judgmentalist and the perceptualist accounts, is that, according to the 
enactivist view, the "aboutness" of an emotion cannot result from 
attributing an object to it, neither by the means of a judgment, nor by 
associating it with a perceptual or interoceptive content. The reason 
why neither the content of a thought nor a perceptual representation 
can exhaust the intentional object of an emotion is that the emotion 
already has an implicit intentionality: this kind of intentionality is 
inherent to the emotion itself, and is not about something specific; 
rather, it "has to do with the aims of self-organization, which are 
complex, relational, and oriented toward maintaining a pattern of 
11 It should be noted that, although for brevity I do not illustrate them here, further 
views of emotions that resemble the one proposed by Ellis have been advanced by 
Griffiths and Scarantino (2009), as well as by Thompson and Colombetti (2012). 
More recently, Shargel and Prinz (2017) have also elaborated an enactivist account of 
emotions.
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self-initiated action, relative to available or potentially available 
environmental affordances" (Ellis 2005, 8). For instance, an agent may 
feel anger towards the motorist that cuts her off in traffic, and may 
judge the motorist as the cause and the intentional object of her 
anger. Her anger, however, is probably not really about the motorist. 
Rather, the motorist functions as an affordance, triggering the 
expression of an emotion, that is already ongoing in the context of 
achieving the organism's self-organizational purposes, and that "may 
frequently involve larger life issues, than the trivial but powerfully 
triggering event of being cut off in traffic" (Ellis 2005, 17). This is why 
beating up the motorist usually does not result in getting rid of the 
anger: "[t]he emotion would have been just the same had the motorist 
not cut me off. It would have found some other occasion to express 
itself" (Ellis 2005, 35).
Emotions are always felt in relation to the action affordances of 
objects, "and these will be different depending on the object's 
relations to the ultimate aim, which is self-organizational and can be 
realized by a variety of combinations of conditions" (Ellis 2005, 20). A 
certain emotional response is triggered by a certain environmental 
stimulus, because the emotion, as an ongoing process, has already 
disposed the organism to selectively attend to certain affordances. For 
instance, in the example of the motorist, the anger that is already 
ongoing may result in bodily adjustments, such as tension and hyper-
vigilance, that in turn foster the agent's apprehension of the motorist 
as triggering her anger. The emotions are already underway before 
the agent processes the event that is presumed to trigger it, and 
current objects are used as opportunities to explore and unfold 
ongoing emotional processes.
According to Ellis, what art does is to specifically offer 
affordances to the agent's ongoing emotional dynamics, allowing her 
to explore and explicate her emotions. He takes paintings as an 
example: "[p]aintings, rather than causing us to see and feel certain 
ways, only provide us with an opportunity to do so" (Ellis 2005, 171). Ellis 
grounds his argument on the enactivist assumption that "[t]he total 
motivational purposes of our organisms lead us to see according to 
expectations and motivated interests that precede the presentation of a given 
stimulus" (Ellis 2005 p 169). In other words, our eyes are already active 
before encountering any stimulus, and their pattern of activity, 
69
determined by the totality of organism's self-organizational purposes, 
is what Ellis calls "the dance of the eyes" (Ellis 2005, 177). Artistic 
paintings not only present visual affordances, but also emotional 
ones. They catch our attention, specifically because they offer 
meaningful affordances for the overall motivated pattern of activity of 
the organism, which is already ongoing:
"In the experience of an emotional response to a work of art, 
we can see that the relationship between the work and the 
feeling it evokes is not a direct causal one. Just as with the 
dance of the eyes, the dance of the emotional life is already 
ongoing, and the work must speak to that" (Ellis 2005, 177)
Ellis' idea of paintings as offering emotional affordances to the 
viewer can be applied to the case of literary narrative, and it can be 
profitably used to conceive the contribution of emotions to narrative 
understanding.
6.  Implicit intentionality and narrative understanding
My proposal comprises two main claims. First, I argue that emotions 
felt during reading are triggered by elements in the text that function 
as emotional affordances, in an analogous way to Ellis' proposal for 
emotions evoked by paintings. Second, I argue that both felt and 
inferred emotions help to connect elements within the narrative and 
contribute to narrative understanding because of their implicit 
intentionality. 
According to my first claim, the narrative elements eliciting 
emotional responses, including, as mentioned in section 3, aesthetic 
features, episodes, characters, etc., are not the proper cause of 
emotions in the reader, but merely affordances that trigger in the 
reader the expression of ongoing emotional processes. For instance, 
Dumbledore's death, in Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince by J. K. 
Rowling (2005), makes us sad, but is not the cause of our sadness; 
rather, it functions as an affordance that triggers our sadness. Very 
simply put, this narrative episode may elicit an emotional response in 
the following way: Dumbledore may remind us of some important 
figures for our life, and we may compare Harry's relationship with 
him to our relationship with them: thus, as we would be (or have 
been) saddened by their deaths, we are now saddened by 
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Dumbledore's death. However, it is not the narrative event itself that 
causes us to be sad, rather, as we are humans, with affective ties to 
important figures in our life, we are geared up to respond to the death 
of those (as they matter for our well-being); therefore, Dumbledore's 
death saddens us because it is an affordance for an emotional 
dynamic that is already ours.
Conceiving the emotional responses towards literary narratives 
as triggered by emotional affordances rather than properly caused by 
narrative elements seems apt to account for those features of the 
emotions experienced towards literature that the paradox of fiction 
has highlighted. Since discussing this issue would require a paper by 
its own, here I will only put forward a few considerations. The nature 
of the paradox, as formulated by Radford and Weston (1975), lies in 
the assumption that to be, for instance, afraid, the agent needs to 
believe that she is in danger; in the case of fiction, the agent knows 
that the apparent object of her fear is not real and therefore she is not 
in danger; yet, she feels fear. The paradox arises because it is assumed 
that a necessary aspect of the emotion is to be connected with an 
existing intentional object, perhaps by way of belief or a judgment: 
Ellis' enactivist approach eliminates this assumption. It should be 
noted that the paradox remains, even if, rather than a propositional 
attitude, a perceptual representation of the intentional object of the 
emotion is assumed. After all, the representation of a fictional lion is 
hardly similar to the representation of a real one, and yet it may elicit 
an emotional response. 
The enactivist account eliminates this problem, as it recognizes 
that it is not in virtue of perceiving a narrative event as more similar 
to reality that such event is more likely to elicit an emotion: language, 
rhetorical figures, pacing, and other effects do not add to the reality 
of what they represent; rather, they offer emotional affordances to the 
reader. 
Another advantage offered by the application of Ellis's 
framework to the case of the emotions elicited by literary reading is 
that it seems to explain why the same narrative may elicit different 
emotions in different people, and in the same person at different 
times. This is because different people, or the same person at 
different times, are more responsive to certain kinds of emotional 
affordances rather than others, depending on their status in respect 
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to the dynamic balance of their organisms. The same romantic novel 
may elicit different emotional reactions in a person who has just got 
happily married and someone coming out of a bitter divorce: this is 
because they have different ongoing emotional dynamics that find 
their way to be explored through the elements presented in the 
narrative. What about those narratives that elicit consistent emotional 
responses? I argue that some threads may be common, as we are all 
human, and especially within the same cultural contexts, we may 
share what we value and the way we respond when that is at stake.
I have explained how the reader's felt emotional reactions to a 
narrative can be conceived as responses triggered by emotional 
affordances in the text. What about the emotions that the reader 
infers? As shown by the experimental evidence within the cognitive 
framework, reported in section 4.1, the reader may infer emotions by 
making the appropriate inferences from textual cues. For instance, 
reading that Dumbledore is dead may not make me sad, but knowing 
the kind of relationship that Harry had with him, I can infer that the 
he will be sad because of his death. As I hinted at the end of section 
2, the same narrative event may be the source of both felt and 
inferred kinds of emotion. In light of the enactivist framework that I 
adopt, I argue that this may happen because the same textual element 
does not necessarily function as an emotional affordance for the 
reader, as shown above.12 However, the reader may still be able to 
draw inferences about the occurrence of emotional instances within 
the narrative. 
Inferred emotions should be distinguished from what 
cognitivists refer to as "emotion thoughts," that is, from the 
propositional attitudes such as beliefs and judgments, that are the 
sole necessary and sufficient component of emotions in the 
cognitivist paradigm. In contrast with those, inferred emotions are 
not the thoughts that the person entertains when she feels what she 
feels, and they do not involve a propositional-evaluative component. 
Rather, given that emotions are associated with certain goals, 
motivations, and behaviors, considering those elements may allow the 
reader to infer the occurrence of a certain emotion by means of 
12 An interesting hypothesis is that those narratives that we have read and 
appreciated many times may be as such specifically because, despite knowing them 
very well, their text elements keep functioning as emotional affordances for us, or 
maybe they are able to offer us new emotional affordances every time.
72
inferential reasoning. Although they are brought about by inferential 
reasoning and not by affordances in the text like felt emotions, 
inferred emotions, I argue, contribute to narrative understanding in 
virtue of the same relevant feature. This brings me to my second 
claim. 
As illustrated in the previous section, according to Ellis, 
emotions are part of the organism's ongoing regulatory processes, and 
their function is to monitor and promote the organism's dynamic 
balance. In virtue of this, emotions already set a direction towards 
which the organism is motivated to move, before signaling whether a 
certain environmental feature (i.e., affordance) is good or bad for the 
organism. As such, Ellis claims, emotions have an implicit 
intentionality because they are directed at the organism's balance 
before they are consciously associated with any environmental trigger. 
I argue that this implicit intentionality characterizes the 
emotional states elicited by narrative elements, both as inferred and 
as felt by the reader, and I argue that, because of this implicit 
intentionality, these emotional states present an anticipatory 
character. More precisely, I argue that the implicit intentionality of 
the emotional states elicited during reading gives rise to a certain 
anticipation, such that the subsequent narrative events are processed 
as either confirming or disconfirming such an anticipation. Either 
way, the reader apprehends subsequent events in relation to the 
intentionality of the feeling presented by previous events. Although 
the connection between text elements that underlies narrative 
understanding is differently specified by the cognitive model and by 
Miall's model, as suggested in section 5, the implicit intentionality of 
emotions is what allows emotions, both felt and inferred ones, to 
contribute to the narrative connection in its two different forms. To 
make this clear, consider the following case: 
A narrative passage may function as an affordance for a feeling 
of grief in the reader because of its aesthetic character, the episode it 
describes, or other characteristics. The implicit intentionality of this 
feeling, in relation to the organism's balance, is (presumably) in the 
direction of soothing this state. Therefore, the reader may anticipate a 
narrative element that may be able to do so. If the subsequent 
element that the reader processes does so, then the anticipation is 
confirmed, otherwise it is not. In any case, the subsequent element is 
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apprehended by the reader in relation to the implicit intentionality of 
the feeling afforded by the narrative element that was processed 
previously. In virtue of this, the emotional affordances in the text 
provide a connection between the elements within the narrative, and 
by doing so they contribute to the reader's understanding of them. As 
illustrated in section 4.2, the anticipatory nature of emotions has been 
already highlighted by Miall as relevant for narrative understanding. 
My account is consistent with Miall's model, and adds to it the 
enactivist idea that the anticipatory character of emotions is rooted in 
their implicit intentionality. 
The case of an inferred emotion is no different, although the 
narrative connection, and therefore the narrative understanding that 
the inferred emotion contributes to, is of the kind specified by the 
cognitive model. This model, as suggested in section 4, supposes that 
understanding a narrative consists in coherently connecting its 
elements within a model, by means of inferential reasoning, and 
emotions are supposed to contribute to narrative understanding by 
contributing to this kind of connection. For instance, as the reader 
infers that a character is angry because he has been wronged, she can 
coherently insert the subsequent narrated events within her model of 
the narrative, in virtue of the fact that she assumes anger to be 
associated with certain goals, motivations and behaviors. When she 
reads that the character punched the wall, this fits within the model, 
as it is a reaction that is consistent with anger. Although the emotion 
itself is inferred and the connection to the subsequent elements of 
the text within the model is also the product of inferential reasoning, 
such inferences would not be possible if the emotion that was 
inferred was not assumed to be linked to certain goals, motivations, 
and behaviors. 
This assumption, I argue, is rooted in the implicit 
intentionality that characterizes emotions. In virtue of its implicit 
intentionality, an emotion already charts a direction, and certain 
goals, motivations, and behaviors are associated with that emotion, 
specifically because they are consistent with this direction. They 
could not be assumed, and the inferences based on them could not 
be drawn, if the implicit intentionality of the emotion in question was 
not implicitly considered by the reader who inferred the emotion. 
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To summarize, my claim is that both felt and inferred emotions 
are characterized by an implicit intentionality, as specified by Ellis' 
enactivist account, and that in virtue of this, they anticipate 
subsequent elements in the narrative, connecting them with previous 
ones, thus contributing to narrative understanding.
Conclusion
This novel account of the contribution of emotions to narrative 
understanding has considerable advantages in comparison with the 
philosophical solutions that were discussed in section 2. Concerning 
Velleman's proposal of an "emotional closure," as illustrated in 
section 2.1, it does not seem plausible that, in order to understand a 
narrative, the reader must experience a resolving emotion as 
associated with a conclusive event. What seems more plausible is that 
regardless of whether the outcome is explicitly stated as achieved or 
not within the text, the emotion that the reader feels or infers 
indicates, in virtue of its implicit intentionality, that there is an 
outcome to be reached, and, by doing so, it contributes to narrative 
understanding in the way described above. Moreover, this account 
avoids assuming the diachronic nature of emotions and the process of 
emotional resonance that, according to Velleman, is based on it. As 
illustrated in section 2.2, these are unclear and unsubstantiated 
notions. What seems more plausible is that both responding to 
emotional affordances and inferring the goals, motivations, and 
behaviors associated with emotions drive the reader to apprehend the 
narrated events as following each other, in respect to the 
anticipations that they imply. Finally, concerning the evaluations 
made or the reason-based dependencies attributed by the reader in 
respect to the narrative, as illustrated in section 2.4, this account does 
not consider emotions as necessarily involved in any of those, in 
order to contribute to narrative understanding. Their contribution, in 
fact, precedes the interpretative level, and only concerns either 
catching affordances or making on-line inferences during the 
comprehension of a text. 
The objections that might be raised against this proposal are 
certainly numerous. First of all, the enactivist framework itself might 
be considered flawed. This paper, however, is not the appropriate 
place to address this problem: here, I assume that Ellis' enactivist 
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account of emotions is plausible, and I argue that its application to 
the case of literary narrative offers an appealing solution to account, 
in a comprehensive way, for the role of emotions in narrative 
understanding. Further objections might concern the conclusions 
that I draw from the empirical literature, about the connecting 
function that both felt and inferred emotions exert. Moreover, the 
link between such conclusions and my claims on the implicit 
intentionality of emotions might be considered strained. Although 
these objections are legitimate, addressing them is material for future 
work. 
This paper is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to link 
empirical studies on narrative comprehension (both from the 
cognitivist tradition and from Miall's framework) to an enactivist 
account of emotions. As such, it puts forward an idea that has not 
been explored before, and that will necessarily require confrontation 
and dialogue within the field, to be developed and improved. The 
goal of this paper was to determine how emotions contribute to the 
understanding of literary narratives. After clarifying that narrative 
understanding depends on the connection between the elements 
within a narrative, I examined the philosophical solutions proposed 
to account for the contribution of emotions to this connection and I 
found them all inadequate. In order to construct a more plausible 
account, I turned to the empirical literature, by identifying first which 
emotional states are relevant for narrative understanding, and then by 
examining two psychological models accounting for them. Since both 
models highlight the capacity of emotions to connect subsequent 
narrative elements, although in different terms, this led to an account 
that explains how both the emotions felt and those inferred by the 
reader can contribute to narrative understanding. In order to achieve 
this, I drew on Ellis' enactivist account of emotion, and applied it to 
the case of literary narrative. I claimed that the emotions felt by the 
reader are triggered by emotional affordances in the text, and that 
both the emotions felt and those inferred by the reader are 
characterized by an implicit intentionality. In virtue of this, I have 
argued that the reader processes subsequent elements within a 
narrative in respect to the anticipation implied by previous elements. 
This is, I conclude, the way in which emotions intervene to connect 
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the elements within a narrative, therefore contributing to narrative 
understanding.
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Chapter 3
Emotional Appeals in Propaganda and 
Persuasion: Epistemic Differences
Abstract 
The traditional view holds that appeals to emotions in politics are 
harmful, because they exert a manipulative function, by undermining 
rational reasoning. In this paper, I propose a novel account of emotional 
appeals: specifically, I distinguish persuasive from propagandistic 
appeals, and I attribute the manipulative character of the latter to the 
impact that they have on the agent's emotional processing of political 
objects. I argue that both kinds of appeals put forward evaluative kinds of 
arguments, and the emotions that they elicit make salient certain 
goals/values. However, whereas persuasive appeals promote the 
assessment and coherent integration of these goals/values with the 
agent's further values and appropriate beliefs, propagandistic appeals do 
not do so. In virtue of this epistemic distinction, I argue, persuasive 
emotional appeals can give a positive contribution to the agent's political 
sophistication, whereas propagandistic ones can only undermine it. 
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Introduction
Although many different definitions of propaganda have been 
proposed, most of them seem to converge in highlighting its 
manipulative nature. Taylor, for instance, describes propaganda as 
"the planned use of communications to manipulate words, images, 
symbols, and ideas that encourage a target audience to think and act 
in a manner desired by the source" (Taylor 2011, 914). The manipulative 
character of propaganda has been commonly attributed to the 
disruption of clear reasoning that propagandistic messages promote. 
This is highlighted, among others, by Marlin, who defines 
propaganda as "[t]he organized attempt through communication to 
affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in 
ways that circumvent or suppress an individual's adequately 
informed, rational, reflective judgment" (Marlin 2013, 12). Emotional 
appeals have been included among the most typical propagandistic 
strategies for manipulating, and they have been generally assumed to 
perform their manipulative action, by impairing rational thinking: 
propaganda "attempts to move a recipient to a predetermined point of 
view by using simple images and slogans that truncate thought by 
playing on prejudices and emotions" (Pratkanis & Turner 1996, 187). 
Indeed, the centrality of emotional appeals for the propagandistic 
character of a political message, is so widely presupposed, that the 
role of emotions in politics is often reduced to their propagandistic 
use. Moran, for instance, notably opposes the appeals used in proper 
communication, with those used in "pseudo-communication", like 
propaganda, as the first "are directed towards the rational, with an 
emphasis on a clear relationship between the message and supporting 
data", while the latter "are directed towards the emotional, with an 
emphasis on finding emotional connections between the receiver and 
the message" (Moran 1979, 189). 
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In this paper, I propose a novel account of the emotional 
appeals employed in propaganda. My proposal is motivated by two 
reasons at least. First, by associating emotional appeals in general, 
without any further specification, with propaganda, the epistemic 
value of emotions in politics is disregarded. Second, attributing the 
manipulative effect of emotional appeals uniquely to their supposedly 
disruptive impact on reasoning, relies on the unwarranted dichotomy, 
especially in politics, between the rational and the emotional 
dimension of thinking. In response to these concerns, I draw a 
distinction between persuasive and propagandistic emotional appeals: 
I argue that while the former have a positive epistemic function in the 
political context, the latter have a negative one; moreover, I argue that 
this is not due to the appeals' impact on the agent's rational 
processing of political issues, but rather to their impact on the agent's 
emotional engagement with them. 
Before outlining the structure of the paper, two remarks are in 
order. First, I do not intend to suggest any guidelines to disentangle 
in general what is propaganda and what persuasion in the political 
discourse, since this would involve the analysis of many other 
features, besides their use of emotional appeals. Despite employing 
similar techniques, propaganda and persuasion have been described 
in the literature as different forms of communication, because of their 
intended effects on the receiver of the message. Specifically, as 
argued by Melissen (2005), while persuasion aims at "broadening the 
audience's perspectives and opening their minds, (...) propaganda 
strives to narrow and preferably close them" (Melissen 2005, 18). 
Similarly, Pratkanis and Turner (1996) argue that persuasion fosters 
thoughtful deliberation, while propaganda hinders it. A widespread 
claim among propaganda scholars is that the difference between 
propaganda and persuasion, as characterized above, is due to the fact 
that, differently from persuasion, "[p]ropaganda closes off debate by 
bypassing the rational will" (Stanley 2015, 48). Although propaganda 
may indeed hinder rational deliberation, in this paper I do not focus 
on this kind of manipulation. Rather, I focus on the manipulation of 
the agent's emotional processing of political objects: I argue that this 
kind of manipulation characterizes propagandistic emotional appeals 
and differentiates them from persuasive ones. 
80
My second remark concerns what is the communicative ideal of 
a liberal democratic society, as I take this kind of society as the 
"political context" in the paper. Modern liberal theory has promoted a 
rationalist conception of politics, where normative ideals such as 
"public reason" (Rawls 1993) and "communicative rationality" 
(Habermas 1984) regulate the public debate in terms of exchanges 
solely based on logical principles and rules of evidence. The political 
theorists following this tradition have been mainly concerned with 
the improvement of adequate reasoning skills in order to achieve an 
ideal form of deliberation, disregarding any emotional contribution to 
it; they considered emotions as irrational and thus as either 
epistemically irrelevant, or even damaging for the political discourse 
(Nie, Junn & Stehlik-Barry 1996, Callan 1997). The plausibility of the 
rationalist position, which maintains the exclusion of emotions from 
the political domain, has been challenged by the studies showing that 
emotions are part and parcel of human reasoning, and that they are 
engaged in our deliberative assessments in the political context 
(Marcus 2010, Redlawsk 2006). In philosophy, liberal rationalism has 
been dismissed not only as a highly idealistic notion, but also because 
it disregards the role of emotion in argumentation and public 
discourse (Benhabib 1992, Young 1996, Kingston & Ferry 2009). As 
Dowding (2016) puts it: "Given that emotion is always part and parcel 
of our reasoning process, and given acknowledgement that our 
emotions ought to be engaged in our deliberative assessments, we 
cannot always assume that we are being manipulated simply because 
our emotions are engaged" (Dowding 2016, 9). What is crucial, thus, is 
to determine when emotions are manipulative, and when they are 
not. This is exactly the objective of this paper. I will proceed as 
follows.
In the first section, I will define what I take to be emotional 
appeals, and I will describe both propagandistic and persuasive ones 
as advancing evaluative kinds of arguments. In the second section, I 
will explain how the emotional responses elicited by emotional 
appeals intervene in the arguments that such appeals put forward, 
that is, by making certain goals/values salient. In the third section, I 
will list the criteria that I adopt to determine whether an emotion is 
legitimately used within an evaluative argument; in the fourth section, 
I will argue that this is the case when the goal/value that the emotion 
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makes salient is coherently integrated with the agent's further values 
and appropriate beliefs. In the fifth section, I will argue that the 
epistemic distinction between persuasive and propagandistic 
emotional appeals is that the first use emotions legitimately, while the 
latter do not, and I will present a few relevant examples. Finally, in 
the sixth section, I will explain how the process of coherent 
integration previously illustrated is relevant for political 
sophistication, and thus how persuasive and propagandistic 
emotional appeals provide a positive and negative contribution 
respectively to the individual's political sophistication.
1.  Emotional appeals and evaluative arguments
I define "emotional appeal" in the political discourse as the elicitation 
of an emotional response through the presentation of information 
relative to a political object (i.e. an issue, character or event with 
political relevance) in order to support a certain evaluative claim. For 
instance, the 1964 political advertisement, known as the "Daisy Girl", 
featured a nuclear explosion, aimed at prompting voters to show up to 
the polls and vote for Lyndon Johnson. In this case, presenting a 
threatening event as imminent is intended to elicit fear (i.e. emotional 
response); and presenting it as avoidable only by voting for Johnson 
(i.e. information), aims to convey the message that voting for Johnson 
is the best option, namely, that you should vote for Johnson (i.e. 
evaluative claim). 
As for the first component, that is, the emotional response, 
emotional appeals may take various forms based on how they elicit 
it.13  For instance, a message might contain an explicit emotional 
expression (e.g. "More employment, more joy for the Italians!), an 
emotionally connotated term (e.g. "Stop the Muslims' invasion"), or it 
might present a situation evoking a certain emotion (e.g. the nuclear 
explosion of the Daisy Girl ad). Moreover, emotions might be 
13 My list of the ways in which emotions are communicated, is drawn, at least in 
part, from Koschut (2018). There are certainly other ways in which a political 
message might evoke an emotion, but I do not mention them here, as it is not my 
intention to review all of them, but only to use some of them as illustrative 
examples of the components of emotional appeals. Moreover, I do not delve into the 
processes through which emotional reactions might be triggered by the different 
kinds of appeals presented in political messages, as I simply assume that emotional 
appeals, by definition, are intended to evoke emotional reactions, despite being 
more or less successful in their intent.
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triggered by the presentation of metaphors, analogies, and 
comparisons, that depict political actors and relations as calling for 
certain emotional reactions. An example is the campaign poster of the 
right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP) in favor of the prioritization of 
Swiss workers over foreign commuters: the poster was supposed to 
elicit anger in Swiss citizens, as it depicted cartoon rats dressed as an 
Italian worker, a Roma thief, and an Italian former finance minister 
nibbling at a piece of Swiss cheese (Fig 1). The second element of an 
emotional appeal, namely, the information presented, is a descriptive 
claim, that is, a statement about some state of the world (e.g. "In 
Germany, Merkel welcomed hundreds of thousands of refugees"), or 
about some factual relations (e.g. "Voting for Johnson will ward off 
the use of the atomic bomb"). Usually, in propagandistic messages, 
the information presented is oversimplified, biased, and, in some 
cases, even false. The last component of an emotional appeal, namely, 
the evaluative claim, is a normative kind of statement: it is about what 
should, or should not, be done; what is, and is not, desirable (e.g. 
"You should vote for this candidate", "This policy is more desirable 
than another").
Since emotional appeals are employed with the aim of 
convincing the audience to endorse some claim, and specifically an 
evaluative kind of claim, I consider it useful to conceptualize 
emotional appeals in argumentative terms, although the arguments 
they put forward might not be clearly structured, and their 
components plainly formulated.14 Specifically, I consider both 
propagandistic and persuasive emotional appeals as evaluative kind of 
arguments. In order to define what I take to be an evaluative 
argument, I will first distinguish it from the factual one. On the one 
hand, a factual argument is an argument that advances a descriptive 
kind of claim: as such it can be supported only by the relevant factual 
evidence. For instance, the claim that immigrants are a burden for 
the economy of Switzerland, can gain support only if numbers are 
provided showing that the country's financial resources are negatively 
impacted by the presence of immigrants. On the other hand, an 
14 Although the notion of argument has been defined by some scholars in narrow 
terms, as exclusively written discourse in which all premises are explicit, in this 
paper, I follow the broader definition proposed by Lunsford et al (1999), who call 
argument anything expressing a point of view, or by Toulmin (2003), who defines an 
argument as a claim on our attention and belief.
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evaluative argument is an argument that advances an evaluative kind 
of claim: as such, it cannot be supported solely by the relevant factual 
evidence, but this evidence must be coupled with a certain goal or 
value.15 In order to make this clear, I will first turn to a simple non-
political example, leaving the political ones for the next section. 
The factual evidence that smoking damages health can support 
the evaluative claim that you should stop smoking, only if it is 
coupled with the assumption that health is valuable/that being 
healthy is your goal. For instance, if someone's goal is to get sick, 
then the factual evidence that smoke damages health is not a reason 
for her to stop smoking, but rather, to do the opposite. An evaluative 
claim cannot be supported either by a factual premise alone or by a 
goal/value alone. Rather, once the goal/value is set, the support of the 
evaluative claim, that is, whether a certain action should be 
performed to achieve the goal/value, is contingent upon the relevant 
factual evidence. For instance, simply desiring to be healthy would 
not be a reason to stop smoking, if it was not proven that smoking 
damages health; indeed, if the factual evidence was that smoking 
improves health, desiring to be healthy would be a reason to smoke. 
In this section, I have first characterized emotional appeals as 
comprising three elements, namely an emotional reaction, some 
factual claim, and an evaluative claim. Then, I have argued that since 
emotional appeals support evaluative claims, they can be 
conceptualized as evaluative kind of arguments; I have characterized 
evaluative arguments as involving a normative conclusion, supported 
by both facts and goals/values. In the next section, I will illustrate 
how the emotional reactions elicited by emotional appeals intervene 
in the evaluative arguments that such appeals put forward.
2.  The role of emotions in evaluative arguments
I claim that the function that emotions perform within evaluative 
arguments is to make certain goals/values salient, and in this way, 
they affect the support for the evaluative conclusion. Different 
theories of emotions can explain how emotions make certain goals or 
values salient. Here I do not commit to any of these theories in 
particular. The basic idea is that emotions are adaptive responses, 
15 An analogous distinction between factual and normative propositions in rhetoric 
has been proposed by Scarantino (2008).
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which reflect appraisals of features of the environment, which are 
significant for the organism's well-being (Moors et al. 2013, 119); as 
such, emotions signal what in the environment may affect the agents' 
concerns, including needs, attachments, values, goals, and in general 
"anything that an individual cares about" (Moors et al. 2013, 120).16 For 
instance, feeling fear signals "being in danger", which in turn makes 
salient "being safe" as the goal to be reached. What does this have to 
do with emotional appeals and the evaluative arguments that they put 
forward? I will illustrate my proposal in the following. 
As I have illustrated above, evaluative arguments comprise an 
evaluative conclusion, whose support depends both on the 
presentation of certain factual evidence and on the assumption of a 
goal/value. My claim is that the emotion elicited by an emotional 
appeal affects the evaluative argument by making a certain goal/value 
salient, therefore affecting the support of the evaluative conclusion. 
Most of the contemporary public discourse against immigration offers 
an example to my claim. The evaluative conclusion that this kind of 
discourse supports is the appropriateness of restrictive immigration 
policies. The factual evidence presented in support of it mostly 
involves imprecise or inflated data about the number of admitted 
immigrants and about the crimes that they committed. For example, 
Trump declared that "Numerous foreign-born individuals have been 
convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes since September 
11 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States 
after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas, or who entered 
through the United States refugee resettlement program".17 As for the 
goal/value presented, it is usually made salient through the use of 
classic fear appeals. For instance, Trump has repeatedly referred to 
Mexican immigrants as "rapists", "animals" or "criminals".18 These 
negatively connotated words and phrases are designed to trigger fear 
in the audience, and to make them worry about their safety. The fear 
appeal, in other words, makes safety the goal/value on the basis of 
16 Here I illustrate the capacity of emotions to indicate goals/values in the terms 
offered by the "appraisal theory" of emotions, because of their simplicity, although I 
do not commit to this theory in particular.
17 On Trump's "factual" statements about immigrants, see 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/how-risky-is-it-really/201702/paranoia-
about-immigrants-the-danger-fear
18 On Trump's terminology to describe immigrants, see 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/trump-animals-ms-13-gangs.html.
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which the evaluative claim (i.e. restrictive immigration policies) is 
supported.
As the example about smoking has shown, changing the salient 
goal/value changes the supported evaluative conclusion. For instance, 
while fear appeals might be used to support restrictive immigration 
policies, appeals to compassion might be used to support open 
border policies. By eliciting compassion in the audience (e.g. through 
the picture of the drowned Syrian toddler, Alan Kurdi – Fig 2) 
solidarity among human beings and the importance of human lives 
are brought forward as the salient goals/values, thus supporting 
policies that comply with those.
The idea that emotional appeals intervene within evaluative 
arguments by making salient certain goals/values seems to be 
confirmed by the empirical models on the impact of emotion on 
persuasion, such as the one proposed by Miceli et al (2011).19 In their 
view, a general principle of any form of persuasion is that of "goal 
hooking": in order to persuade, the sender of the message acts on 
some goal of the receiver of the message, suggesting a means-end 
relationship between the intention that the sender wants to induce on 
the receiver, and the receiver's goal; in this sense, the intention is 
"hooked" to the goal. In this respect, the "hook" that emotions 
provide, is particularly powerful, because, given their strong 
motivating power, the goals that emotions signal, have a high priority. 
Poggi (2005) suggests the following example:
 "A tells his electorate B: If you vote for me, I'll create one 
million new jobs (let us call it a UG, a utilitarian goal), a very 
valuable goal in fact, from a rational point of view. But suppose 
A adds: If you vote for me, I'll fight for your freedom (let us 
call it a EG, an emotional goal). Now, freedom is not simply a 
very important goal, it is a value -- a goal to which emotions are 
attached since it is not only a contingent goal in life, but one of 
the goals we usually all have at any given time of our lives. 
Thus, if A had hooked his proposed goal (...) (vote for me) only 
to UG he would have reached an average goal value. By 
19 To avoid confusion, it should be noted that in Miceli et al (2011), the term 
"persuasion" does not refer to a particular form of public discourse, as it does in 
this paper in contrast with propaganda, but it refers, more generally, to the kind of 
discourse aimed to convince an audience about something.
86
hooking it to EG, however, he can reach a much higher value" 
(Poggi 2005, 315).
In this section, I have explained how the emotions elicited by 
emotional appeals intervene in evaluative arguments, that is, by 
making certain goals/values salient. This characterizes the emotions 
elicited by both persuasive and propagandistic kind of appeals. What 
distinguishes them, then? I will try to answer this question in the rest 
of the paper. 
3.  Criteria to assess the argumentative use of emotions
As was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the traditional view 
holds that the use of emotions in argumentation is necessarily 
inappropriate, as emotions are assumed to subvert rational reasoning. 
Against this view, Walton (2007) has argued that the elements 
presented in an argument should be evaluated on the basis of the 
purpose of that kind of argument. Therefore, in the case of 
propaganda, since it is a type of discourse that aims at convincing the 
audience to accept a particular conclusion, the use of emotions is 
appropriate, as it contributes to this purpose. Walton's approach does 
not seem satisfactory, in order to distinguish persuasive from 
propagandistic emotional appeals. As I have mentioned above, both 
persuasion and propaganda present evaluative kinds of arguments, 
and the emotions elicited through their appeals both contribute to 
the evaluative conclusion of the argument, by making certain 
goals/values salient. Therefore, following Walton's approach, both 
kinds of appeal would be appropriate in the same way. However, this 
is not the case. Despite their similarities, persuasion and propaganda 
are different kinds of discourse, and the emotional appeals that they 
present, despite performing the same role within the argument, are 
different. In order to clarify what this difference amounts to, I will 
move from Walton's framework, which focuses on the effect of 
emotional appeals on the purpose of the argument, to other 
approaches, which focus, instead, on the inherent argumentative 
dimension of emotional appeals. 
Established that the arguments constructed through the use of 
emotional appeals are evaluative in character, I argue that 
propagandistic arguments make use of emotions in an illegitimate 
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way, while persuasive arguments make use of emotions in a legitimate 
way. How is the legitimacy assessed in this respect?  In order to 
answer this question, I turn to the paradigm offered by Gilbert (2004). 
Gilbert is one of the few scholars, who has provided a theoretical 
account on the argumentative use of emotions. Specifically, he has 
argued that the use of emotions in arguments can be assessed on the 
basis of the same criteria that are employed to evaluate the soundness 
of the premises within arguments that do not involve emotions, 
namely acceptability, relevance, and adequacy. Although I retain the 
criteria identified by Gilbert, I propose a different interpretation of 
their significance. 
As for the first one, Gilbert observes that non-emotional 
premises are considered to be acceptable when they are true, or when 
they meet the standards of the field in which the argument is 
deployed; emotions, however, are not factual, and therefore cannot be 
true or false, but require their standards of evaluation, which Gilbert 
identifies in their being genuine or fake. Identifying the acceptability 
requirement with the authenticity of emotions does not seem 
effective. Regardless of whether the proponent of an emotional 
appeal might genuinely feel the emotion that the appeal is intended 
to trigger, such emotion might still be exaggerated or unfounded,20 
resulting therefore to be much less than acceptable. Moreover, 
assessing the authenticity of an emotional reaction is problematic, 
and can be done (sometimes with great uncertainty), only by the 
person concerned, that is, by the proponent of the emotional appeal.
As for the relevance requirement, Gilbert emphasizes that it is 
highly dependent on context, both in the case of emotional and of 
logical arguments, but he does not mention any general principle to 
disentangle relevant from non-relevant emotional premises. Instead, 
he contrasts two examples. The first one is about deciding over 
whether he should go to a conference on his wedding anniversary: in 
this case, his wife's sadness if he goes, is a relevant factor to be 
considered. The second example is about deciding over whether he 
should give a passing grade to a student who did not pass the course: 
in this case, the student's distress if he doesn't, is not a relevant factor 
20 To be fair, "non-exaggeration" and "justification of evidence" are also mentioned 
by Gilbert as requirements for an emotion to be acceptable within an argument 
(Gilbert 2004, 16), but he does not explain how these features relate to the "veracity" 
of the emotion, namely, its being genuine or fake.
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to be considered. These examples try to appeal to our intuitions, but 
they do not really succeed in pinpointing what is it that actually 
makes an emotion relevant or not within an argument. Why is the 
wife's sadness relevant but the student's distress is not? What does 
this really depend on?
The relevance condition is specifically what, according to 
Govier (2013), emotions fail to meet: emotionally charged language, 
she argues, is often employed "to take the place of evidence" (2013, 
59), "to distract us from the relevant reasons or--worse yet--from the 
fact that no relevant reasons are given" (Govier 2013, 171). She takes 
the case of the appeal to pity (i.e. "ad misericordiam"): according to 
Govier, although charitable appeals may be constructive and helpful, 
as they draw attention to the suffering of others, still, in themselves 
do not provide reasons for action of beliefs. She considers the case of 
the appeal to fear (i.e. "ad baculum") as similar. For instance, trotting 
out the fear of eternal damnation in order to convince you to believe 
in god, does not provide relevant reasons for believing, but only calls 
on fearful consequences to manipulate you into accepting the claim. 
However, Govier argues, "[t]here is a difference between logically 
irrelevant appeals to fear (seeking to intimidate by manipulating 
attitudes) and logically relevant warnings that an action may have 
negative consequences" (Govier 2013, 171). For example, when the 
doctor tells the patient that, should he continue smoking, his chances 
of lung cancer will increase, in this case, "that consequence provides 
a relevant reason for not smoking. A warning is not an appeal to fear, 
threat, or attempt to intimidate" (Govier 2013 p. 171). The examples 
offered by Govier, like those offered by Gilbert, are not clarificatory. 
What is the difference between a warning about eternal damnation 
and one about cancer? As I might consider the dangers of smoke with 
no fear, but only as a relevant consequence of my smoking behavior, I 
might consider the dangers of going to hell with no fear, but only as a 
relevant consequence of my not believing in god. Likewise, I might be 
afraid of damnation as I might be afraid of cancer. How is the fear of 
cancer a less relevant reason to stop smoking than a fearless 
consideration of the dangers of smoking?
Finally, the adequacy condition, Gilbert argues, is about 
whether an acceptable and relevant premise is sufficient for 
warranting a claim, and he maintains that a premise, being it either 
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emotional or not, is adequate if it is "enough to convince the 
participants that, given their beliefs, values, goals, and criteria for 
argumentation, that the claim has been warranted" (Gilbert 2004 p 
259). Gilbert's claim, as he himself admits, is circular, and does not 
offer a clear explanation of what the argumentative adequacy of 
emotions amounts to.
Given the critiques that I have raised above, how should the 
conditions of acceptability, relevance and adequacy be understood, in 
the case of emotions within evaluative arguments? I will illustrate my 
proposal in the following section.
4.  How emotions can satisfy the argumentative criteria
As was illustrated in section 1, an evaluative claim can be supported 
by a factual claim in conjunction with a goal/value. I argue that the 
emotion making salient a certain goal/value, is legitimately employed 
within the argument, if it is acceptable, relevant, and adequate, and 
whether or not the emotion meets these conditions, depends on how 
the goal/value that it makes salient is processed. 
First, in order for an emotion to be acceptable within an 
evaluative argument, the goal/value that it makes salient should be 
assessed in respect to appropriate beliefs. For instance, the word 
"invasion" referred to the migratory movements towards Europe 
instills fear, making safety salient. However, if considered in respect 
to the agent's factual knowledge in forms of beliefs (e.g. "the actual 
numbers of immigrants is not that high"), fear does not seem 
justified, and its goal/value, does not result to be the most significant. 
Clearly, it is important that the factual knowledge, in respect to which 
the emotion and its goal/value is assessed, is appropriate, that is, 
accurate and complete.
As for the relevance criteria, I argue that an emotion is 
argumentatively relevant if the goal/value that it makes salient is 
weighed against the agent's further values concerning the issue at 
stake. The reason why, in Gilbert's examples, the wife's sadness is 
relevant, but the student's distress is not, seems to be that the love 
towards the wife is assessed as more important than being present at 
a conference, and the student's momentary wellbeing is assessed as 
less important than the professor's work ethic. Similarly, in Govier's 
examples, it seems that the reason why the fear appeal to believe in 
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god is not relevant is that, the goal of salvation that it makes salient is 
assessed in respect to the conviction that supposing the existence of a 
supernatural being with no physical proof is irrational. Therefore, the 
agent rejects such appeal as irrelevant. Conversely, the reason why 
the warning about smoking is relevant is that the goal of health that it 
makes salient is assessed in respect to the knowledge of the available 
scientific data about the dangers of smoke. Therefore, the agent 
embraces such appeal as relevant. 
Finally, I argue that an emotion is argumentatively adequate if 
the goal/value that it makes salient, being assessed in respect to the 
agents' further values and appropriate beliefs, results to be coherent 
with them. The climate scientist James Hansen, for instance, used the 
following analogy in his 2010 Ted Talk: "400,000 Hiroshima atomic 
bomb explosions per day, 365 days per year – that is how much extra 
energy Earth is now gaining each day due to human-emitted 
greenhouse gasses". Such fear appeal might seem excessive, and 
therefore illegitimately used in an evaluative argument aimed at 
raising awareness about this issue. However, if the appeal is assessed 
in respect to the pertinent data (e.g. "Unabated emissions of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases, primarily from the burning of fossil 
fuels, are likely to have irreversible consequences")21 and to the 
agent's further values on the matter (e.g. "As an inhabitant of this 
planet, I have the duty to preserve it"), a fearful reaction does not 
seem undue and the goal that it makes salient (i.e. the necessity to 
reduce greenhouse gasses) should be legitimately considered in 
evaluative arguments about the topic.22 
What emerges from my characterization of the criteria of 
acceptability, relevance, and adequacy, is that what counts for an 
emotion to meet them, is the coherent integration of the goal/value 
that it makes salient with the agent's further values and appropriate 
beliefs. This process of coherent integration seems to account for the 
factors that are commonly considered as important for determining 
the legitimate use of emotions in arguments, such as, as Gilbert lists 
21 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate. Climate Change 2007: The Scientific 
Basis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007.
22 My analysis of the appropriateness of fear appeals in evaluative arguments about 
climate change does not imply that eliciting fear is the best strategy to effectively 
engage people in acting against global warming. Indeed, this does not seem to be 
the case (O'Neill et al 2009).
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them, "veracity, non-exaggeration, justification of evidence, avoidance 
of bias, consideration of alternatives, and so on" (Gilbert 2004, p. 16). 
Moreover, my proposal seems to accommodate the important 
suggestion, put forward by Brinton (1988), that emotions are not 
irrelevant in an argument, if they are provided reasons for, that is, if 
their appropriateness is justified on the basis of certain "grounds". 
Specifically, it seems reasonable to locate these grounds precisely in 
the further values and appropriate beliefs that the agent should 
consider in the assessment of the goal/value that the emotion makes 
salient.
5.  The epistemic difference between persuasive and propagandistic 
emotional appeals
In the last two sections, I have argued that an emotion is legitimately 
used in an evaluative argument, if it is acceptable, relevant and 
appropriate, and that, in order to meet these conditions, the 
goal/value that it makes salient should be coherently integrated with 
the agent's further values and appropriate beliefs. Having established 
this, my claim is that the difference between persuasive and 
propagandistic emotional appeals lies specifically in the fact that the 
former ones use emotions legitimately, while the latter do not. One 
objection against my proposal could be that the process of coherent 
integration that I have illustrated, seems to concern the agent as 
processing the message rather than message itself, and therefore it 
might be difficult to objectively differentiate persuasive from 
propagandistic emotional appeals on the basis of it. Although this is 
certainly true, I argue that persuasive and propagandistic appeals can 
still be distinguished on the basis of whether they promote or not such 
processing. I will try to clarify my proposal through a few examples.
The coherent integration of the goal/value that an emotion 
makes salient is hindered when the emotional appeal presents 
inappropriate factual evidence in support of the evaluative claim that 
it puts forward. An example is provided by the front page of an Italian 
newspaper (Fig 3) with the headline: "Criminal state", presenting two 
contrasting pictures: on one side, the victims of an earthquake in 
central Italy hosted in a gym, and on the other side, a group of 
immigrants in front of a three stars hotel. By highlighting the 
difference in treatment, the purpose of the appeal was to elicit anger, 
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and to direct the latter against immigrants and against the 
government who welcomed them: the goal/value made salient by 
anger was to rectify the injustice, thus supporting a negative 
evaluation of immigrants, as well as of the government. The factual 
situation depicted, however, was clearly oversimplified: the difference 
in the accommodation of earthquake victims and refugees did not 
reflect a preferential treatment of the first over the latter, but only 
logistical necessities. The appeal did not promote the assessment of 
the goal/value made salient by the emotion in respect to the 
appropriate evidence, because it omitted relevant facts, grounding the 
anger solely on the oversimplified contrast between two pictures. 
Another typical propagandistic emotional appeal is given by 
what Stevenson (1938) calls "persuasive definitions". Persuasive 
definitions make use of emotionally charged notions to describe the 
meaning of a term, in order to engender a favorable or unfavorable 
attitude towards the definiendum. They are commonly regarded as 
fallacies because, by giving the impression to simply define 
something, they actually affirm its value. Hurley (2015) offers some 
examples of opposing pairs of persuasive definitions:
"'Abortion' means the ruthless murdering of innocent 
children.
'Abortion' means a safe and established surgical procedure 
whereby a woman is relieved of an unwanted burden.
'Liberal' means a drippy-eyed do-gooder obsessed with giving 
away other people's money. 
'Liberal' means a genuine humanitarian committed to the goals 
of adequate housing and health care and of equal opportunity 
for all of our citizens" (Hurley 2015 p 101)
According to the framework that I have illustrated above, the 
emotional appeals expressed through persuasive definitions make an 
illegitimate argumentative use of emotions, and are therefore 
propagandistic, because of the following. By masking the value-laden 
content associated with the emotion as part of the definition of the 
term, they hinder the processing of such content for what it actually 
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is on the part of the receiver of the message. More precisely, 
persuasive definitions induce the agent to treat the emotion and the 
goal/value that it makes salient as they were facts, therefore skipping 
its assessment in respect to her further beliefs and values, and its 
coherent integration with them. 
Further examples of propagandistic emotional appeals are 
those that play on what Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir (2000) call 
"simple transfer of affect". Such appeals function by pairing an affect-
laden object (e.g. an American flag) to an object that arouses little or 
no emotional response (e.g. a political candidate). For instance, as 
illustrated by Huddy and Sears (1995), the agent's attitude towards a 
neutral political subject, such as bilingual education, can be 
influenced through its association with a more affect-laden symbol, 
such as illegal immigrants; in this way, extant negative feelings 
towards illegal immigrants are transferred to bilingual education 
programs. By using this technique, Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir 
(2000) observe, the emotion elicited through the affect-laden object 
"exerts its influence independently of any argument advanced for or 
against a particular cause, policy, or candidate, and [...] works 
independently of one's rational interests and deliberations" (Huddy & 
Gunnthorsdottir 2000, 748). Indeed, if considered within the 
framework that I outline in this paper, the mere transfer of affective 
connotation from one object to another is propagandistic because the 
emotion elicited and the goal made salient are not meant to undergo 
any scrutiny (e.g. any assessment in respect to further values and 
beliefs) before being attributed to the neutral object, but only result 
from the association, imposed by the sender of the message, of one 
object to the other. 
The previous examples were illustrative of what I consider 
propagandistic emotional appeals, according to the framework that I 
have proposed. I will now provide a couple of examples of persuasive 
emotional appeals as well. I identify the first one in 2013 Obama's 
speech for gun vote control in Connecticut,23 when he cried in 
23 "Every single year, more than 30,000 Americans have their lives cut short by guns 
-- 30,000. Suicides. Domestic violence. Gang shootouts. Accidents. Hundreds of 
thousands of Americans have lost brothers and sisters, or buried their own 
children. Many have had to learn to live with a disability, or learned to live without 
the love of their life. (...) Now, I want to be absolutely clear at the start -- and I've 
said this over and over again, this also becomes routine, there is a ritual about this 
whole thing that I have to do -- I believe in the Second Amendment. (...) But I also 
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recalling gunshot victims and their families. I will try to analyze 
Obama's emotional appeal by detecting its argumentative 
components, according to my framework. The evaluative claim made 
by Obama was the appropriateness of a vote in Congress on gun 
control measures. The factual assumption that he made was that the 
current gun regulation is underlying the accidents causing so much 
pain to the families of the school shooting victims. The sadness that 
he expressed was intended to make salient the goal of avoiding such 
pain. It is significant that Obama did not argue for the approval of a 
particular measure, but only for the opportunity of a vote. The pain 
and the sadness were not used to argue for stricter gun control laws 
directly, but were aimed at showing how a number of American 
citizens are negatively affected by the current regulations. In this way, 
sadness was not intended to be a conclusive reason for stricter gun 
control laws, thus avoiding its concurrent considerations with further 
concerns, but as an element to be factored in when thinking about 
the current regulations. Further considerations might be, for 
instance, that the US is a democracy, and laws are supposed to 
safeguard the citizens and to receive approval by them. The sadness 
expressed by Obama highlighted that the families involved in the 
shootings were not among such citizens and, given the considerations 
above, they deserved to have a say.
I find another example of persuasive emotional appeal in 1964 
Malcom X' speech for racial justice in Michigan,24 when he expressed 
believe that we can find ways to reduce gun violence consistent with the Second 
Amendment. (...) We have to tell Congress it's time to strengthen school safety and 
help people struggling with mental health problems get the treatment they need 
before it's too late.  Let's do that for our kids and for our communities. Now, I know 
that some of these proposals inspire more debate than others, but each of them has 
the support of the majority of the American people.  All of them are common sense.  
All of them deserve a vote.  All of them deserve a vote". Obama B. (2013) Hartford, 
Connecticut. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijFPMrptrwE
24 "We must know what part politics play in our lives. And until we become 
politically mature we will always be mislead, lead astray, or deceived or maneuvered 
into supporting someone politically who doesn't have the good of our community at 
heart (...). [W]e will have to carry on a program, a political program, of re-education 
to open our people's eyes, make us become more politically conscious, politically 
mature, and then whenever we get ready to cast our ballot that ballot, will be cast 
for a man of the community who has the good of the community of heart (...). 
[W]e're trapped, trapped, double-trapped, triple-rapped. Anywhere we go we find 
that we' re trapped. And every kind of solution that someone comes up with is just 
another trap. (...)1964 looks like it might be the year of the ballot or the bullet. Why 
(...)? Because Negroes have listened to the trickery, and the lies, and the false 
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anger in denouncing black Americans' lack of economic and political 
opportunities. I will try, as I did above, to frame Malcom X' emotional 
appeal within my account. The evaluative claim made by Malcom X 
was the necessity of self-empowerment and the achievement of 
greater political awareness by the black community. The factual 
assumption was that, by these means, black people could improve 
their conditions. The anger that the repeated appeals expressed was 
meant to make salient the goal of bridging the inequality between 
blacks and white, by liberating the blacks from oppression. Such 
goal, however, was not linked to the advocacy of violent action, but of 
self-empowerment and political awareness. Anger, in other words, 
was not used to blindly instigate action against white people. Rather, 
it was used to highlight and make palpable the profound injustice 
inherent in the unequal standing of black and white people in 
American society, and it was justified by the multiple abuses 
perpetrated against black people, as listed in the speech. The emotion 
was, in other words, "grounded", as it was integrated with the factual 
knowledge about the situation of black people in the US. 
The distinction that I have proposed between propagandistic 
and persuasive emotional appeals, and the examples that I have 
reported as indicative of it, might not sound fully convincing. Indeed, 
in actual political contexts, it can be hard to discern whether the 
integrative processing of an emotion and its goal/value is promoted or 
not, and identifying particular instances of emotional appeals in this 
respect require complex considerations, which might be contested. 
However, alternative criteria to operate the distinction may result 
equally, if not more, problematic. Moreover, empirical studies seem to 
confirm that different ways of processing emotional appeals can 
indeed be identified. I will just mention a couple of them. 
On one hand, Cacioppo et al (1992) have found that eliciting 
emotional responses might influence the formation of attitudes by 
simple classical conditioning. Similar results were achieved by Huddy 
and Gunnthorsdottir (2000), whose study on the "simple transfer of 
promises of the white man now for too long. And they're fed up. They've become 
disenchanted. They've become disillusioned. They've become dissatisfied, and all of 
this has built up frustrations in the black community that makes the black 
community throughout America today more explosive than all of the atomic bombs 
the Russians can ever invent." Malcolm X (1964) Detroit, Michigan. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9BVEnEsn6Y .
96
affect" I have mentioned above. On the other hand, Rosselli et al 
(1995) provided direct evidence that the emotions elicited through the 
exposure to emotional appeals can affect people's opinions, through 
their integration with the cognitive content of the message. Whereas 
the first studies seem to suggest that emotive cues might influence 
individuals independently from any substantive arguments and 
further considerations, thus embedding a non-integrative processing 
of emotions, the latter suggests that the messages including emotional 
cues might be considered in conjunction, not at odds with or 
independently of, the intellectual content of the message, thus 
embedding an integrative model of emotion processing. Given the 
different empirical findings, it seems that emotional appeals might 
indeed be processed in distinct ways. It would be interesting to verify 
whether this distinction is grounded, not only in the different 
characteristics of the people processing the appeals, but also in the 
different configurations of the appeals themselves: this would help to 
pinpoint exactly what specific features, encourage or not the process 
of coherent integration, thus making an emotional appeal, within my 
framework, persuasive or propagandistic respectively. I leave this 
research suggestion to the psychologists, and I turn now to outline 
how the epistemic difference between persuasive and propagandistic 
appeals results in their different contribution the agent's political 
sophistication.
6.  Emotional appeals and political sophistication
The term "sophistication" has been interchangeably used in the 
literature with the terms "expertise", "cognition", "awareness", 
"competence", "literacy", preceded by the word "political", to 
comprise, despite the diverse accounts of the concept, not only the 
individual's factual knowledge about political events, but also, 
crucially, her capacity to relate this knowledge to her own goals and 
values. In Luskin's words: "[t]here are many reasons to think 
sophistication important, but perhaps its greatest importance lies in 
its conditioning of the relationship between values and policy and 
candidate preferences, which can be expected to be tighter among the 
more sophisticated" (Luskin 2002 p 220). Indeed, studies have shown 
that a fundamental difference between political novices and experts is 
that, although both may be sure of what they value, the first are 
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unsure on how to use those values in political choices (Alvarez and 
Brehm 2002). Schreiber (2007) has illustrated this discrepancy by 
adapting Searle's Chinese Room Argument: in expressing their 
political attitudes, political novices are like the English speaker who 
processes ideograms without really understanding them, as in 
processing political information, they express their preferences, by 
using ideology as a framework; in contrast, for political experts, "the 
symbols of politics have meaning and are connected to deeply held 
values; these people are in the Chinese room and they speak Chinese" 
(Schreiber 2007, 64). 
The relevant point about the notion of political sophistication 
is that it cannot be accounted for only in terms of the facts that one is 
able to recall: "If you know the name of the Indonesian president, 
whether he has the power to veto legislation, and whether his party 
controls the legislature, you do not have sufficient knowledge to 
assess whether he and his policies will conform to your values" 
(Schreiber 2007, 65). Factual knowledge is not enough to make an 
individual politically sophisticated, but another form of knowledge is 
necessary. I have call it "evaluative knowledge" and I have defined it 
as the knowledge concerning how one's own goals and values are 
evoked by concrete political matters (Romano 2018). My claim is that 
the emotions elicited by persuasive emotional appeals can give a 
positive contribution to the agent's evaluative knowledge, while 
propagandistic emotional appeals can only offer a negative 
contribution to it. 
How can the emotions elicited by persuasive emotional appeals 
contribute to the agent's evaluative knowledge? I argue that they can 
do so, in two complementary ways. First, by eliciting an emotion in 
respect to a situation, a persuasive appeal can make salient properties 
of that situation that are related to a certain goal/value. For instance, 
the anger expressed by Malcom X' appeal had the function to make 
apparent properties of a situation grounding injustice, making salient 
the goal to remedy. Therefore, perceiving the situation described by 
Malcom X with anger, through his emotional appeal, may prompt the 
audience to notice an injustice, that they might have overlooked 
otherwise. This contribution, however, would not have a positive 
impact on the agent's evaluative knowledge of the situation, if it did 
not undergo a coherent integration with the agent's further values 
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and beliefs. Specifically, confronting the emotional component, 
elicited through the appeal, with the beliefs and values that the agent 
holds in relation to a certain political issue, allows the agent to better 
understand what grounds the evaluative property and the goal/value 
that the emotion makes salient. For instance, Malcom X' appeal to 
anger includes a description of the reasons grounding such anger, 
and by doing so, it promotes the coherent integration of anger with 
factual knowledge about the situation and with the values on the basis 
of which the situation is considered unjust. This, in turn, promotes a 
greater understanding of the injustice and the necessity to remedy, 
that the emotion makes salient. The two complementary ways in 
which the anger elicited by Malcom X' appeal can contribute to the 
agent's evaluative knowledge, and thus to her political sophistication 
are aptly summarized by the words of Lepoutre (2018): "[t]he salience 
role of anger is epistemically valuable not only because it can yield 
knowledge that an injustice is taking place but also because it 
facilitates a greater understanding of the nature of that injustice" 
(Lepoutre 2018, 410). By integrating the goal/value suggested by the 
emotion within the persuasive appeal, the agent can acquire greater 
evaluative knowledge, because she can more effectively ground her 
evaluative judgments, and this is exactly, as Schreiber's formulation 
points out, at the core of her political sophistication.
Having illustrated how persuasive emotional appeals can make 
the agent more politically sophisticated, by positively contributing to 
her evaluative knowledge, it is now easier to show how propagandistic 
emotional appeals can do the opposite. The problem with the 
emotions elicited by propagandistic emotional appeals is that the 
goal/value that they make salient in relation to a certain evaluative 
property, is not meant to undergo a process of coherent integration 
with the agent's further values and beliefs. In this way, the agent 
embraces the evaluative claim put forward by the appeal and 
supported by the goal/value made that the emotion makes salient, 
without assessing whether this is the goal/value that actually grounds 
her attitude on that matter. This, clearly, negatively impacts her 
political sophistication, by impairing her evaluative knowledge. For 
instance, the anger appeal that I have illustrated above as 
propagandistic, makes salient the goal of rectifying an injustice, 
supporting the evaluative claim that the government behaves in a 
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criminal way, by welcoming immigrants.  By not grounding the anger 
in proper factual evidence, and directing it against the government 
and immigrants, the appeal prevents the agent from considering 
whether the political object represented by the behavior of the 
government towards immigrants, really accounts for his anger, and 
therefore whether the presence of an injustice to be rectified is the 
goal on the basis of which the agent should form her evaluative 
knowledge about the issue. Moreover, by eliciting an emotion and not 
promoting the assessment of the goal/value that it makes salient, 
propagandistic emotional appeals prevent the agent from relating to 
the political object with other emotional attitudes, which might 
highlight goals that are more coherent with her beliefs and values. 
The danger of persuasive emotional appeals for the formation 
of the agent's evaluative knowledge and therefore for her political 
sophistication, seems to be confirmed by the observations of Miceli et 
al (2011), whose "goal hooking model" I have mentioned in section 2. 
According to Miceli et al (2011), the reason for the particular strength 
and immediacy of the impact of emotion on attitude change, lies 
exactly in its relationship with goals. Specifically, whereas beliefs can 
only activate pre-existing goals, emotions can generate new ones: 
"Suppose I learn that tomorrow there will be shortage of water. This 
belief will activate my pre-existing goal 'to have water,' which in turn 
will generate my goal 'to stock up on water' as a means for it" (Miceli 
et al 2011 p 140). By contrast, suppose, they continue, that my envy is 
aroused by someone saying that John is smarter me: this emotion can 
generate by itself the goal that John suffers some harm, driving me, 
for instance, to deny John a favor. Although such goal is linked to the 
more general goal to not be less than John, this is not the reason why 
I want John to suffer some harm: 
"If I envy John, I want this [that he suffers some harm] for its 
own sake (because of my envious ill will against John), not as a means 
for not being less intelligent than John. Thus, unlike the purely 
cognitive activation, the emotional triggering of goals is a form of 
direct generation of goals" (Miceli et al 2011 p 140).
Clearly, a goal that is generated independently from any 
planning and reasoning, is less likely to undergo scrutiny or 
evaluation of its value, and, in this sense, is more likely to exert a 
manipulative action. However, this danger can be avoided if the goal 
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generated by the emotion is confronted with the agent's further 
values and beliefs, to assess whether it is or nor coherent with them. 
Indeed, as I have indicated above, when the goal generated by the 
emotion, is coherently integrated, then it can positively affect the 
agent's evaluative knowledge, thus contributing, in the political 
context, to her sophistication. 
The epistemic distinction between persuasive and 
propagandistic emotional appeals that I have proposed, can account 
for the distinction between propaganda and persuasion, that was 
briefly introduced in the first section of the paper. Specifically, the 
fact that the persuasive appeals promote the assessment and the 
coherent integration of the goal/value that they make salient, seems to 
account for the capacity of persuasion to encourage a reasoned 
dialogue about values in relation to the political issues at stake (e.g. 
Jowett & O'Donnell 2014); in contrast, by hindering the assessment 
and the integration of the goal/value that they make salient, 
propagandistic emotional appeals hinder such dialogue: instead, they 
exploit and strengthen flawed ideologies that, as noted by Stanley 
(2015), prevent a proper understanding of political reality.
Conclusion
My objective in this paper was to show that emotional appeals are not 
per se harmful in the political discourse; rather, while propagandistic 
appeals can undermine the agent's political sophistication, persuasive 
appeals can improve it. To make my point, I have first defined 
emotional appeals as evaluative arguments, that is, arguments that 
support an evaluative conclusion by presenting some factual evidence 
in conjunction with a goal/value. Second, I have argued that the 
emotions elicited by emotional appeals intervene in the evaluative 
arguments that these appeals put forward by making salient certain 
goals/values. Third, I have analyzed the criteria of acceptability, 
relevance, and adequacy, for determining when an emotion is 
legitimately used in an evaluative argument; from my analysis, I have 
concluded that emotional appeals use emotions legitimately if they 
promote the coherent integration of the goal/value that they make 
salient with the agent's further values and appropriate beliefs. On this 
basis, I have established an epistemic distinction between persuasive 
and propagandistic appeals, claiming that the former use emotions 
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legitimately, while the latter do not. This epistemic distinction, I have 
argued, results in a different impact of emotional appeals on political 
sophistication. Specifically, I have identified what I call "evaluative 
knowledge" as a key element of political sophistication, as the 
knowledge concerning how the agent's own goals and values are at 
stake in concrete political matters. I have argued that persuasive 
emotional appeals, by promoting the assessment and coherent 
integration of the goal that they make salient with the agent's further 
values and beliefs, have a positive impact on the agent's evaluative 
knowledge, while propagandistic emotional appeals can only have a 
negative impact on it.
Clearly, the criterion that I propose to distinguish how 
persuasion and how propaganda make use of emotional appeals 
might be judged as lacking the rigor required to distinguish them in 
practice: indeed, I do not propose any straightforward guidelines to 
disentangle them, but only some indicative examples. Still, my 
proposal might provide useful inputs for developing this kind of 
guidelines, by prompting further theoretical and empirical 
investigation. Moreover, my analysis might contribute to challenge 
the traditional view of emotional appeals as necessarily detrimental, 
and, more generally, to the compelling task of rehabilitating emotions 
in the political discourse.
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Poster from the Swiss People’s Party 
  
(Retrieved from https://www.thedailybeast.com/switzerland-paints-eu-as-cheese-hungry-
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Figure 2.  
 
A man holds a placard with a photograph of Alan. 
 
(Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-12/protesters-hold-a-photo-of-aylan-
kurdi/8179320) 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.  
 
“Libero”’s first page: “Criminal state”. 
 
(Retrieved from http://www.dagospia.com/mediagallery/Dago_fotogallery-
167393/830148.htm) 
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Chapter 4
I Belong therefore I Am: Immigrants, National 
Identity and the Feeling of Belonging
Abstract 
Is the cultural background of immigrants an appropriate criterion for 
determining their access to a host country? Those who endorse the 
cultural criterion have emphasized national culture's value as a source of 
identity for the members of the national community, and have argued 
that the inclusion of immigrants with a different cultural background 
into the community constitutes a threat to it. To assess the cultural 
criterion, I determine what constitutes national culture's value as a 
source of identity, and then examine what it entails to respect it. I show 
that the value of national identity resides in providing a feeling of 
belonging and that this value has a participatory character. In light of 
this, I claim that immigrants do not threaten the national identity, when 
they do not share cultural traits similar to those of the host community, 
but may threaten it, when they do not share a feeling of belonging to it. 
For this reason, I conclude that, in order to protect the national culture's 
value as a source of identity, it is more appropriate to foster immigrants' 
feelings of belonging to the host community, than to select them based 
on their cultural backgrounds.
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Introduction
Last year's electoral campaigns in Western Europe appealed 
frequently to the national identity's value, in order to justify a 
selective exclusion of immigrants. In the Netherlands, the leader of 
the nationalist conservative FvD party, Thierry Baudet, warned that 
immigration might cause a "homeopathic watering-down" of Dutch 
culture. In France, Marine Le Pen's party presented itself as fighting 
for the "French identity" and a "French France", especially against 
immigrants with a Muslim background. Italy's Northern League and 
Germany's AfD party provided analogous examples. Similarly, in the 
US, Trump's politics depicted immigration as a threat to the 
authentic American national identity. These kinds of appeals found 
fertile ground in their electorates. Indeed, studies of mass attitudes 
towards immigration policies in North America and Western 
Europe,25 reveal that it is perceptions of immigrants' impact on 
aspects of national culture and identity, rather than economic 
concerns, that drive peoples' preferences for restrictive immigration 
policies. The majority of those who oppose immigrants and asylum 
seekers attribute a great value to the "cultural, religious, and linguistic 
distinctness and unity of their national community" (Ivarsflaten 2005, 
25). It follows that, since they perceive immigrants and asylum seekers 
as a threat to their community, they are more motivated to support 
limitative immigration policies for "preserving the uniqueness and 
specificity of the national community – that is, unity of language, 
religion and tradition" (Ivarsflaten 2005, 37). 
It seems that the great value attributed to national culture and 
identity is deeply embedded in popular attitudes about immigration. 
This might explain the traction of the aforementioned political 
appeals. I conceptualize these types of appeals as supporting what I 
25 See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a comprehensive review.
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call the "cultural criterion", namely, the idea that a nation should take 
immigrants' cultural backgrounds into account, when determining 
their access to a host country. Economic and social reasons also exist 
to support the cultural criterion.26 However, in this paper, I focus 
exclusively on those reasons related to culture and identity. 
Specifically, I consider the justification of the cultural criterion saying 
that national culture is valuable to the members of the national 
community as a source of identity, and that the inclusion of 
immigrants with a different cultural background into the community 
constitutes a threat against it. 
To achieve this, I will proceed as follows. I will begin (Section 1) 
by presenting a definition of culture and some formulations in 
defense of the cultural criterion as a means of preserving the national 
identity of the host country. In order to assess the cultural criterion, I 
will address two issues. First (Section 2), I will determine what the 
actual value of national culture is, as a source of identity; i.e., how 
national culture can provide a national identity. I will claim that the 
actual value of national culture as a source of identity is not that it 
provides members of the national community with shared 
characteristic cultural traits, but rather that it offers them a "feeling of 
belonging". Second (Section 3), I will determine what type of value 
national identity has; i.e. what it means to preserve it and whether 
immigrants with different cultural backgrounds threaten it. I will 
argue that national identity's value has a participatory character, 
meaning that it endures only if the members of the national 
community participate in it. Having located national identity's value 
in the feeling of belonging that it provides, I will claim that because 
of its participatory character, this value can be preserved if the 
community's members share a feeling of belonging. Thus, immigrants 
26 In order to protect national security and the welfare state, for example, nations 
have used the nationality of immigrants as a criterion to exclude those who were 
identified as either safety threats or as financial burdens. The Muslim ban, 
proposed by D. J. Trump in February 2017 discriminates against immigrants from 
countries with a Muslim cultural majority it associates them with potential 
terrorists. Likewise, Trump's proposal for a Mexican wall discriminates against 
immigrants from Mexico, depicting them as potential competitors in the job market. 
Appeals to culture in order to limit immigration, moreover, have been advanced to 
preserve social cohesion and democratic participation, on the ground that a 
culturally homogeneous society is more stable than a multicultural one (Putnam 
2007), and that belonging to a country's national culture is necessary to take part in 
the public and civic life of that country (Mill 1861).
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with a different cultural background may threaten the national 
identity's value, not because they might not share its characteristic 
cultural traits, but because they might not share the feeling of 
belonging to the host community. This is why (Section 4), I will argue 
in favor of encouraging immigrants' feelings of belonging, rather than 
selecting them on the basis of their cultural traits (i.e. the cultural 
criterion), as a way to preserve the actual national identity's value for 
the members of the community. I will conclude by addressing some 
possible objections to my proposal and by highlighting the relevance 
of my contribution.
1.  National culture and the cultural criterion
Waldron (1996) offered a definition of culture that captures, I believe, 
some of its most relevant dimensions: 
"'Culture' refers to a set of related practices and traditions 
associated currently and historically with a community (...). 
Membership in a community (...) is usually taken to be 
ascriptive, rather than voluntary, and to have implications 
across a whole range of one's actions and relations with others 
(...). The culture of a community is a way of doing things, 
particularly the things that are done together (...): language, 
governance, religious rituals, rites of passage, family structures, 
patterns of material production and decoration, economy, 
science (...). It is a way that its members have, as they think 
their ancestors had and as they hope their descendants will 
have, of enjoying and enduring the joys and vicissitudes of 
human life together" (Waldron 1996, 96) 
As Waldron points out, culture encompasses many different 
aspects of a person's life in their community, and when this 
community is a nation,27 we can talk about national culture. Different 
aspects have been emphasized as more or less salient for the 
definition of specific national cultures, and here I will not dwell upon 
discussing whether and how these features can be exactly 
determined. What matters for my discussion is that one of the main 
objects of concern, for those endorsing restrictive immigration 
27 Herein, I use the term "nation" as generally indicating any country that is 
organized as a political unit, leaving aside the discussion on multinational states.
106
policies, is the so-called "national culture", which is characterized by 
a different combination of the elements mentioned in Waldron's 
definition. This concern is the basis of what I call the "cultural 
criterion", namely the idea that the cultural background of 
immigrants should be taken into account for determining their access 
to the host country, because immigrants may compromise the 
country's national culture and the value associated with it. Some 
formulations of the cultural criterion follow. 
Walzer (1983) defended the idea that members of a national 
community have the right to admit only those who conform to the 
members' understanding of what it means to be part of the 
community and to the kind of community they want to have. He 
explained this as a means of preserving the members' distinctive 
national culture (Walzer 1983, 32). Without such a criterion for 
admission, Walzer argues, "there could not be communities of 
character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women 
with some special commitment to one another and some special sense 
of their common life" (Walzer 1983, 62). Similarly, when Miller (2005) 
discusses the good reasons a country might have to limit immigration, 
he mentions the cultural change that immigration might bring about: 
"The public culture of their country is something that people 
have an interest in controlling: they want to be able to shape 
the way that their nation develops, including the values that 
are contained in the public culture (...). [T]hey may certainly 
have good reason to try (...) to maintain cultural continuity over 
time, so that they can see themselves as the bearers of an 
identifiable cultural tradition that stretches backward 
historically" (Miller 2014, 370)
Even Carens, one of the most influential advocates of open 
borders, maintains that restrictions on immigration are justified when 
"they are necessary to preserve a distinct culture or way of life" 
(Carens 1992, 25). He takes the Japanese culture, as an example: 
"It seems reasonable to suppose that many Japanese cherish 
their distinctive way of life that they want to preserve it and 
pass it on to their children because they find that it gives 
meaning and depth to their lives. They cannot pass it on 
unchanged, to be sure, because no way of life remains entirely 
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unchanged, but they can hope to do so in a form that retains 
both its vitality and its continuity with the past (...). It also 
seems reasonable to suppose that this distinctive culture and 
way of life would be profoundly transformed if a significant 
number of immigrants came to live in Japan. A multicultural 
Japan would be a very different place. So, limits on new 
entrants would be necessary to preserve the culture if any 
significant number of people wanted to immigrate" (Carens 
1992, 40)
The aforementioned formulations of the cultural criterion 
seem to have at least three assumptions in common. The first is that 
national culture bears a value that is not related to furthering 
economic, social, or political ends, but in itself, as what determines 
the "character", the "tradition", the "way of life" of the national 
community. These terms can be comprehensively embedded in what 
has been called, in a more or less rhetorical fashion, the "identity" of 
a country, or "national identity". Thus, the first assumption of the 
cultural criterion is that national culture has value as a source of 
identity, and, specifically, a national identity. The second assumption 
is that immigrants who present different cultural traits from those 
characterizing the national culture of the host country, threaten the 
value of the national culture as a source of identity. That is to say, 
their presence may compromise the national identity of the host 
country. The third assumption is that a nation may legitimately 
exclude immigrants on a cultural basis in order to protect its national 
identity. 
Supporters of the cultural criterion only rarely state these 
premises explicitly, but those are at its core. Therefore, assessing the 
criterion necessitates assessing its premises. In the literature, a 
number of authors have engaged with the cultural criterion, with 
respect to the third of its premises.28 However, in this paper, I leave 
28 For example, several authors have argued that the cultural criterion is 
incompatible with a liberal state. Among them, Blake (2005) criticized the cultural 
criterion saying that it legitimizes the preservation and protection of a particular 
cultural community. This leads to the nation's discriminating against those within 
the nation, who do not belong to that community: "in all cases in which there are 
national or ethnic minorities, which is to say, the vast majority of actual cases, to 
restrict immigration for national or ethnic reasons, is to make some citizens 
politically inferior" (Blake 2005 233). Similarly, Lindauer (2017) pointed out how, by 
expressing an attitude about certain potential immigrants, the cultural criterion also 
expresses an attitude about the members of the nation who identify with those 
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the third premise aside and instead focus on the other two. 
Specifically, I address the following questions. First, is national 
culture an actual source of identity and, if so, how? Second, do 
immigrants with a different cultural background disrupt national 
culture's value as a source of identity? I will begin to answer the first 
of these questions in the following section.
2.  What is national identity's value as a source of identity?
In this section, I will clarify what constitutes national culture's value 
as a source of identity, that is, how national culture can be a source of 
identity. Specifically, I will examine the theories of national culture's 
providing an identity, in terms of distinctive cultural traits and a 
"context of choice". I will argue that none of them capture the actual 
value of national culture as a source of identity. Instead, I will 
propose to understand this value as providing a "feeling of 
belonging". 
2.1 Distinctive cultural traits
Some authors have focused on national culture's value as a source of 
identity in terms of the cultural traits that the members of the 
national community share. One of the most prominent among them is 
David Miller (1995).29 Miller (1995) acknowledges that the great 
variability and individual diversity, among the members of a national 
community, make it difficult to pinpoint a community's characteristic 
immigrants. This is by virtue of some of the characteristics that they share (e.g. 
religion, race, ethnicity, etc.): "To exclude nonmembers based on these qualities is 
also to express disrespect for members who possess them" (Lindauer 2017, 290).
29 Miller (2016) also addresses what I have identified as the third premise of the 
cultural criterion, claiming that the state may legitimately select immigrants on a 
cultural basis. He supports this claim by saying that a unified national culture is 
necessary to support the welfare state. However, citizens would only be willing to 
pay the state's costs if they shared a sense of common identity with their fellow 
citizens. Because admitting immigrants disrupts this shared community identity, it 
follows that it erodes support for the welfare state, thus obstructing the realization 
of justice. For this reason Miller concludes that the state can legitimately adopt a 
cultural criterion when selecting immigrants. Pevnick (2009) criticized this, pointing 
out that even if increased immigration had negative consequences on the support of 
the welfare state, its consequences would be more advantageous overall than those 
of restrictive immigration. He supports this, stating that because of the advantages 
that immigrants from poor countries might bring, an appeal to consequences of 
immigration is not effective as it does not explain why the interest of compatriots 
should be prioritized over those of the others (Pevnick 2009).
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traits. Conversely, he insists that such traits are precisely what give a 
national community its own identity and that distinguish it from 
other communities: 
"There is a shared way of life, which is not to say that everyone 
follows exactly the same conventions or adheres to the same 
cultural values, but that there is a substantial degree of overlap 
in forms of life. One can't detach this way of life from the 
national identity of the people in question" (Miller 1995, 41)
Miller conceptualizes the relevance of national culture as a 
source of identity, by comparing nationality to the "values that have 
been inculcated in us by the communities and institutions to which 
we belong: family, school, church, and so forth" (Miller 1995, 44). He 
maintains that we construct our identity through experience and 
reflection, selecting the values that we want to endorse, and "[t]here is 
no reason why nationality should be excluded from this process" 
(Miller 1995, 45). 
The attempt to distinguish different national cultures on the 
basis of their characteristic traits has been criticized on the ground 
that it is based on an "essentialist" notion of culture, as a determinate, 
bounded, and homogeneous entity (Patten 2011), and that such a 
notion is fundamentally distorted, because cultures overlap, interact, 
and change (Waldron 1995, Scheffler 2007). Miller responded to the 
critique by denying the monolithic view, which poses a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to a nation. Instead, 
he favored a broader and more flexible conception of national 
culture, "as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to 
conduct its life together" (Miller 1995, 26), including, without being 
limited to, political principles, social norms, religious beliefs, and 
language. He argued that "[i]t is (...) wrong to suppose that 'national 
character' consists in a set of features that everyone who belongs to 
the nation must display in equal measure (...). National identities can 
remain unarticulated, and yet still exercise a pervasive influence on 
people's behaviour" (Miller 1995, 26-27). 
Miller's solution does not seem satisfactory. His assumption of 
a broad definition of the cultural traits and characteristics of a 
national culture does not make it easier to identify them. It is 
undeniable, as Miller points out, that people's cultural context 
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influences them. However, in light of the essentialist critique, we 
cannot attribute this influence, and therefore the significance of 
culture to identity, to the distinctiveness of the elements presented 
within a certain cultural context.30 Drawing from the essentialist 
critique, Scheffler (2007) rejects the notion of national identity as 
intrinsically problematic. He argues that the identity of an individual 
is a "protean" notion, meaning that individuals have multiple and 
variable identifications, which are generated by different cultural 
sources and affiliations (e.g. class, religion, occupation, race, gender 
or sexual orientation). Each of these may be more or less salient, 
depending on the context. Therefore, Scheffler argues, "the idea of 
having the state assign each individual to a single culture chosen from 
a fixed menu of options based on geography, religion, skin color, or 
language" (Scheffler 2007, 101) is completely misguided. In light of 
this, Scheffler rejects the cultural criterion: since cultural identity is a 
complex and fluid phenomenon, one cannot reduce it to the 
opposition between a host culture and an immigrant one. 
Effectively, the essentialist critique shows that the national 
culture's value as a source of identity does not come from attributing 
the members of the national community with some features, which 
are supposed to be distinctive of their national culture. However, this 
does not imply that national culture has no value for identity at all. 
Will Kymlicka advanced an alternative proposal. 
2.2 Context of choice
According to Kymlicka, cultural membership affects our very sense of 
personal identity, by offering a "context of choice" (Kymlicka 1989, 
164), that is, by providing us with a range of options and the capacity 
to evaluate them meaningfully. The options that we consider "have 
meaning to us because they are identified as having significance by 
our culture because they fit into some patterns of activity which are 
culturally recognized as a way of leading one's life" (Kymlicka 1989, 
165). As we grow up in a certain culture, we participate in and learn 
about certain forms of life (familial, religious, sexual, educational, 
etc.), which define potential models for us, and "[w]e decide how to 
30 The next section (Section 2.2) will address Miller's position further, when I 
discuss his critique to the concept of culture as a context of choice.
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lead our lives by situating ourselves in these cultural narratives" 
(Kymlicka 1989, 165). 
Kymlicka addresses the essentialist critique by distinguishing 
between the "structure" and the "character" of a national culture. He 
defines cultural structure as the primary sense of cultural 
membership, the "context of choice" as illustrated above. The cultural 
character, on the other hand, comes from the "norms, values and 
attendant institutions" (Kymlicka 1989, 166), that is, by the content 
within the structure at any given time. According to Kymlicka, it is 
normal and right for the character of a culture to change, as a result 
of the choices of its members, who may decide to revise their values 
and to integrate what they find most valuable from other cultures. A 
liberal nation, he argues, cannot impose restrictions on the character 
of a culture; instead, it must protect the structure, that is, the 
essential principles of a culture, those providing people with a 
"context of choice", and without which the culture would cease to 
exist. 
The weakness of Kymlicka's proposal lies in its lack of any 
clear criteria to distinguish the "structure" from the "character" of a 
culture. If we accept that culture's value for identity lies in its capacity 
to provide a "context of choice", and if that resides in the "cultural 
structure", we must first determine what constitutes the structure, in 
order to understand what culture's actual value is for identity. Given 
the ambiguity in Kymlicka's proposal for distinguishing between 
cultural structure and character, different conclusions have been 
drawn about the implications of his distinctions for the arguments 
concerning immigration policies. 
For example, Perry (1995), interpreted Kymlicka's suggestion as 
saying that a nation should protect the cultural structure, in the sense 
of granting "cultural continuity" (Perry 1995, 116). He argues that the 
culture's value as a context of choice does not require a particular 
cultural framework to shape an individual's identity. Cultures that 
change under the effects of different factors, including immigration, 
can also accommodate it, provided that those changes do not happen 
too quickly. According to Perry, a liberal nation cannot limit 
immigration in order to shape the nature of cultural change; however, 
it is entitled to limit the flow of immigration in order "to ensure that 
change is sufficiently gradual, whatever direction it ultimately takes, 
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that individuals' 'context of choice' (to use Kymlicka's term) is not 
disrupted" (Perry 1995, 116). Perry's conception of "cultural 
continuity" does not include "certain key or core substantive 
elements" (Perry 1995, 116), not even a particular language, since 
"sufficiently gradual cultural change can lead, over time, to a shift 
from one language to another without undue disruption of the 
context of choice" (Perry 1995, 117). 
Other scholars have interpreted culture's value as a context of 
choice, to comprise basic liberal democratic values and, 
consequently, have proposed arguments in favor of immigration 
policies that aim to protect these values. As an example, Orgad (2015) 
proposes regulating immigration, based on what he calls "National 
Constitutionalism". Under this, immigrants must accept some 
structural liberal-democratic principles, such as those contained in a 
national constitution, as a prerequisite for admission: "these 
principles are not culturally-oriented but rather constitute a system of 
rules governing human behavior in liberal democracies" (Orgad 2015, 
13). Building on Habermas' "Constitutional Patriotism" (Habermas 
2001), Orgad argues that, under national constitutionalism, 
immigrants are required to respect the national constitutional 
principles, but not to feel any "devotion" or "emotional 
connectedness" for them (Orgad 2015, 100).
In their arguments, Perry and Orgad recast the importance of 
national culture, away from some particular cultural traits and 
towards something more general, such as cultural continuity or a 
liberal-democratic structure. In their frameworks, national identity's 
value coincides with those elements and is protected as long as those 
are preserved. This led Miller (2014) to call Perry's proposal the "any 
culture will do" position, as it assumes that as long as a viable public 
culture is maintained, then "it should not matter that its character 
changes as a result of taking in people with different cultural values" 
(Miller 2014, 369).31 Similarly, Orgad's solution seems to disregard the 
cultural elements and attachments that go beyond the respect of 
31 It should be pointed out that Miller's characterization of Perry's position as the 
"any culture will do" position, is not fully accurate. Perry, indeed, does not argue 
that the context of choice can be preserved within "any culture", but rather within a 
culture that, despite changing its character, does not change too quickly. However, 
as will be illustrated later, this is still not sufficient for Miller, in order to preserve 
the value of national identity.
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liberal-democratic values. Again, as long as the latter are kept stable, 
the character of the former does not seem to be relevant. 
Scholars have criticized Perry and Orgad's positions on similar 
grounds. Miller (2014) criticized Perry's proposal, by arguing that a 
nation has a legitimate interest in controlling the direction, and not 
only the pace, of cultural change. In particular, a nation should 
preserve the "community's most important distinguishing 
characteristics" (Miller 2014, 370), such as its language and its spatial 
organization. Miller emphasized the importance of people's 
attachment to the particular culture they have grown accustomed to: 
"People feel at home in a place, in part, because they can see that 
their surroundings bear the imprint of past generations whose values 
were recognizably their own. This does not rule out cultural change, 
but again it gives a reason for wanting to stay in control of the 
process" (Miller 2014 370). Orgad's proposal and, in general, all 
proposals akin to Habermas' constitutional patriotism have been 
criticized on the grounds that they rely on an excessively thin 
conception of national identity, one that is based solely on some 
liberal values. As Joppke (2008) argues, these values cannot supply 
the national identity discourse with distinctiveness and particularity; 
thus, they cannot really provide a shared national identity that 
inspires and mobilizes a feeling of common belonging.32 
Both critiques seem to deny that making cultural change 
gradually, or ensuring respect of the constitutional principles, may 
preserve the national identity's value as a source of identity for the 
members of a national community. Specifically, neither critique 
considers these measures sufficient to allow the preservation of the 
particular cultural traits, to which the members of the national 
community feel emotionally attached, and which make them "feel at 
home" while prompting a feeling of common belonging. These 
critiques highlight two crucial aspects that are relevant to my 
discussion on national identity's value.
32 In Joppke's view, positions such as Orgad's fall into a so-called "paradox of 
universalism". On one hand, the state wants immigrants to integrate into particular 
national communities. On the other hand, the liberal state can only legitimately ask 
for their adherence to liberal democratic values that are universal, even if framed as 
English, German or Danish. This is a paradox, because universal values cannot 
denote cultural particularity (Joppke 2008).
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First, they rightly point out that solutions, such as those 
proposed by Perry and Orgad, are not completely satisfactory, 
because they do not adequately respond to concerns about the 
protection of a national identity. Although the provision of a "context 
of choice", either in the form of cultural continuity or a liberal 
democratic structure, seems to be an important constituent of 
national identity, I argue that it does not truly exhaust its value. Those 
who endorse the cultural criterion for selecting immigrants are 
concerned with protecting their own peculiar culture, not of "a 
culture" in general. A generic cultural structure does not consider a 
specific 'something' within their own culture, which bears value for 
their identity. What is this? The answer brings me to the second 
aspect, central to these critiques. 
Both critiques seem to point out that cultural distinctiveness, 
in the form of certain particular cultural traits, makes national culture 
valuable as a source of identity. They suggest that these traits explain 
why people feel at home in their national community and what 
prompts their sense of mutually belonging to it. I argue that this view 
is not completely accurate. On one hand, it highlights the presence of 
an emotional component, which does indeed seem to be fundamental 
to the national identity's value. On the other hand, the fact that 
people have an emotional attachment to a specific culture, with 
certain characteristics, does not mean that national identity's value 
lies in the specificity of those characteristics. As previously illustrated, 
the essentialist critique casts legitimate doubts on the very existence 
of these characteristics. Notwithstanding, I argue that people's 
attachment to them indicates that there is another source of value, 
within the national culture, for its members' identity. Specifically, I 
locate national culture's value for identity in its capacity to provide a 
"feeling of belonging", and I argue that this capacity does not depend 
on the preservation of specific cultural traits. I will present my 
proposal in the next section.
2.3 Feeling of belonging
Scholars, such as Anderson (1991) and Connor (1993), have 
emphasized that tangible and objective criteria are not sufficient for a 
group of people to form a nation. For instance, speaking Polish, living 
in Poland, and adhering to Catholicism are not enough to make you a 
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Pole: there are Germans, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians who meet 
these criteria but who do not consider themselves Polish; nor do their 
Polish fellow citizens consider them Polish (Connor 1993, 376). 
Instead, what lies at the core of a nation are the individual feelings of 
group membership: "The essence of the nation is a psychological 
bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious 
conviction of its members, from all non-members in a most vital way" 
(Connor 1993, 376). Given this, Anderson defined the nation as an 
"imagined political community": "It is imagined because the members 
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 1991, 6). Connor and 
Anderson both point out that this sense of belonging to a community, 
despite its being an imagined one, is what creates emotional 
commitment towards such a community and its distinctive culture, 
and what makes people willing to kill and die for their nation. I argue 
that the feeling of belonging, as described by Anderson and Connor, 
lies at the core of national culture's value of as a source of identity. I 
will explain how in the rest of this section. 
The philosophers Margalit and Raz (1990) proposed a 
connection between the feeling of belonging and national identity. 
Like Waldron (1996) in his definition of culture, Margalit and Raz 
observed that cultural membership has an ascriptive character, 
because it is a matter of belonging rather than of accomplishment: 
"qualification for [cultural] membership is usually determined by 
non-voluntary criteria. One cannot choose to belong. One belongs 
because of who one is" (Margalit & Raz 1990, 447). They go on to claim 
that, because of this, national culture is a primary source of a person's 
identity, as "[i]dentification is more secure, less liable to be 
threatened, if it does not depend on accomplishment" (Margalit & Raz 
1990, 447). Hence, national culture provides people with "an anchor 
for their self-identification and the safety of effortless secure 
belonging" (Margalit & Raz 1990, 448-449). 
The psychological literature seems to confirm the association 
between national identity and the feeling of belonging. In particular 
the research on social identities offers valuable insights. As noted by 
the psychologists Tajfel and Turner (1979, 2004), individuals not only 
view themselves as collections of traits and abilities but also define 
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themselves by the groups to which they belong, thus developing 
social kinds of identities. A social identity is defined as "that part of 
an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, 
255). Social identities involve multiple dimensions (Ashmore et al. 
2004), and their "emotional significance", to use Tajfel's terms, is one 
of the most important. I will not engage in a thorough discussion on 
the character and implications of the emotional component within 
social identities, instead I will only its relevance to a specific kind of 
social identity; the one provided by identifying with a national 
community, namely, the "national identity". 
National identification occurs when one perceives membership 
in a certain national community as relevant to one's overall identity 
(Rahn et al. 1996). Similar to other kinds of social identification, 
national identity does not merely involve a simple self-categorization, 
or perception of oneself as similar to the other members of the 
groups. Rather, studies have shown that, crucially, it includes the 
perception that the fate of the group overlap with one's own personal 
fate and an affiliative orientation towards the group.33 Because of 
these components, national identification has important affective 
consequences. Specifically, since the national identity "extends the 
self" (Rahn 2000, 132) beyond the individual, the individual becomes 
emotionally responsive to events and information that are relevant to 
the group (Smith 1993). According to Rahn (1996), these emotional 
responses constitute a "public mood", which she defines as a "diffuse 
affective state, having distinct positive and negative components that 
citizens experience because of their membership in a particular 
political community" (Rahn et al. 1996. 31).34 
In order to characterize the feeling of belonging associated 
with national identity, it is useful to differentiate this feeling from 
other forms of national feelings, such as nationalism or patriotism. 
Specifically, the latter two feelings include exclusively positive 
33 For a review of the studies examining the different dimensions of social identity 
and the measures employed to account for them, see Ashmore et al. 2004, 90-92.
34 Often, events in politics and sport make national identity salient. Examples are 
the death of the UK's Princess Diana in 1997, and Italy's victory in the 2006 World's 
cup, both of which affected the public mood, by evoking, respectively, collective 
feelings of sadness and joy.
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feelings for the national community and its symbols. In the case of 
nationalism, it also comprises a belief in the superiority of one's own 
nation compared to others. Conversely, the notion of national identity 
is not exclusively positive. The feelings associated with national 
identity may also include negative emotions, such as disappointment 
or shame, if a nation is judged to behave in a reprehensible way 
(Rahn 2000). Moreover, whereas nationalism and patriotism center on 
beliefs about the specific cultural traits that make up a certain 
national identity (e.g. what being an American amounts to), national 
identity is about the significance that the individual invests in 
membership (e.g. how important the fact that I am American is to 
who I am) (Rahn 2000, Jeong 2013)35 .
To conclude, drawing from the philosophical and 
psychological accounts of what I call the "feeling of belonging", this 
feeling can be described as an affective state, associated with the 
perception of a particular national community, including its members 
and its characteristics, as part of one's own identity. The individual, 
who identifies as a member of a certain national community and who 
experiences the feeling of belonging associated with this 
identification, becomes emotionally attached to the cultural artefacts 
and traits that she perceives as characterizing her national 
community. In the following section, I will explain why the feeling of 
belonging to a national community is relevant. I will also show why 
attributing to it national culture's value as a source of identity, is 
more defensible than attributing it to particular cultural traits or to a 
context of choice. 
2.4 Feeling of belonging and national identity
35 In his study, Jeong (2013) shows that nationalism and national identity have a 
different impact on the formation of attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, 
while nationalism correlates with greater resistance to immigrants, national identity 
does not. Jong speculates that the reason might be that nationalism puts emphasis 
on some specific cultural traits, which immigrants do not possess, while national 
identity does not. Consequently, people who endorse nationalism may be 
concerned about maintaining these traits unaltered, and therefore support 
immigrants' exclusion, whereas people who have a sense of national identity may 
not be concerned about this. These results suggest that the concern underlying the 
preservation of a national identity, may not be the conservation of some specific 
cultural traits. What I suggest (in Section 2.4), is that this concern is actually about 
the preservation of a feeling of belonging.
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Social identities are relevant because they serve important 
psychological functions for the person and, in particular, they meet 
the basic and fundamental need to belong, which Baumeister and 
Leary (1995) identified as a distinctive feature of humans. According 
to Ashmore and colleagues (2001), people manifest this need for 
attachment to important reference groups, in their tendency to 
develop affective ties to even the symbols representing these groups, 
such as flags, land, cities, buildings, etc. The key to understanding 
what national identity's value truly entails, as a source of identity, is to 
reflect on how the national type of identification meets this need to 
belong. As with other forms of identification, national identity offers 
"a place in the social world" (Simon and Klandermans 2001). 
However, the type of social world, which the national community 
defines, is particularly relevant to the individual. This is because the 
feeling of belonging to the national community can contribute to an 
individual's identity in a more crucial manner than other forms of 
social identification. I will illustrate this in the following section.
The classical literature on nationalism has largely engaged with 
the argument that "a sense of national identity provides a powerful 
means of defining and locating (...) divided and disorientated 
individuals who (...) contend with the (...) uncertainties of the modern 
world" (Smith 1991, 17). Recent approaches have provided a more 
precise characterization, showing how the feeling of belonging to a 
national community is particularly important because it is grounded 
in people's everyday lives and underpins access to key psycho-social 
resources. Specifically, although the increased mobility of the 
contemporary era has led many to dismiss the concept of national 
identity as historically obsolete and politically questionable (Wimmer 
and Glick Schiller 2002), others have noted that social and political 
life remain largely structured by discourses, practices, and 
institutions that are articulated on a national scale (Antonsich and 
Matejskova 2015). This articulation is not abstract, but is materially 
embedded in people's lives "through the management of the physical 
environment, the consistent patterning of socio-spatial relations and a 
range of recurring material/symbolic features" (Skey 2013, 88). Skey 
(2013), drawing from a number of authors, points out how all these 
aspects form a frame of reference, which generates a more or less 
consistent sense of reality, and which enables individuals to manage 
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their daily lives and to connect with others. Since the collectivity 
embedded in the nation, informs and defines so many relevant 
aspects of the individual's life, a feeling of belonging to this 
collectivity emerges as particularly crucial for the individual's identity 
and her need to belong. 
Attributing national culture's value as a source of identity to its 
capacity to provide a feeling of belonging avoids the problems 
connected with the aforementioned other characterizations of such 
value. Specifically, locating culture's value for identity in the 
provisioning of a context of choice does not explain what is valuable 
about a particular culture; however, locating that same value in the 
feeling of belonging does. This is because people cannot feel that 
they belong to just any kind of culture. It is their identification with a 
particular culture, with its characteristics and its members, that 
provides them with a feeling of belonging. This does not entail, 
however, that the feeling of belonging depends on the distinctiveness 
of certain cultural traits. One critique of my proposal, on this ground, 
may be the following. 
 In the end, a feeling of belonging has to have a connection to 
a certain representation of the national community and its cultural 
characteristics. Anderson (1991), pointed out that this representation 
is only "imagined", as it originates from a picture of national culture 
that is offered by the media. Miller (2005) also highlighted how the 
national media, in order to stir national feelings in the members of 
the community, sustain the collective imagination of the national 
culture as continuous and distinct, making up for the contingencies 
and the discontinuities that characterize its actual development and 
configuration (Miller 2005, 31-35). If the feeling of belonging, which I 
claim is central to national culture's value as a source of identity, 
depends on this fictitious representation, then the essentialist critique 
can undermine it, in the same way as it undermines the assumption 
of characteristic cultural traits. As it is misguided to attribute national 
culture's value as a source of identity to some specific cultural traits, 
because once cannot identify those traits, likewise, it is misguided to 
attribute national culture's value as a source of identity to the feeling 
of belonging, because it depends on a fictitious representation. 
Although people clearly base part of the importance they attach to 
their national identity on their view of what characterizes their 
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national community, and mediated information further conditions 
this view, I argue that the distinctiveness of this content is not a 
determinant in prompting the feeling of belonging associated with 
national identity. I ground my claim in the empirical evidence 
presented by particular studies on social identification. 
In these studies, researchers allocated individuals to different 
groups using trivial and arbitrary criteria, such as their estimation of 
the number of dots on a page, their preference for Kandinsky or Klee, 
or according to the flip of a coin.36 The results consistently showed 
that these types of categorization were enough to prompt the 
individual's preference for their in-group over the out-group. This 
was bore out in terms of their evaluation, liking, and allocation of 
resources, as well as in estimations of inter-category differences and 
intra-category homogeneity.37 Further experiments confirmed that 
this type of behavior was not due to expected reciprocity or 
familiarity. Rather, according to social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner 1994), it was a psychological consequence of knowing that one 
belongs to a particular social group. Specifically, social identity theory 
postulates that individuals strive to obtain a positive sense of the self 
from their social identities and, therefore, they construct more 
favorable representations of the in-group members, as distinct from 
the out- group. Here, I will not engage in a thorough assessment of 
social identity theory. Instead I will outline what the aforementioned 
experimental evidence seems to suggest as concerns the national type 
of identification and the feeling of belonging associated with it.
In these studies, the group members' behavior reflected how 
they identified themselves as members of their allocated group and 
how they experienced feelings of belonging to it. Indeed, if they had 
not identified with the group by internalizing the group membership 
as part of their self-concept, such behavior would not have occurred 
(Tajfel & Turner 1979). Given the triviality of the allocation criteria for 
the groups, it seems that the content of these criteria was not the 
decisive factor for the identification, the feeling of belonging, and the 
associated behavior to arise. Applying these considerations to the 
identification with a national community, seems to suggest that it is 
36 For a review of the studies on social categorization criteria, see Diehl (1990).
37 For a review of the methods for triggering these intra and inter-group effects, see 
Pinter & Greenwald (2011).
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not necessary to hold a picture of one's national culture as rich and 
coherent, or as characterized by relevant characteristics, to prompt 
the individual's identification as a member of the community and the 
feeling of belonging associated with it. Rather, the feeling of 
belonging may be evoked, even in the absence of such a picture. As I 
will discuss later, other factors may be important for evoking the 
feeling of belonging, but the specificity of certain cultural traits does 
not seem to be one of them. Therefore, characterizing national 
culture's value for identity as providing a feeling of belonging can 
avoid the essentialist critique.38 
Having illustrated how the feeling of belonging to a national 
community is important for an individual's identity, and how it does 
not depend on peculiar cultural traits, my claim is that national 
culture's value for identity consists specifically of providing the 
individual with this feeling of belonging. Common attitudes about 
cultural preservation, especially those within small cohesive 
communities, seem to deny that the national identity's value actually 
consists of this feeling, rather preferring the preservation of certain 
cultural traditions, conventions, and "ways of life". As mentioned 
earlier, these elements are indeed what give a culture its form: people 
are attached to them and consider them valuable. However, although 
a culture, including a national one, does take the form of particular 
shared "ways of life", and people do care about their preservation, I 
claim that the distinctiveness of these elements is not what 
constitutes national culture's value for identity.
An analogy might help to make sense of this point, at least in 
part. Suppose that I am fond of a teddy bear that my mother gave me 
when I was little. If I lose it, I will miss it; not because of its 
characteristics (e.g. the old fur, the loose eye, etc.), but because it 
represents the loving relationship with my mother. In other words, its 
value does not lie in its physical characteristics but in what it 
represents. These characteristics could be different, and they could 
change over time, but this would not really matter to its value, as its 
value is independent of these specific characteristics. Of course, given 
my attachment to the teddy bear, I would recognize it anywhere, and 
I would not like it, if my daughter painted its face or sewed buttons 
38 I further discuss the findings of social categorization and their implications for 
the feeling of belonging as the core of national identity in Section 4.
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onto its ears. However, despite disliking these changes, I would not 
say that the teddy bear meant less to me because of them. 
The points of analogy that this example offers as concerns the 
national identity's value are the following. People are attached to the 
specific forms that their national culture takes; however, their 
attachment does not originate from the particularity of these cultural 
expressions themselves, but rather from the feeling of belonging to 
the national community that includes these cultural expressions. The 
individual's attachment to a particular language, holiday, or 
architecture is not because their specific character is relevant to them, 
as such. They are attached because, by considering them as part of 
what they are, they feel that they belong. This fulfils their human 
need to belong, gives them a place in the social world, and ultimately 
contributes to the constitution of their identity in the important ways 
illustrated above. 
Politicians, especially those in the populist wings, often appeal 
to people's feelings concerning the perceived threat of immigrants' 
cultural diversity, and they emphasize that people's feelings matter. 
Indeed, people's feelings do matter because, although they are more 
or less grounded in reality, they have tangible consequences.39 
However, if political discourse appeals to national identity's value, 
feelings of attachment to specific cultural traditions do not show, by 
themselves, that the national identity's value resides in these specific 
cultural traditions. People's attachments to them are legitimate and 
their fear of what they perceive as a threat to them is understandable. 
However, the fact that people are attached to their particular cultural 
traits does not imply that these traits play the role they perceive, in 
the constitution of their identities. I argue that changes in these traits 
(which immigrant might bring about, among other causes) would not 
alter, by themselves, the value that national culture holds for the 
identity of the members of the national community. As mentioned 
earlier, the reason is that this value does not depend on the 
preservation of specific cultural traits, but comes from a feeling of 
39 Margalit and Raz (1990) described this thus: "To a considerable extent, what 
matters is how well people feel in their environment: Do they feel at home in it or 
are they alienated from it? Do they feel respected or humiliated? etc. This leads to a 
delicate balance between "objective" factors and subjective perceptions. (...) Even a 
group that is not persecuted may suffer many of the ills of real persecution if it feels 
persecuted" (Margalit and Raz 1990, 453-454).
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belonging that is independent of them. Having characterized the 
national identity's value in these terms, the question remains 
whether, and how, admitting immigrants with a different cultural 
background may threaten it. In order to answer this question, I will 
first clarify what type of value national identity is and what it means 
to respect it.
3.  What type of value is national culture?
According to the definition that was reported in the first section of 
this paper, the term culture encompasses many aspects of an 
individual's life, but especially those relative to the individual as a 
member of a community (and specifically a national community, in 
the case of national culture). Besides culture's comprising "a whole 
range of one's actions and relations with others" (Waldron 1996, 96), 
and "ways of life together" (Miller 1995, 26), a deeper sense exists in 
which one could say that culture concerns the individual as a member 
of a community. Researchers, such as Réaume (1988), Waldron (1993) 
and Taylor (1995), captured this, by characterizing culture as a 
"participatory", "communal", and "irreducibly social" good 
respectively. They used this terminology to illustrate that culture is a 
special kind of public good, as the individual cannot either realize its 
production or its enjoyment in isolation, but only together with 
others. Clean air, for instance, is a public good, because it needs a 
community to produce it. However, it is not a communal or 
participatory good, because it does not need a community to enjoy it. 
Each individual can breathe and enjoy the good of clean air, alone 
(Réaume 1988, 8). As with the example of clean air, a single individual 
cannot produce communal or participatory goods; however, unlike 
clean air, the individual cannot enjoy these goods, unless others enjoy 
them also. Waldron suggests an example of communal goods as the 
good of conviviality in a party: 
"A party is convivial when people derive benefit from the 
active enjoyment of one another's company, not when each of 
them sits around experiencing the pleasures of the evening – 
the food, the wine, the music – as purely personal enjoyment 
(...). Conviviality (...) is a communal good experienced as such 
by people only to the extent that they are participant members 
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of a group to which the benefit of the good accrues at a 
collective level" (Waldron 1993, 356) 
Waldron also included cultural features, such as traditions and 
languages, in the category of communal goods: 
"We can say that Welsh people, for example, do not benefit as 
individuals from the preservation of their language. Though 
each may get a warm glow of pride when he sees a road sign in 
Welsh, his own sense of that experience will refer immediately 
beyond itself to the fact that this is something whose nature 
and value make sense only on the assumption that others are 
enjoying and participating in it too" (Waldron 1993, 358) 
It is intuitive that a national culture cannot exist without a 
national community. However, the definition of culture as a social 
good also points out that the national community is what allows the 
realization of national culture as a value. National culture is valuable 
to the individual because the members of the national community 
participate in it. It follows that, if the community includes members 
that do not participate in the national culture, the value of the 
national culture is compromised. However, what does participating in 
the national culture actually mean here? The answer to this question 
carries important consequences for determining whether immigrants 
with a different cultural background can participate in the culture of 
the host community, and thus whether they can actually "dilute" 
national culture's value of as a source of identity. 
Participating in a culture may be intended as displaying its 
characteristic traits, which are assumed to be common to its 
members, and which are assumed to be distinctive of the national 
community in question. For example, participating in the national 
culture may be intended as speaking a certain language, or 
celebrating certain national holidays, and so on. Since immigrants 
with different cultural backgrounds do not share these cultural traits 
(i.e. they do not speak the language, they do not celebrate the holiday, 
etc.,), they cannot participate in the culture. Therefore, given the 
communal character of the cultural membership's value, the presence 
of immigrants, within a community whose culture they do not share, 
may "dilute" the national identity's value. This idea of participation 
seems to be behind the defense of the cultural criterion: if 
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participation in a national culture is interpreted as displaying its 
characteristic traits, then immigrants that do not display them are not 
participating; therefore, they are undermining its value, thus 
justifying the cultural criterion. However, I argue that the cultural 
criterion can be dismissed by applying a more appropriate conception 
of participation in a culture.
Several authors have already pointed out that one cannot 
interpret a culture as a series of meaningful and representative 
objects, because even the most static culture is never made once and 
for all; rather, cultures are continually readapted and reaffirmed, as 
cultural objects change their salience and meaning (Poole 1999, 2). As 
Réaume noted, 
"A cultured society is not a set of artefacts – plays, paintings, 
films. The good (...) consists in participating in the production 
of those artefacts which constitute a cultured society. But there 
is no end product because, in a sense, these artefacts are never 
completed but are continuously reinterpreted and re- created 
by each generation" (Réaume 1988, 10-11) 
Similarly, Scheffler argued in favor of what he called 
"Heraclitean pluralism"; that is, the idea that "cultures are always in 
flux" (Scheffler 2007, 105), as change is necessary for a culture to 
survive. According to Scheffler, insulating a culture from external 
influences in order to keep it fixed will not accomplish cultural 
preservation. Instead, "the successful conservation of valued 
practices, ideals, and ways of life necessarily involves their extension, 
modification, and reinterpretation in changing circumstances" 
(Scheffler 2007, 109). 
The observations above highlight that one should conceive of 
culture as, to use Poole's expression, a process rather than a product 
(Poole 1999). Therefore, one might conceptualize participation in a 
culture more adequately, as consisting of contributing to the 
development of cultural traits and artefacts, rather than displaying 
them as they are in present. If one interprets participation in a culture 
in this sense, immigrants with a different cultural background can 
participate in the national culture. This is because, by taking part in 
the common life and interacting with the other members, they can 
give their contribution to the way in which the common culture 
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evolves, and to the shape that it takes. I argue that this conception of 
participation is more appropriate to the changing nature of culture 
itself, and does not justify the cultural criterion: by bringing their 
different cultural backgrounds to a particular national community, 
immigrants do not dilute the national culture but instead contribute 
to its development. 
To conclude, the participatory character of national culture 
means that national identity's value is preserved only through the 
national community's participation in that culture. Since 
participation in a culture does not entail the exhibition of specific 
cultural traits, immigrants with a different cultural background can 
participate and their differences do not, in principle, undermine its 
value. However, as Festenstein (2005) noted, the participatory 
character of national culture only refers to the kind of value that 
national culture is, and not to its content. Therefore, since here I 
consider the value of national culture as a source of identity, and I 
have characterized this value as providing a feeling of belonging, the 
participation of immigrants in respect to this content should be 
considered, in order to assess whether they undermine it or not. I will 
discuss this in the next section. 
4.  How do we preserve national identity's value as a source of 
identity?
In the previous two sections, I argued, first, that national culture's 
value as a source of identity consists in providing the members of the 
national community with a feeling of belonging; second, I argued that 
that national identity's value has a participatory character; namely, the 
participation of the members of the national community is what 
preserves it. It follows that, in the same way as the value of 
conviviality at a party is undermined, if the partygoers do not feel 
convivial, so the feeling of belonging, which makes national culture 
valuable as a source of identity, is compromised, if the community 
includes people who do not feel they belong. By the same measure, if 
immigrants with a different cultural background can participate in the 
culture of the host community, in principle, and do not necessarily 
undermine its value, then immigrants who do not share a feeling of 
belonging might, indeed, do that. 
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Therefore, what is it appropriate to do, in order to preserve 
national identity's value as a source of identity for the members of the 
national community? I argue that the answer is not to select 
immigrants based on their cultural background but rather to foster 
their feeling of belonging to the host community. If immigrants feel 
that they belong to the host community, then the value of the national 
culture for the identity of its members can be preserved. In the 
following section, I will examine some possible objections to my 
proposal, and I will elaborate on its content and implications. 
A first critique might be that people can develop a feeling of 
belonging only to the national culture they grew up in and, therefore, 
it would be impossible for immigrants to feel that they belonged to 
their host community. This critique assumes that national identity is a 
zero-sum game, in which identification with one national community 
reduces ties to others. However, research on international migration 
has refuted this assumption, by developing the concept of 
"transnational identity". The term indicates that the national identity 
of immigrants is not monolithic. Rather, immigrants' identities can 
absorb new elements from the host culture, while preserving old 
elements from the culture of origin through "the processes by which 
immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement" (Basch et al. 1994, 6). 
According to transnational theorists, immigrants can participate in 
familial, social, economic, religious, political, and cultural processes 
that extend across borders, while they become part of the 
communities that host them (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007). Given the 
contemporary era's increased mobility, some have questioned the 
concepts of national identity and the feeling of belonging to a 
national community; however, there is evidence that these new forms 
of mobility have enabled immigrants to create and maintain 
transnational connections, in terms of social spaces and forms of 
national belonging (Dahinden 2012).40 
A second point of criticism might target the feeling of 
belonging itself and its conditioning factors. I have drawn from the 
literature on social categorization to argue that the feeling of 
40 I will not go further into the temporal dimension of the process in this paper. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that immigrants' achievement of a stable 
feeling of belonging to a host community might require some time and, in some 
cases, possibly generations.
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belonging does not depend on the distinctiveness of cultural traits; 
however, I have not clarified what it depends on instead. A thorough 
examination of this issue falls beyond the scope of this paper, but I 
consider one factor decisive. Specifically, I suggest that the practices, 
which make up what I have identified as participation in a culture, 
might foster the feeling of belonging to a culture. In the previous 
section, I mentioned how immigrants can contribute to the host 
community's cultural development, by taking part in the common life 
and by interacting with the other members, thereby participating in it 
in the true sense. I believe that these forms of participation are 
exactly those that might foster a feeling of belonging. The work of 
scholars and experts in the field seems to confirm this. For example, 
Alison Phipps, UNESCO Chair Refugee Integration through 
Languages and the Arts, highlighted the impact of activities for 
refugees, such as plays or art projects in general, in which what was 
central was not speaking the language of the host community, or 
learning about its cultural value and traditions, but participating in 
the realization of a common project. These activities to took place in 
Glasgow and seemed to be very effective in fostering a sense of 
belonging to the Glasgow community in the refugees who were 
involved (Phipps 2017). A recommendation to the Council of Europe 
from Andrew Orton (2012) puts forward a similar message. Orton 
thoroughly illustrated the importance of promoting more and more 
positive interactions between immigrants and receiving societies, "as 
a means for building a greater sense of belonging for the individuals 
concerned" (Orton 2012, 9). He emphasized the necessity to design 
interaction processes "so that not only migrants but also those within 
receiving communities feel less threatened and more like they belong 
in their changing environment" (Orton 2012, 27).
My claim that participation is key to the development of a 
common feeling of belonging could provoke a third and a fourth 
objection to my proposal. The third objection might be that one 
cannot truly disregard cultural traits. If the feeling of belonging 
depends on participation, immigrants, who present cultural traits 
more similar to those characterizing the host community (e.g. 
language, religion, etc.), might participate more easily in its cultural 
life and, therefore, might find it easier to develop a feeling of 
belonging to it. It follows that the cultural criterion might still be 
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valid, even admitting that the core value of national identity lies in the 
feeling of belonging, rather than in the specific cultural traits. I 
suggest the following response to this objection. It is true that 
immigrants, who are less culturally similar to the members of the host 
community, might find it harder to feel that they belong to it. 
However, they can still develop a feeling of belonging through the 
many forms of participation and interaction, wherein cultural 
similarity plays only a minor role. This is especially true for the 
younger generations. In this respect, Orton emphasizes the necessity 
to give immigrants a diverse scope of opportunities for interactions, 
whether they are in the workplace, in their neighborhood, at school, 
in the hospital, or in the offices of the local administration etc., in 
order to prevent particular groups from being excluded from the 
interaction if they are unable to participate on one particular basis 
(e.g. a Muslim immigrant might not be able to join her German peers 
in the celebration of the Oktoberfest, which is based on drinking beer 
and eating pork knuckles).41
A fourth objection to my proposal concerns those immigrants 
who refuse to engage in the forms of participation that could foster 
their feeling of belonging to the host community. Miller (2016), among 
others, points out how immigrants might retreat into enclaves that are 
isolated from the rest of the community, because of their religious or 
linguistic differences. These immigrants might not participate in the 
public culture of the host society, nor would they engage in any kind 
of political interaction with those outside of their own circle. This 
could cause a "possible alienating effect of separate and exclusive 
cultural identities" (Miller 2016, 68). Establishing that national 
identity's value lies in a shared feeling of belonging, and that 
41 I would refer to Orton (2012, Section 3) for a more detailed description of how 
positive interactions between immigrants and receiving communities should look 
like, and for indications about their practical implementation. One point that I 
consider important is that the activities and the interactions that contribute to the 
building of a common feeling of belonging are those that involve working together 
on issues of common concern, and that focus on the individual's contribution to a 
"shared future", to use Orton's terminology. These kinds of interventions, I argue, 
are much more effective than those emphasizing the difference and the peculiarity 
of certain cultural characters, such as, for example, those fairs that involve 
immigrants' traditional music, food, art, and so on. Although these kinds of events 
might be pleasant and, although they might be organized with the intent to present 
the cultural diversity of immigrants as valuable and to promote integration, they 
might achieve the opposite, by reinforcing stereotypes, and by failing to show how 
immigrants, as individuals, might be part of the social fabric in a significant way.
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immigrants who do not participate in the host society's culture might 
not develop this feeling, leads to the potential conclusion that these 
immigrants might jeopardize the national identity's value as a source 
of identity for the members of the community. Therefore, would it be 
legitimate to exclude them? Answering this question would require 
touching on the third premise of the cultural argument, i.e., whether 
a nation can legitimately exclude immigrants in order to preserve the 
members of the national community's feelings of belonging. I will not 
address this point directly, as it lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
but I will propose a few considerations concerning it.
My characterization of the forms of participation that can foster 
a feeling of belonging is deliberately broad. It is possible that 
immigrants, who live in cultural enclaves, might have no interest in 
developing feelings of belonging to the host community, and may live 
in an isolated manner. However, by virtue of their living in the host 
country, they will be obliged to engage in at least some interactions, 
albeit slight, with the other members of the national community. 
These minimal interactions might be a starting point, and they do not 
necessarily have to entail an eagerness to join the local culture, in 
order to initiate the development of a feeling of belonging. Moreover, 
as mentioned above, I consider participation as a decisive factor for 
fostering a feeling of belonging in immigrants, but it is not the only 
one,42 and different factors might exert their influence at different 
times. Concerns about immigrants' cultural enclaves are often an 
expression of the so-called "participation paradox" (Klarenbeek and 
Weide 2019): on the one hand, the active participation of migrants in 
the host society is considered necessary for their integration; on the 
other hand, the presence of immigrants with a different cultural 
background is feared because of the alleged "illiberal threats" that 
they pose. Thus, worries about cultural enclaves often go hand-in-
hand with proposals to impose conditions for what counts as good, 
integrative participation. Apart from being potentially discriminatory, 
these proposals stem from a view that sees participation in a culture 
as the display of certain characteristics, and the previous section 
showed this perspective to be inadequate.
42 Citizenship, for instance, has been associated with increased host national 
belonging, in countries where the host population attaches great importance to 
citizenship as a mark of national membership (Simonsen 2017).
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One final objection could be that the aforementioned 
experiments on social categorization do not actually support my 
conclusion. After considering the triviality of the criteria for 
allocating the test groups and the consequent behavior of the groups' 
members, I stated that the specificity of cultural traits is not what is 
relevant to engendering a feeling of belonging. However, studies did 
show that even such trivial criteria were sufficient to prompt one 
group's members to perceive that their group was different from, and 
better than, another group. This may indicate that the act of 
identifying with a group unavoidably implies the discrimination of 
others, even if the most of trivial differences separate them. This 
would make the possibility of a more inclusive notion of national 
identity, based on the feeling of belonging, utopian, at least. However, 
before dismissing my proposal for this reason, the following 
considerations should be taken into account. Even if it is true that 
humans have a tendency to discriminate others, as part of the 
constructing the groups to which they belong, this does not take away 
their capacity to reflect on the reasons for their discriminatory 
behavior or (at least, try) to counteract this tendency. What my 
proposal intends to suggest is precisely that cultural homogeneity is 
not necessary to preserve the national identity's value. Grounding the 
national identity's value in the feeling of belonging might still be 
discriminatory, but it advances an account of national identity that is 
much more inclusive than one based on the cultural criterion. 
Moreover, the idea of protecting national identity by fostering a 
feeling of belonging has not yet been translated, at least to my 
knowledge, in concrete institutional and political attempts. These 
attempts would be necessary before dismissing my proposal as 
utopian.
Conclusion
In this paper, I attempted to determine whether it is effective to select 
immigrants based on their cultural background, in order to protect 
the national culture's value as a source of identity. To do this, I 
answered two questions. The first was whether, and how, national 
culture can truly be a source of identity. I argued that national culture 
is indeed valuable to the identity of the national community's 
members; not because it provides them with characteristic cultural 
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traits or with a "context of choice", but because it offers them a 
feeling of belonging. Having determined what constitutes national 
culture's value as a source of identity, I then assessed whether, and 
how, immigrants with a different cultural background might threaten 
it. Given that national identity's value has a participatory character, I 
argued that it might be compromised when the members of the 
national community did not share its content, that is, when they did 
not share a feeling of belonging to the community. Therefore, I 
concluded that if the intention is to protect the national culture's 
value as a source of identity, it is more appropriate to foster 
immigrants' feelings of belonging to their host community than to 
select them based on their cultural backgrounds.
Other objections, besides those that I have addressed, might 
be raised against my proposal. Moreover, a complete assessment of 
the cultural criterion would require a determination of what a nation 
can, and cannot, legitimately do concerning the selection of 
immigrants. I have not covered this question in this paper. Instead I 
have focused on the national culture's value for identity and 
immigrant's potential to threaten it. For this reason, my contribution 
is not intended to provide a definitive answer to the question of the 
cultural criterion's legitimacy, but only to add a few elements to reach 
a more thorough and informed examination of the problem. These 
elements include the suggestion that respecting the national identity's 
value does not entail keeping things as they are, but rather keeping 
what is valuable about them, and that creating more favorable 
attitudes towards immigration may require a reimagining of the role 
of national feelings.
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Summary and general conclusion
The objective of this thesis was to show that emotions have an 
epistemic value, that is, they can give a positive, distinctive, and even 
essential contribution to certain epistemic processes within particular 
domains. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the contribution of 
emotions to the acquisition of knowledge, and to the processes of 
understanding, argumentation and reasoning; the domains that the 
thesis considers are the political context, the narrative setting and 
specific ethical issues, such as the selection of immigrants on a 
cultural basis. In the four papers that make up this dissertation, four 
particular questions about the epistemic value of emotions have been 
addressed:
1) What kind of knowledge can emotions provide to make citizens 
more politically sophisticated? 
2) What part do feeling and inferring emotions play in the readers' 
understanding of literary narratives?
3) Are the arguments presenting emotional appeals necessarily 
manipulative, or can they be epistemically beneficial?
4) How can the feeling of belonging ground the value of national 
identity, and how can it affect reasoning about immigration 
policies?
As for the first question, it is addressed in the first chapter. In 
this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political 
facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge 
about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an 
epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I 
argue that, although emotions in themselves are not sufficient to 
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ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so 
within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those 
facts. With regards to the political part, I argue that the contribution 
of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political facts, is indeed 
politically valuable. To develop my argument, I first show that an 
evaluative kind of knowledge is relevant for reaching a sophisticated 
level of political cognition. Second, I show that emotions contribute 
distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I conclude that, when 
emotional experiences towards political events are coupled with an 
adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can ground a 
distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such 
knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political 
perspective.
In the second paper, I show how emotions contribute to the 
understanding of literary narratives. Narrative understanding depends 
on the connection between the elements within a narrative, but 
previous philosophical solutions that explain the contribution of 
emotions to this connection seem to be inadequate. I develop a more 
plausible account, by drawing insights from empirical literature, and 
by applying an enactivist account of emotions. I argue that the reader 
responds to emotional affordances in the text, and that by feeling or 
inferring emotions, she processes subsequent elements in the 
narrative in respect to the anticipation afforded by previous elements. 
I conclude that this is the way in which emotions intervene to 
connect the elements within a narrative, thus contributing to 
narrative understanding.
The third paper concerns again the political context and 
tackles the topic of emotional appeals. The traditional view holds that 
appeals to emotions in politics are harmful, because they exert a 
manipulative function, by undermining rational reasoning. In this 
paper, I propose a novel account of emotional appeals: specifically, I 
distinguish persuasive from propagandistic appeals, and I attribute 
the manipulative character of the latter to the impact that they have 
on the agent's emotional processing of political objects. I argue that 
both kinds of appeals put forward evaluative kinds of arguments, and 
the emotions that they elicit make salient certain goals/values. 
However, whereas persuasive appeals promote the assessment and 
coherent integration of these goals/values with the agent's further 
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values and appropriate beliefs, propagandistic appeals do not do so. 
In virtue of this epistemic distinction, I argue, persuasive emotional 
appeals can give a positive contribution to the agent's political 
sophistication, whereas propagandistic ones can only undermine it.
Finally, the fourth paper addresses a particular issue with 
political and ethical relevance, namely, the "cultural criterion". This is 
the idea that immigrants should be selected for admission on the 
basis of their cultural background, in order to preserve a country's 
national identity. To assess the cultural criterion, I determine what 
constitutes national culture's value as a source of identity, and then 
examine what it entails to respect it. I show that the value of national 
identity resides in providing a feeling of belonging and that this value 
has a participatory character. In light of this, I claim that immigrants 
do not threaten the national identity, when they do not share cultural 
traits similar to those of the host community, but may threaten it, 
when they do not share a feeling of belonging to it. For this reason, I 
conclude that, in order to protect the national culture's value as a 
source of identity, it is more appropriate to foster immigrants' 
feelings of belonging to the host community, than to select them 
based on their cultural backgrounds.
Despite addressing different topics, these four papers all 
illustrate instances of the epistemic value of emotions. The guiding 
concern of this thesis has been to characterize the place of emotional 
experiences within epistemic processes, and to do so in a way that is 
compatible with empirical evidence, and that gives emotional 
experiences a significant and favorable role. The diversity of the 
contexts that are touched upon, is indicative of the many dimensions 
that are affected by the emotions and by their epistemic functions. 
Clearly, the collection presented here does not exhaust the ways and 
the places in which emotions can be epistemically relevant. Rather, 
the contribution of this thesis is intended as an addition to the 
increasing body of research about the epistemic role of emotions, and 
as an indication of how considering this role is relevant not only to 
the philosophy of emotions, but to a number of other domains as 
well.
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